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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 national-
level contextual factors matter in different ways for individuals in EU member states 
when assessing support for the EU. Individuals hypothesise that EU member states 
economic affluence and quality of governance creates the salience of issues. This 
influences the criteria adopted by them when determining attitudinal factors towards 
the EU. When applied to individuals in less affluent EU member states individuals 
evaluate the EU on the basis of economic prospects, while in more affluent EU 
member states individuals rely on political criteria to evaluate the EU. In the least 
affluent EU member states individuals generalise their perceptions of national and 
personal economic conditions to the EU level believing that the EU does not represent 
their economic interests. In the most affluent EU member states individuals are 
equally critical of the EU but centre their judgements on the comparative quality of 
national governments and EU institutions. For individuals the assumption remains 
that further EU expansion implies continued market liberalisation. However since the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis what individuals regard as excessive 
inequality may have little to do with inequality per se but whether the liberal-market 
economy as a whole provides high living standards and dynamic economic 
development. Inequality as a macro-political and economic determinant bridges the 
gap between economic and political systems at the national and EU level. Using data 
from European Election Study (EES) 2009 and Standard Eurobarometer data from 
2009-2013 this inquiry examines individual-level effects on perceptions of inequality 
and how this plays a significant role when analysing mass public opinion support for 
the EU. By using a Binary Logit Regression model, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Multiple Regression analysis and Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) the analysis 
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demonstrates two predominant findings. Firstly, individuals believe that the EU has a 
positive role to play in addressing inequality since the onset of the economic crisis. 
Secondly, the role to be played by the EU in addressing inequality supersedes that of 
the EU member statesÕ governments and reinforces support for the European 
integration project. Overall, this demonstrates that individuals in the EU believe that 
the EU is best placed to address market-generated inequality since the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 and as a result this produces increased support 
for the EU. These findings demonstrate a strong case for the inclusion of inequality as 
a determinant of mass public opinion support for the EU since the economic and 
financial crisis began in 2007/8.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Introduction  
Since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 national-
level contextual factors matter in different ways for individuals in EU member states 
when assessing support for the EU. The crisis has demonstrated that there are a larger 
proportion of individuals in the EU who may not be objectively ÔpoorÕ but perceive 
themselves to be at an increased risk of economic hardship due to the economic 
problems in both their member state and the EU. This chapter introduces the rationale 
for selecting the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 as the salient 
moment to examine individualsÕ perceptions of inequality and how this in turn affects 
individual-level support for the EU. This chapter outlines the context of the beginning 
of the economic and financial crisis in 2007/8 and how the crisis is important in 
selecting inequality as a determinant of mass public opinion support for the EU. The 
chapter gives a brief introduction to individual-levels of support for the EU as well as 
theoretically grounding inequality within the debate about mass public opinion and 
support for the EU. The chapter also highlights the justification for the cross-national 
and single case study and the methodological contribution of this inquiry.  
1.2: Basis and Rationale for this Research  
The beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 has 
demonstrated that there are a larger proportion of individuals in the EU who may not 
be objectively ÔpoorÕ but perceive themselves to be at an increased risk of economic 
hardship due to the economic problems in both their member state and the EU. 
Therefore, the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8 is used in this inquiry as the 
salient moment to activate citizensÕ concerns about overall economic performance 
suggesting that there are more individuals if not actually doing worse economically, 
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feeling or perceiving as if they are achieving less economically. This subsequently has 
an effect toward individual-level support for the EU, as these evaluations are not only 
economic but also socio-tropic. As a result, it is possible to assess the liberal market 
economy via the spectrum of inequality highlighting that the market may in fact be 
too unfair. This makes inequality representative at the individual-level as individuals 
begin to assess societal opportunities in terms of access and opportunity to the EU in 
turn creating inequality as a determinant for support for the EU. In this inquiry the 
analysis of inequality as a determinant of EU support is founded upon a value-based 
position that reflects individualsÕ support for democratic institutions to serve as an 
arbiter of market-generated inequality.  
In order to demonstrate that this measure of inequality is not a proxy for other 
value-based positions and can therefore be independently predictive of support for the 
EU, an analysis of how inequality is correlated with both ideological and socio-
economic positions (i.e. variables that focus upon instrumental self-interest, social and 
economic status, social location and political institutions and the market) is 
conducted. The on-going economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 is used as the salient 
moment to activate individualsÕ concerns about overall economic performance 
highlighting that there are an increased number of individuals who may not be 
actually doing worse economically but perceiving or feeling as if they are achieving 
less economically.  This in turn affects their views on support for the EU.  
The majority of research on mass public opinion has resulted in understanding 
individual-level support for the EU either in terms of personal and aggregate 
economic growth, which in turn produces higher support for the EU project or how 
individuals within the EU are becoming more critical of the EU project which 
produces reduced support for the EU. This inquiry broadens these existing findings of 
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mass public opinion research to argue that since the onset of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8 individualsÕ attitudes towards inequality, and the belief that 
inequality should be addressed, is a noteworthy and innovative way to examine 
individual-level support for the EU.  
1.3: Why the Beginning of the Economic and Financial Crisis of 2007/8? 
The economic and financial crisis of 2007/08 unfolded in three broad stages. 
The first stage started in the United States in early 2007 when the housing bubble 
burst resulting in an increase in mortgage defaults in particular by those individuals 
defaulting on subprime mortgages1, which had been extended in vast quantities to 
creditworthy borrowers. These mortgage defaults increasingly affected the stability of 
financial institutions as a result of their exposure to these subprime mortgages, as well 
as financial products that were attached to these mortgages (Helleiner 2011, p. 69).  
This in turn produced the second stage in the economic and financial crisis as 
hedge funds collapsed in the summer of 2007. There were also increasing concerns 
about the exposure of financial institutions in both the United States and in Europe 
that had invested substantially in mortgage-related financial products. The crisis 
deepened in spring 2008 when the US investment bank Bear Sterns received a 
financial rescue package from the US government. This resulted in a collapse of 
market confidence, which was evidenced by two mortgage lending agencies Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac being placed into conservatorship. By September 2008 the US 
investment bank Lehman Brothers was forced into bankruptcy while the worldÕs 
                                                              
1 Subprime mortgage lending allowed loans to be available to those individuals who had difficulty in 
maintaining a repayment schedule. The loans were hallmarked by higher interest rates, poor quality 
collateral and less favourable terms in relation to the mortgage in order to compensate for the higher 
risk in lending. These subprime loans were backed by mortgage-backed securities, which defaulted and 
thus contributed to the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
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largest insurance company American International Group (AIG) was nationalised by 
the US government.  
This then led to the third stage in the onset of the economic and financial crisis 
and the most significant for Europe as banks in both the United States and Europe 
reduced their international loans. This reduction in international loans triggered severe 
financial problems and debt crises in countries that had been borrowing heavily from 
abroad (Helleiner 2011, p. 69). Financial contagion was experienced in particular in 
countries whose financial systems were vulnerable as a result of home-grown housing 
bubbles combined with large current accounts deficits. Within the EU, the UK, 
Greece, Ireland and Spain were beginning to experience the risk and insecurity of the 
liberal market economy coupled with the economic and financial crisis as cross-
border financial flows dried up in late 2008 with investors repatriating funds to 
domestic markets and reassessing their international exposure levels (Milesi-Ferretti 
& Tille 2011). As a result of this process, the crisis disproportionately affected 
countries with a significant reliance on external funding, in particular short-term debt 
markets. Within the Eurozone, the Irish banking systemÕs high reliance on 
international short-term funding prompted the Irish government to provide an 
extensive two-year liability to guarantee its banks (i.e. the Irish Bank Guarantee 
Scheme) in September 2008 (Honohan, 2010; Lane, 2011).   
During this period within the EU, the end of the credit boom was particularly 
troubling for Ireland and Spain, as the construction sectors in these countries had 
grown rapidly. The decline experienced in the construction sectors in both countries 
was a significant shock to domestic economic activity while abandoned construction 
projects and falling property prices indicated significant prospective losses for banks 
which had conducted too many property-backed loans (Lane, 2012, p. 55). In late 
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2009, the economic and financial crisis in the EU entered a new phase with fiscal 
revenues in Ireland and Spain falling much more rapidly than GDP as a consequence 
of the high sensitivity of tax revenues to declines in construction and asset prices 
(Lane, 2012, p. 56). In conjunction with this was the scale of the recession and 
increasing estimates of prospective banking-sector losses on bad loans since investors 
recognised that a deteriorating banking sector posed increased fiscal risks (Mody & 
Sandri, 2012).  
However, for the EU it was at the end of 2009 when the newly elected Greek 
government announced a revised budget deficit forecast which sent shockwaves 
among the member states of the EU. The Greek government announced a budget 
deficit forecast of 12.7 per cent of GDP, which was more than double the previous 
estimate of 6 per cent (Gibson, Hall & Tavlas 2012; Lane 2012). As a result of this 
budget deficit revelation many within the EU placed the blame on GreeceÕs fiscal 
irresponsibility and indeed on the fiscal irresponsibility of the peripheral member 
states of the EU (Lane 2012 p. 56).  This subsequently shaped the narrative for the 
economic and financial crisis in the EU.  
In order to link the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 
and inequality to support for the EU, this research makes a connection between 
individualsÕ concerns about inequality to changes in individuals level of support for 
the EU through the relationship inequality has to both democratic political institutions 
and the liberal market economy.  The perception that there has been an improvement 
or deterioration in an individualÕs socio-economic well-being can be an effective 
determinant of an individualÕs support for the EU project.   
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1.4: Mass Public Opinion and Support for the European Union  
There is a diverse and substantive literature which aims to explain mass public 
opinion attitudes and support for the EU. This literature is extensively analysed for 
both of the cross-national case studies of the twenty-seven member states2 of the EU 
and the single case study of the Republic of Ireland in chapter two of this inquiry. 
Determinants of support for the EU include social location (Inglehart, 1970; 
Anderson & Reichert 1995; We§els, 1995; Inglehart 1997; Gabel 1998a; Hooghe et 
al, 2007), social and economic status (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998a & 1998b; 
Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Gabel & Whitten, 1997), national versus European 
identities (Moravcsik, 1993; Franklin & Wlezien, 1997; de Winter & Swyngedouw, 
1999; Scheuer, 1999; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Cederman, 2001; Carey 2002; 
McClaren, 2002; Kritzinger, 2003; De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Schmitt, 2005; 
De Vries & Van Kersbergen, 2007; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2008) and evaluations 
of institutional performance (Janssen, 1991; Franklin, Van der Eijk & Marsh, 1995; 
Anderson, 1998; Majone, 1998; Norris, 1999; Schmitt & Thommassen, 1999; 
Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002; Rohrschneider, 2002; Crombez, 2003; Ray, 
2003a; Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010). 
Mass public opinion support for the EU has also been examined through the 
lens of political intermediaries such as elites (Dalton 1985; Franklin, Marsh, & 
McClaren, 1995; Weβels, 1995; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997; Anderson 1998; Gabel 
1998a, Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Schmitt & Thomassen, 2000; Carrubba, 2001; 
De Vreese, 2002; Hooghe, 2003), political parties (Mair 1990; Katz & Mair, 1994; 
                                                              
2 On 1st July 2013, Croatia joined the EU and there are now 28 Member States. For the purpose of this 
analysis, 27 EU Member States were examined: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, (Republic of) Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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Franklin, Marsh & McClaren, 1994; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996; Taggart, 1998; 
Van der Brug & Van der Eijk, 1999; Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 
2002; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2003; Ray 2003a & 2003b; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 
Hooghe & Marks 2006; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards, 2006) and mass media 
(Meyer 1999; Anderson & McLeod 2004; De Vreese et al 2006; De Vreese & 
Boomgaarden 2006).  
The initial individual-level models on mass public opinion support for the EU 
were constructed according to a utilitarian approach, which hypothesised that 
individuals assess EU membership based on their social position, assessment of their 
own economic experience and expectations of their member statesÕ market economy. 
As a consequence of this utilitarianism there are ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ of European 
integration (Gabel 1995; 1997; 1998a & 1998b). The ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ thesis 
demonstrates that individuals with high socio-economic status and low socio-
economic status regard the EU in a different manner. The ÔwinnersÕ consider the EU 
as the expansion of the liberal market economy and thus as a source of opportunities, 
while the ÔlosersÕ view the EU in terms of diminishing welfare as a result of declining 
patterns of national-level redistribution within the expanded liberal market economy 
(Gabel, 1998a & 1998b; Brinegar & Jolly, 2005).  
Given the findings of the ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ thesis and by using the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 as the salient moment to 
contextualise and activate citizensÕ concerns about overall economic performance, 
this inquiry expects resurgence in GabelÕs (1995, 1997; 1998a & 1998b) ÔwinnersÕ 
and ÔlosersÕ thesis. Overall, the inquiry posits that the beginning of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8, and continuing economic recession in Europe has created a 
new group of ÔlosersÕ in the EU project. This new group of ÔlosersÕ continues to be 
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socio-economically secure but it now includes those individuals who perceive 
themselves to be pushed closer to the economic edge of ÔlosingÕ. Put simply, there are 
more individuals in the EU who are, if not actually doing worse economically, then at 
least feeling or perceiving as if they are achieving less economically. This 
subsequently has an affect upon support for the EU.  
1.5: The Role of Inequality  
IndividualsÕ perceptions of feeling as if they are achieving less economically 
since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 mirrors with the 
Revisionist School within welfare state research which focuses upon political 
cleavages based on risk exposure (Baldwin 1990; Iversen & Soskice 2001; Moene & 
Wallerstein 2001; Swenson 2002; Mares 2003; Cusack, Iverson & Rehm 2006). For 
the Revisionist School, social insurance programmes are desirable for those 
individuals with low incomes but also those individuals facing higher economic risks. 
This creates the basis for cross-group coalitions (i.e. between the ÔwinnersÕ and the 
ÔlosersÕ of the EU project) in support of social protection as the Revisionist School is 
utilised as an alternative to arguments which emphasise the primacy of class position 
(Baldwin 1990, pp.20).  
The cross-group coalition between the different socio-economic groups of 
ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ shapes preferences for redistribution and in turn produces a 
renewed role for the nation state. This renewed role of the nation state creates the 
expectation that both socio-economic status and social location as an indicator of 
economic security would preserve or increase its strength as a determinant of support 
for the EU project. As Gabel (1998a & 1998b) states, the effect of socio-economic 
status and social location is based upon the fact that the EU is being regarded as a 
guarantor of economic growth (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2006; Tucker et al 2002; 
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Loveless 2010) whereby individuals are able to determine what continued European 
integration means to them as either ÔwinnersÕ or ÔlosersÕ of the EU project.   
However, it is fundamental to this inquiry that ÔlosingÕ is not necessarily 
restricted to variations in individual income. It is the distribution of the goods of 
society which may have placed individuals in a more fragile economic state or has 
made these individuals feel or perceive that they are in a more precarious economic 
state. The variations in how individuals benefit from and share in aggregate economic 
growth or in how those alterations in growth are distributed can be reflected in 
individualsÕ concerns about inequality. Individuals may not be ÔpoorÕ or ÔlosersÕ in a 
stringent economic definition but they may indeed perceive to be closer to such a 
position since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
The perception that an individual is not apportioned the ÔfairÕ benefits of 
society are likely to affect how individuals think about the current political and 
economic status of both the EU and their member state. Therefore inequality in this 
inquiry is viewed via the distribution of economic growth and the changes in the 
distribution of economic growth which in turn aids in examining individual-level 
support for the EU and individualsÕ actual socio-economic status and social location. 
The perception that there has been an improvement or deterioration in an individualÕs 
socio-economic well-being can be an effective determinant of an individualÕs support 
for the EU project.   
IndividualsÕ concerns about inequality are being closely examined in the 
emerging literature on social justice whereby individualsÕ perceptions of excessive 
inequality are to some extent driven by normative values of ÔfairnessÕ and ÔjusticeÕ in 
society (Kreidl 2000; Wegener 2000; Verwiebe & Wegener 2000; Osberg & 
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Smeeding 2006; Loveless & Whitefield 2011). This scholarly literature on social 
justice expresses views, which are not strictly egalitarian, thus diminishing GabelÕs 
(1998a; 1998b) thesis of pure ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ across the European integration 
project. It almost approves of the idea that individuals should accept inequality up to a 
point.  
These views are also closely associated with normative notions that 
democratic institutions in societies have an obligation to achieve fair and just 
outcomes for individuals. Given the view that democratic institutions are constructed 
to function in a roughly egalitarian or nominally majoritarian manner (Dahl, 1989), 
these institutions are the principal mechanism available for individuals to contend 
with the excessive and inevitable distortions of the liberal market economy (Bollen & 
Jackman 1985; Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996; Reuveny & Li 2003). These democratic 
institutions can be considered by individuals to provide protection from inequalities 
embedded within the liberal market economy as these institutions can function as 
impartial intermediaries of social insurance programmes, in turn reducing the effects 
of market-driven inequality in the EU.  
In order to relate this to support for the EU, this research makes a connection 
between individualsÕ concerns about inequality and changes in individualsÕ level of 
support for the EU, through the relationship inequality has to both democratic 
political institutions and the liberal market economy.  It is not posited that EU citizens 
want an alternative arrangement with political democracy and the liberal market 
market economy of the EU, but rather that EU citizens want democratic institutions 
and the liberal market economy to both function effectively (Rohrschneider & 
Whitefield, 2006). If an economy provides high living standards and vigorous 
economic development, individuals will often accept comparatively high-objective 
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levels of inequality (Jackman 1975; Bollen & Jackman 1985). This makes the balance 
between market-generated inequalities and effective democratic institutions a 
plausible connection to formulate because individuals in the EU will regard EU 
member states with strong, democratic political institutions as a safeguard against 
excessive inequalities (Bollen & Jackman 1985; Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny 
& Li 2003; Whitefield & Loveless 2013).  
With regards to the role of inequality, this inquiry proposes that given the 
ongoing economic and financial crisis, the EU can be primarily regarded as the 
guarantor of democracy that can combat market-driven inequalities. This will be 
apparent in individualsÕ support for the EU project and its continuation. In addition, 
individuals will consider the EU as the mechanism to enforce democratic responses to 
economic woes in the context of rising inequality. It is not unreasonable to make this 
connection between strong democratic responses and market inequalities. IndividualsÕ 
perceptions of excessive inequality do not create dislike or distrustfulness of 
democratic institutions, in fact, it is nearly always the opposite (Kaltenhaler et al. 
2008; Whitefield & Loveless 2013), corresponding to a long-standing body of 
literature in which it is demonstrated that individuals who exhibit dissatisfaction with 
the functioning of democracy want more, rather than less, democracy (Norris 1999; 
Dalton 2004). If effective democratic institutions are the remedy for inequality, this 
inquiry allows an examination of the changes in the level of support for the EU and a 
re-examination of the question as to whether the EU is regarded more for its 
democratic character than its liberal market economy character. 
1.6: Cross-National Case Study and Single Case Study  
As previously highlighted in this chapter the EU is often regarded as the 
economic instigator of the liberal market economies of Europe with scholarly research 
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on mass public opinion support for the EU producing findings that emphasise the 
notion that personal and aggregate economic growth produces higher support for the 
EU project. The rationale for the cross-national case study of the twenty-seven 
member states of the EU in order to analyse the role of inequality in determining 
individual-level support for the EU centres upon the beginning of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8.  
Since the onset of the crisis in 2007/8, individual-level support for the EU now 
concentrates on a more individualist and egocentric perspective as individuals 
perceive the notion of inequality through the lens of fairness and justice in society. 
IndividualsÕ perception of inequality in determining individual-level support for the 
EU is important for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the EU should reflect 
citizensÕ preferences for fairness and justice in society via strong and democratic 
governance. Secondly, it suggests that for individuals the EU has failed to create 
adequate economic and social opportunities or has provided these prospects in an 
unequal manner. Whether it is the first, second or a combination of these reasons, the 
examination of inequality as a determinant of individual-level support for the EU 
becomes all the more pertinent.  
The rationale for selecting the single case study of the Republic of Ireland 
centres upon the Republic of IrelandÕs relationship with the EU and the beginning of 
the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. The Republic of Ireland has been an 
active participant in European integration since its accession to the EU in 1973 
(Laffan & Tonra 2005). From a utilitarian perspective, the Irish economy has 
experienced many highs and lows since accession to the EU: significant periods of 
growth (1970s, 1990-2007), as well as periods of stagnation and significant 
expenditure reduction (1980s, 2008 to the present). It was during the 1990s and 2000s 
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that Ireland experienced an unparalleled period of economic growth, rising living 
standards, job creation and export performance that repositioned it away from the 
southern periphery of the EU with which it had long been associated. The Celtic Tiger 
became a global role model and precipitated considerable, extensive and rapid 
changes, in both Irish society and Irish politics.  
The economic crisis of 2007-8 revised IrelandÕs relationship with the EU as a 
result of the economic downturn and the widening of individual economic disparities. 
The focus of support for the EU in Ireland now concentrates on a more individualist 
and egocentric perspective as individuals perceive the notion of inequality through the 
lens of fairness and justice in society. The theoretical mechanism that connects EU 
citizens to the debate on support for the EU is embedded within the perception of 
costs and benefits accruing from European integration in light of domestic capitalist 
institutions (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, pp. 64). It is aimed through the single 
case study of the Republic of Ireland to establish the link (by using inequality as an 
independent variable) between Irish respondents perceptions of the costs and benefits 
of European integration and the patterns of redistribution in order to gauge 
individualsÕ evaluations of inequality and support for the EU.  
1.7: Methodological Contribution  
This research is interested in the influence of inequality on individual-level 
support for the EU and is an examination into the understanding of the relationship 
between inequality and support for the EU through two cross national case studies of 
the twenty-seven member states of the EU and a single case study of the Republic of 
Ireland. In the following chapters this research will determine the influence of 
inequality on individual-level support for the EU allowing generalizable findings to 
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be concluded toward the theoretical claim that inequality is an innovative and 
noteworthy determinant of individual-level support for the EU.  
As individuals in the EU have struggled to make sense of the complex social, 
economic and political changes that have taken place since the economic and 
financial crisis began in 2007/8, the need for inequality to be addressed (i.e. the 
central independent variable in this analysis) is well placed as the solution to the 
unjust and unfair ways of the liberal market economy individuals contend with. In 
addition, because differing effects emerge from inequality individuals who believe 
that inequality needs to be addressed also helps us gauge support for the EU.  
Using inequality as a determinant to understand individualsÕ orientation 
towards politics is not innovative with regards to research in which perceptions of 
economic performance including inequality drive specific policy demands (Corneo & 
Gruner 2002; Kenworthy & McCall 2008; Rehm 2009; Finseraas 2012). However, 
this research is an examination of how individual-level support toward the 
supranational project of the EU shifts and is an assessment of individual-level 
normative preferences for the EU project itself rather than a preference for specific 
policy outcomes. The testing of the central independent variable of inequality makes 
no reference to EU member state, political party or specific policy.  
1.8: This Inquiry 
How individuals in the EU orient themselves to the new political, economic 
and social realties since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 is 
fundamental to this research, as it explains the effect of individualsÕ perceptions 
towards inequality in the EU and the impact inequality has on individual-level support 
for the EU. This study asserts that the role of inequality is an overlooked part of 
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gauging individual-level support for the EU, in particular since the beginning of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. In doing so, this study contributes to our 
understanding of inequality as a determinant of EU support and how this affects 
support for the EU since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
The question of how individualsÕ perceptions of inequality affect support for 
the EU has received little scholarly attention. Scholarly research has examined 
perceptions of economic performance including inequality with regards to specific 
policy demands, but this has not been translated to normative notions of inequality 
and mass public opinion research at the supranational level or the national level. By 
using both European Election Studies 2009 data and Standard Eurobarometer data 
from 2009-2013 this inquiry examines individuals perceptions of inequality and the 
economic insecurity they may experience as a result of their perception of inequality 
from the beginning of and continuing economic and financial crisis in order to address 
support for the EU. In particular empirical social science methods and quantitative 
methods are used to inform my analysis on three key questions:  
1. What is the effect of perceptions of inequality on individual-level support for the 
EU? 
2. Do individualsÕ believe the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis? 
3. Do the observed effects correlate with the cross-national case studies and single 
case study in the same way? 
To address the first question the inquiry seeks correlations that prove clues to 
causation. Do individualsÕ perceptions of inequality correlate in the ways expected? If 
this is the case, then why do they correlate with inequality in this way? If this is not 
the case, then why do they not correlate with inequality in this way? This part of the 
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analysis addresses a more important question by capturing individualÕs specific 
attitudes towards inequality in the form of individualsÕ political behaviour as to who 
wants inequality to be addressed (or perhaps not addressed) and how this affects 
support for the EU since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
To address the second question, once again the inquiry seeks correlations that 
prove clues to causation. Do individualsÕ perceptions of their own economic 
insecurity correlate in the ways expected? If this is the case, then why do they 
correlate in this way? If this is not the case, then why do they not correlate in this 
way? The answers to these questions establish that while individuals may perceive 
personal economic insecurity via inequality, individualsÕ perceptions of inequality are 
not correlated to inequality per se. This distinction will have an effect on individualsÕ 
support for the EU and the future of the EU project since the onset of the economic 
crisis of 2007/8. 
Finally in order to address the third question the inquiry correlates the findings 
from the cross-national case study of the twenty-seven member states of the EU and 
the single case study of the Republic of Ireland to determine if the extent of 
individualsÕ desire for inequality to be addressed is indicative of individual-level 
support for the EU since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. 
Essentially, do individualsÕ attitudes towards inequality translate in political 
behaviours that shape individual-level support for the EU? 
1.9: Conclusion  
The proceeding chapter, Chapter Two, addresses the state of the literature 
regarding mass public opinion specifically examining attitudes towards European 
integration, national versus European identities, political intermediaries, institutions 
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and institutional performance and social and economic status and social location. 
Chapter Three theoretically grounds the analysis within the larger inequality and 
political behaviour literature through an examination of literature on instrumental 
self-interest, social and economic status, social location, democratic political 
institutions and the market, inequality and the effects and perceptions of inequality. 
Chapter Four defines the methodological guideline of this research, including the 
selected case studies of the twenty-seven member states of the EU and the Republic 
of Ireland, the European Election Study 2009 data and Standard Eurobarometer data 
2009-2103 to be used, operationalization of indicators, analytical techniques and test 
implications that will support the hypotheses.  
Chapter Five examines two facets with regards to individuals concerns about 
inequality and support for the EU. Firstly, the analysis highlights the importance 
individuals place on addressing inequality. Secondly, it shows that the importance 
individuals place on addressing inequality is positively correlated with support for 
further European integration but not for the EU as it is currently constituted. Chapter 
Six focuses upon the effect of individualÕs perceptions towards inequality in Ireland 
and the impact this has on support for the EU. Once again, this question is posed in 
the context of the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. The chapter 
examines two features with regards to Irish individuals concerns about inequality and 
support for the EU. Firstly, the analysis will demonstrate the importance individuals 
place on addressing inequality. Secondly, it will show that the importance Irish 
individuals place on addressing inequality is positively correlated with both support 
for further European integration, echoing findings in Chapter Five, and Irish 
individuals beliefs that the EU is in the interest of Ireland. Chapter Seven draws upon 
the findings of the cross-national case study of the twenty-seven member states of the 
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EU in Chapter Five and the single case study of the Republic of Ireland Chapter Six. 
Chapter Seven examines the opaque findings from both of these chapters as to 
whether the role to be played by the EU in order to address inequality supersedes the 
EU member state or whether the EUÕs role is one that reinforces the European project. 
The findings demonstrate that it is the EU and not the EU member state which is best 
placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis therefore 
increasing individual-level mass public opinion support for the EU. Finally Chapter 
Eight concludes the research and demonstrates that selecting the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8 as the salient moment to examine individualÕs perceptions of 
inequality was accurate and appropriate as inequality used as a determinant of mass 
public opinion support does in fact affect support for the EU.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  31 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1: Introduction  
This chapter reviews the contextual rationale for this research, surveying and 
evaluating previous explanations for the mass public opinion support for the EU 
literature. It outlines the theoretical contributions of determinants such as national 
versus European identity, political intermediaries for example elites, political parties 
and mass media and social location and socio-economic status all of which have 
played a role in shaping our understanding of support for the EU.  
This chapter also examines the most pertinent gap in the literature: the lack of 
understanding of the influence of inequality as a determinant of support for the EU. 
While inequality has been used as a predictor of support for the EU in Central and 
Eastern European states3, it has seldom been applied to Western Europe or the then 27 
member states of the EU4. As an extension of research, this analysis contributes to the 
broader understanding of how individuals perceive the normative notion of inequality 
and the manner in which these normative notions affect support for the EU.  
2.2: Attitudes towards European Integration   
From the onset, the EU project has experienced what has been termed, as a 
Ôpermissive consensusÕ5 among its citizens. Permissive consensus is based upon the 
notion that the reduction of both physical and financial barriers between European 
states and an adherence to the principles of liberal market economies would promote a 
                                                              
3 For analysis on inequality in Central and Eastern Europe please consult Duke & Grime (1997); 
Orkeny & Szkelyi (2000); Kelley & Zagorski (2004); Loveless (2010); Loveless & Whitefield (2011); 
Karakoc (2012) & Whitefield & Loveless (2013)  
4 For analysis on inequality in Western Europe please consult Beckfield (2006); Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli & 
Gelleny (2008) 
5 Permissive Consensus was a term first coined by Lindberg & Scheingold (1970) and has been built 
upon by Inglehart (1971), Shepherd (1975), Inglehart & Klingemann (1976), Hooghe (2003) & Hooghe 
& Marks (2005) 
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mutually prosperous economic community. By the 1990s, the focus of integration 
shifted towards political and social responsibilities of the EU which in turn led to the 
formation of supranational governance, challenging EU citizensÕ views on attitudes 
and orientations toward the EU. This also challenged the EU itself as it has come to 
rely on the continued positive support of EU citizens for the legitimacy of the EU 
project. As the EU has expanded beyond its original economic remit, questions have 
continuously been asked about whether popular consent is aligned with the EUÕs 
implicit or explicit guiding principles, whether the EUÕs institutional structures are 
regarded as sufficient in order to deliver these objectives, and whether the EUÕs 
institutions are able to provide these goals and objectives in a fair, transparent and 
effective manner.  
As the EU now exerts an influence upon the political and social realities of EU 
citizens in the 27 EU member states, questions on enlargement and continued 
integration continue to be pursued. Supporters of the EU are using these political and 
social realities as a model of supranational institutional possibilities, which in turn 
rely upon the popular support from EU citizens. Rather than being a duplicate of 
national-level institutions with enforcement and accountability mechanisms (Mair & 
Thommassen 2010), the EU is in fact functionally weak and is empowered at the 
individual-level by second order European Parliamentary elections (van der Eijk & 
Franklin 1996), therefore forcing the EU to depend on the popular support of EU 
citizens for its continued existence. If EU citizens consider EU institutions to lack 
transparency and inadequately represent their interests, the EU project will be 
undermined. With a shift from the economic principles and policies of the EU to 
political and social responsibilities in the EU the project analyses of national and 
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European identities have been examined in order to derive a possible new determinant 
in gauging individual-level support for the EU.  
2.3: National versus European Identities  
National identities have increasingly become the focus of analyses of support 
for the EU. When viewing identity through the lens of EU legitimacy, it is the 
apparent absence of a European demos that restricts EU citizens in thinking of 
themselves as Europeans. EU citizens regard themselves as Òthe people of EuropeÓ 
not Òthe European PeopleÓ (Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999, p. 256). However, if EU 
legitimacy refers to the belief that the existing political order is correct, then mass 
support for the EU is a question of value compatibility. Put simply, for individuals it 
is necessary to recognise the EU as the institution that, is both essential and 
representative of the collective will of the people of Europe. This premise also 
assumes the existence of a collective will of the European people therefore placing a 
robust demand on individuals to define themselves in terms of a European identity 
and in turn defining the function and scope of the EU (Cederman 2001).   
When attempting to define European identity the difficulty lies in addressing 
the ambiguity of representation and accountability at the EU level. The sui-generis 
nature of the EU as a supranational institution can weaken the correspondence 
between EU representatives and EU citizens. The EU has continued to enlarge the 
number of EU member states as well as increasing involvement at the nation-state 
level. European publics have responded to what they perceive to be an increase in the 
number of policy areas for which the EU is now partially or completely responsible 
(Schmitt 2005, p. 654) as well as an increase in the volume of EU legislation 
(Franklin & Wlezien, 1997). These increases have not gone unnoticed by EU citizens 
with many individuals believing the EU is encroaching on state sovereignty, thus 
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producing a negative effect on individualsÕ support for the EU. Meanwhile attempts 
have been made to address individualsÕ concerns, in particular through the principle 
of subsidiarity6 however scholars such as Moravcsik (1993) have argued that the 
principle of subsidiarity has revived debates on national sovereignty and highlighted 
both national-level competences and economic abilities of EU member states. While 
de Winter & Swyngedouw (1999) argue that disagreements over the principle of 
subsidiarity have changed the focus of EU governance making it a more salient issue 
at the individual-level and therefore embedding it in the larger debate surrounding 
support for the EU.  
In contrast to the Moravcsik (1993) and de Winter & Swyngedouw (1999) 
framework, ÒEuropean identity is not merely a publicÕs general and ambiguous 
feeling about Europe, but more importantly it is a constellation of attitudes regarding 
the role and nature of the EU and the strength of their [individual] attachments to state 
sovereigntyÓ (Loveless & Rohrschneider 2008 pp. 11). This can be approached in two 
ways.  
Firstly, national identity may be regarded as important to individualsÕ choice 
either to support or endorse the EU. This form of national identification derives from 
perceived cultural threats and hostility towards other cultures. Carey (2002) analysed 
three alternative conceptualizations of national identity: feelings towards oneÕs 
country, the level of attachment to the nation and other territorial entities and the fear 
of other identities and cultures encroaching on the dominant national culture. CareyÕs 
                                                              
6 The principle of subsidiarity aims to explicitly address disputes between the EU and member states by 
aspiring to take decisions as closely to EU citizens as possible. As a result, the EU will only take action 
on matters for which the EU is solely responsible, unless the EU action is more effective than the 
action taken at the national, regional or local level in member states.  
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(2002) findings confirmed that stronger feelings of national identity do in fact lead to 
lower levels of support for the EU. Kritzinger (2003) built upon this and demonstrated 
further that feelings of national attachment are borne out of perceived threats to the 
nation state. Perceived cultural threats were further analysed by De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden (2005) who examined specifically a fear of immigration and anti-
immigration sentiments. Their findings were consistent with previous analyses that 
anti-immigration sentiment is a strong predictor of attitudinal support for the EU.   
All of this can be applied to earlier examinations of Euroscepticism. In early 
analyses, Taggart (1998) argued that Euroscepticism was derived from identity 
politics and that the nation state is the point of reference for identity. However, the 
continuance of the EU project undermines this conceptualisation. As a result, Weβels 
(2007) distinguished between Eurosceptics (i.e. individuals who are sceptical of the 
European integration project) who insist upon an EU that performs better versus those 
who aim to limit or curtail EU enlargement and those individuals who would like to 
ensure that EU enlargement is stopped entirely. Weβels (2007) argues that by not 
distinguishing between Eurosceptics who want a better performing EU and those who 
want a reduced form of EU enlargement and the end of EU enlargement produces 
conflicting consequences for the understanding of European integration and support 
for the EU.  
The second approach to the issue of identity is the competing self-
identification of EU citizens as nationals or as Europeans. Scheuer (1999) argues that 
in the place of nationalism replaces the identification of Europeans as citizens of the 
EU. Put simply, rather than identifying with nationalism per se, a sense of nationalism 
is formed by individuals through membership of the political community of the EU, 
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which fosters a sense of mutual trust between member states and the inclusion of new 
member states. McClaren (2002) considers this and examines perceived threats. She 
argues that people are hostile toward the EU project because of perceived threats 
posed by other cultures. McClarenÕs (2002) findings support the main contention that 
perceived cultural threat is an important determinant in explaining support for the EU. 
Interestingly, McClarenÕs (2002) findings are not exclusive to perceived cultural 
threats from third-country nationals but also extend to other EU member states 
through the mechanism of EU expansion. McClarenÕs (2004) later work posits that 
while there is a prevalent fear of loss of national identity and culture among citizensÕ, 
it is not pivotal to citizensÕ opposition to continued EU enlargement. De Vries and 
Van Kersbergen (2007) take the notion of perceived cultural threats a step further and 
apply it at the individual level, drawing upon the concept of a Ôdouble allegianceÕ 
between utilitarian self-interest and national identity. This Ôdouble allegianceÕ does 
not only explain security (i.e. economic and social-psychological) issues but through 
multi-level modelling also provides a single framework to understand support for 
European integration as a determinant of support for the EU. 
Overall, the limitation of using national versus European identity as a 
determinant of EU support is that the literature on European identity has focused upon 
the notion that both national identity and European identity are competing with one 
another, resulting in a conflict of interests between the national and the EU level. This 
literature has also highlighted the need for EU citizens to think in terms of a shared 
sense of ownership of the EU, which results in a broader call for a collective 
European thinking. This shared European thinking on the part of EU citizens in order 
to connect with the EU project demands a realignment of both political identity and 
political representation for EU citizens. As a result of the inadequacies of national and 
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European identities to be a determinant of EU support, scholars have turned their 
attention to political intermediaries such as elites, political parties and the mass media 
as potential new determinants of support for the EU.  
2.4: Political intermediaries: elites, political parties and mass media 
Elites  
Support for the EU has also been understood as a function of the influence of 
political intermediaries such as elites, political parties and mass media. There are 
three processes into which research has been conducted in terms of elite/mass 
attitudinal congruence and support for the EU. The first are top-down elite-driven 
processes whereby elites adopt an issue position and mass publics position themselves 
according to their own ideological orientations, issue salience and attitudes. The 
second process is that political parties position themselves in harmony with mass 
public opinion in order to encapsulate a larger constituency and therefore be more 
competitive electorally (Carrubba, 2001). In a test of three theories of representation 
permissive consensus, policy-mood theory and cue-taking theory, Carrubba (2001) 
finds that Òpublic disinterest is a sign that political elites are hewing close enough to 
public preferencesÉ [and] suggests that EU politics may be less sui generis and more 
Ôpolitics as usualÕ than people typically believeÓ (Carrubba 2001, pp. 141 & 156). The 
third process is a combination of both of the above processes whereby mass public 
opinions with regards to the EU have been coined as a function of elite and/or 
political party positions.  
As Dalton (1985) has indicated, the level of convergence between mass 
publicsÕ and elitesÕ views on a wide variety of issue dimensions is crucial to 
individualsÕ perceptions of appropriate representation. EU citizensÕ perceptions about 
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the legitimacy of the EU have included individualsÕ institutional evaluations and 
media exposure (De Vreese 2002) while elites have exhibited a preference for both 
continued European integration and for the EU project as well as being referred to as 
opinion leaders. Weβels (1995) has argued that as a result of the complexity of the 
EU project and the detached proximity of the EU from the daily lives of individual 
EU citizens, the role of intermediaries is essential to models of EU support. WeβelsÕ 
(1995) findings demonstrate that evaluations of national political elites directed many 
to deduce that support for continued European integration is indeed an elite driven 
process.  
However, there is a distinction between national and EU elites. Thomassen 
and SchmittÕs (1997) analysis demonstrates that the majority of elites support 
European integration more than mass publics of the EU. Later research by Schmitt & 
Thomassen (2000) builds upon this argument and finds that Òpolitical representation 
of EU preferences works rather well regarding the grand directions of policy making 
and that party elites behave responsively in view of changing EU preferences among 
their votersÓ (Schmitt & Thomassen 2000, p. 318).  
In general attitudes with regards to support for the EU are arbitrated through 
the attitudes of both national and European elites (Anderson 1998; Franklin, Marsh, & 
McClaren, 1994). In older member states of the EU where national institutions 
function well, national elites can affect how mass publics evaluate the EU. In their 
analysis of EU referendums Franklin, Van der Eijk and Marsh (1995) argue that 
support for the EU Òbecomes tied to the popularity of the government in power even 
if the ostensible subject of the referendum has little to do with the reasons for 
government popularityÓ (Franklin, Van der Eijk and Marsh 1995, p. 101). WeβelsÕ 
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(1995) analysis, meanwhile, finds that the development of support for the EU is all 
the more congruent between elites and highly attentive publics than between elites 
and the less attentive strata of society. In addition, he states that Òsuccessful 
mobilization by parties to change the orientations of their supporters must, then, be 
seen as contributory factor to the process of European integrationÉ because support 
and legitimacy are necessary, elites and political actors have to work to secure themÓ 
(Weβels 1995, p. 162).  
However, this may be less pertinent as national political party elites have 
ignored EU policy implementation in national political debates and have generated 
resistance to European integration. As Franklin, Marsh and McClarenÕs (1994) 
findings demonstrate Òthe natural distrust of the EC and the European project by 
voters has been exacerbated by the behaviour of political partiesÉ [and] Europe is 
poorly served by national parties and politicians whose local interests often lead them 
to resort to obfuscation about European mattersÓ (Franklin, Marsh & McClaren 1994, 
pp. 470-71). 
Recent analyses have attained a more nuanced understanding of the elite/mass 
public opinion divide. Hooghe (2003) compares policy preferences among national 
and European elites and mass public opinion and argues that overall elites are more 
willing to relinquish national authority in areas which encroach upon sovereignty, 
while, mass publics are more approving of EU social policies. Hooghe (2003) further 
argues that Òelites and public preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic 
about Europeanising high spending policies [as]É shifting authority could destabilize 
vested interestsÓ (Hooghe 2003, p. 281). It is the public that seeks to contain the 
distributional risk through selectively Europeanising market-flanking policies while 
Òelite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale that conceives European 
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integration as an optimal solution for internalising externalities beyond the stateÓ 
(Hooghe 2003, p. 281). In sum, elites regard the EU and the EU project as a means to 
develop a successful and integrated economic market that allows the EU to be a more 
unified and international political actor. Meanwhile, mass publics in the EU are more 
concerned about social policies that impact individuals directly.  These views 
highlight the gap between the levels of support for the EU between elites and mass 
publics. The differences between elites and mass publics are a result of the underlying 
concerns about what the EU project can provide and what policy areas should be 
pursued for the benefit of individuals in the EU. One the one hand, national elites aim 
to employ national competencies within European issues while on the other hand, 
mass publics are apprehensive about the ability of the EU to deliver the goods of 
society.  
The disparity between elites and mass publics is highlighted by the decreasing 
congruence between policy positions of EU citizens and elite representatives. In their 
analysis on issue congruence, Schmitt and Thomassen (1999) demonstrate that elite 
and mass public opinion on specific EU policies is weak, as Òcontemporary voters 
determine how much leeway to give the leaders that march ahead. It is the irony of the 
situation describedÉ [É] that voters in general seem unaware how far ahead the 
leaders are. Even worseÉ [É] is that the political elite does not know eitherÓ 
(Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, pp. 207). This elite and mass public opinion 
discrepancy with regards to policy positions emphasises popular perceptions of the 
EU by promoting it as a solely elite driven project set apart from the EU assembled by 
individual EU citizens.  
The limitation of using elites as a determinant of EU support derives from the 
competing means by which the process of elite and mass attitudinal congruence is 
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understood. On the one hand, elites adopt an issue position and mass publics align 
themselves in relation to their ideological orientation, issue salience and political 
attitudes. On the other hand, elites situate themselves in accordance with mass public 
opinion in order to attain a larger electoral constituency and subsequently improve 
electoral competitiveness. It is the former theoretical method emphasising mass public 
opinion support for the EU which has resonated the most in debate about the EU 
being an elite-driven project.  
While a distinction has been made between national elites and EU elites 
(Thommassen & Schmitt 1997), this has been contested with the inclusion of the left-
right ideological dimension and the pro-anti European integration positions in the 
elite/mass public opinion debate. In addition, more nuanced analyses of the elite/mass 
public divide have demonstrated that national elites aim to exercise national 
competencies on international issues, while mass publics are much more concerned 
by the ability of the EU to deliver the goods of society (Hooghe 2003). There is an 
increasing disparity between elites and mass publics-which cannot be analysed on the 
basis of elites as a political intermediary alone. Consequently, the nuanced result in 
the elite/mass public debate has pushed scholars to turn their attention to political 
parties as an additional intermediary and potential determinant of support for the EU.   
Political Parties  
The place for political parties in the EU project depends on whether EU 
institutions adopt the form of inter-governmentalism centred upon vigorous 
participation from EU member states and their national parliaments, or whether EU 
institutions embrace a European parliamentary model, which utilises the European 
Parliament as a supranational parliament. Mass political parties have been 
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traditionally understood in terms of representation, coherent policy positions and 
informational connections between governments and citizens. Recently, however, 
political parties have demonstrated a declining role in national politics, providing 
limited cues and ideological investigations to constituents.  
In analyses of the European party system and political party organisation, 
scholars such as Mair (1990) and Katz and Mair (1994) have argued that rather than a 
decline in political parties, national political parties are encountering a modernization 
process in response to the supranational politics national parties have been exposed to 
as a result of EU membership. However, Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) 
demonstrate that national political parties have focused European Parliamentary 
elections on national issues rather than European issues. Van der Eijk and Franklin 
(1996) argue that rather than having national politics as a combatant opposite to 
European politics, national political parties have the ability to improve EU legitimacy 
by coercing European policymaking to be more transparent and accountable.  
Scholars such as Franklin, Marsh and McClaren (1994), Gabel (1998a), Ray 
(2003) and Hooghe and Marks (2005) have argued that partisanship is pertinent at the 
national level because when individuals support national political parties that are pro-
EU, those individuals are pro-EU independent of their own personal characteristics. 
Franklin, Marsh and McClaren (1994) state that political parties act as ÒÔgatekeepersÕ 
to EC policy-making: taking credit for developments that would be popular with 
voters, like grants or bigger markets, and playing down or even blaming the EC for 
less popular ones, like the pressure to reduce public sector debtÓ (Franklin, Marsh and 
McClaren 1994, p. 460). They also demonstrate that the ÒEuropean project is still 
bound up with national politics. Parties hesitate to speak clearly on European 
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questions because most of them are split between pro-European and anti-European 
factionsÓ (Franklin, Marsh and McClaren 1994, p. 469).  
Meanwhile GabelÕs (1998a) individual-level analysis of economic integration 
and mass politics demonstrates that the intra-occupational variation in support for EU 
membership is relevant in aiming to understand party politics in the European 
Parliament. GabelÕs (1998a) findings show that Òwith strengthening of the European 
ParliamentÕs legislative power, European Parliament elections are now consequential 
for EU policy and this should increase the relevance of issues in European Parliament 
elections. In turn, this should promote am electoral connection between mass attitudes 
towards EU policy and the organization of party politicsÓ (Gabel 1998a, p. 951).  
Ray (2003a) reiterates the issue of partisanship at the national level further and 
challenges the notion that supporters of incumbent political parties are more pro-
European than supporters of opposition political parties. Ray (2003a) states that the 
relationship between incumbent support and pro-EU attitudes is a conditional one and 
finds that overall Òthere is a weak positive relationship between incumbent support 
and support for the current EU, but a negative support for further unificationÓ (Ray 
2003a, p. 259). This suggests that advocates of incumbent political parties are not 
natural advocates of support for the EU.  
Finally, Hooghe and Marks (2005) build upon this and reinsert the European 
versus national identity debate into the discussion on political parties and support for 
the EU. Hooghe and Marks (2005) posit that economic calculus and communal 
identity are influential in gauging support for the EU as Òthe more national elites are 
divided, the more citizens are cued to oppose European integrationÓ (Hooghe & 
Marks 2005, p.  419). Their multi-level model fuses economic, identity and cue theory 
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together and explains a quarter of the variation at the individual-level and the majority 
of the variation at national level and political party level.  
However, Taggart (1998) has argued that political parties play a reduced role 
in the emergence of Euroscepticism when compared to domestic contextual factors 
due to a deficiency in discourse about EU politics. TaggartÕs (1998) findings suggests 
that ÒEuroscepticism is mainly limited to parties on the periphery of their party 
system and are often used as an issue that differentiates those parties from the more 
established parties which are only likely to express Euroscepticism through factionsÓ 
(Taggart 1998, pp. 363). Therefore, political party-based Euroscepticism is valuable 
in gauging domestic political patterns.  
Perhaps the most robust research for the reinsertion of party politics into the 
debate surrounding mass public opinion and support for the EU has been made by 
Marks and Wilson (2000), Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002), Hooghe, Marks and 
Wilson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2005 see above), and Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and 
Edwards (2006). The reinsertion of party politics into the debate surrounding support 
for the EU begins with Marks and Wilson (2000) and their analysis on positions 
adopted by national political parties on the issue of European integration. Marks and 
Wilson (2000) base their theory of political party systems on the Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) cleavage theory of political party alignment. Their findings demonstrate that 
Òthe cleavage approach to party politics provides us with a powerful set of conceptual 
and theoretical tools for understanding the positions of national political parties on 
European integrationÓ Marks and Wilson (2000, p. 433). Building upon this analysis, 
Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) examine how political parties position themselves on 
the issue of the EU. They find that the ideological location of a political party in a 
party family is a robust predictor of a political partyÕs position on EU issue salience. 
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They conclude, Òparty family is a stronger influence than strategic competition, 
national location, participation in government or the position of a partyÕs supportersÉ 
[and] É that political parties have bounded rationalities that shape how they process 
incentives in competitive party systemsÓ (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002, p. 585).  
In their analysis on party positions on European integration Hooghe, Marks & 
Wilson (2003) analyse how European integration is structured among political parties 
competing in the member states of the EU. They demonstrate that there is Òa strong 
relationship between the Left/Right dimension that chiefly structures party 
competition in European societies and European integrationÓ (Hooghe, Marks & 
Wilson 2003, p. 966). In addition, by inserting a new politics dimension, which 
ranges from Green/Alternative/Libertarian to Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist, 
they find that Òthis dimension is the most general and powerful predictor of party 
positioning on the issues that arise from European integrationÓ (ibid, pp. 966).  
Finally, building upon all of these findings, Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and 
Edwards (2006) analyse the ideological profile of political parties in both Eastern and 
Western Europe and whether this affects support for the EU. Their findings suggest 
that the Òstructures of party competition in the East and West are fundamentally and 
explicably different and that although the positions that parties in the East and West 
take on European integration are substantively different they share a single underlying 
causalityÓ (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards 2006, p. 155).  
The arguments outlined by Marks and Wilson (2000), Marks, Wilson and Ray 
(2002), Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2005), and Marks, 
Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards (2006) overall argue that political parties do not take 
cues from their respective electorates on issues in relation to the EU as individuals do 
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not have adequately structured orientations towards the EU. This directly contradicts 
GabelÕs (1998a & 1998b) instrumentalist thesis of Ôwinners and losersÕ of the EU: that 
individuals determine what continued European integration means to them. As 
national political parties amalgamate concerns over EU integration into both 
contemporary and historical established positions this reinserts the question of 
domestic politics into the support for the EU debate. National politics, and more 
pertinently national political parties, replicate the existing debate on European 
integration rather than extending debates over national politics into the EU political 
realm.  
However, research by Ray (2003b) and Hooghe and Marks (2006) 
demonstrates that individualsÕ partisanship has moved with individualsÕ support for 
European integration. Ray (2003b) demonstrated that if individuals are fervent 
partisans these individuals are more likely to be influenced by political party stances 
on the EU. RayÕs (2003b) findings suggest, Òparty positions do influence electorate 
opinion, but this effect varies with levels of disagreement among parties, party unity, 
issue salience, and party attachmentÓ (Ray 2003b, p. 978). Overall his analysis 
reflects the proxy argument by demonstrating that national political parties provide 
individuals with a cue with regards to the EU allowing individuals to evaluate the EU 
through the outcomes produced by domestic politics. Given the additional facets of 
party politics in the debate surrounding mass public opinion and support for the EU it 
is also important to highlight the intra-party consensus on European integration 
outlined by Hooghe and Marks (2006). In an analysis of national political party 
manifestos, they find that Òthe salience of European integration for political parties 
has increased since the early 1980ÕsÉ [and that ]Éa second development that 
influences European integration is populismÓ (Hooghe and Marks 2006, p. 248). All 
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of this indirectly reinserts the pertinence of national political contests over the 
perceived lower saliency of second-order European elections.  
In conjunction with domestic constraints, pro-EU and anti-EU political parties 
have been oriented along two dimensions. The first dimension focuses upon the 
normative notion of the EU project, along a spectrum where social democracy stands 
at one end and market liberalism at the other. The second dimension is the 
competition between sovereignty of the nation state in the wake of continuing 
European integration and supra-nationalism. Scholars such as Franklin, Van der Eijk, 
& Marsh (1995) have connected EU support with satisfaction with the incumbent 
government while other scholars such as Ray (2003a) have demonstrated that support 
for incumbent political parties is linked to pro-EU stances whereas support for 
opposition parties is anti-EU. 
The discussion of political parties is important to the understanding of mass 
public opinion and perceptions of the EU because the deficiency in electoral 
competition across political parties in the EU does little to promote debate among 
individuals. Therefore debates on the EU centre upon the national level as opposed to 
the European level. This results in a fragmented European public, which exhibits 
ideology as a weak explanatory variable when analysing support for the EU. In order 
to examine the cognitive basis of voting, Van der Brug and Van der Eijk (1999) 
address the disparity between mass publicsÕ and elitesÕ perception of the EU and to 
analyse whether elections are an effective means of communication of mass publics 
political preferences. Van der Brug and Van der Eijk (1999) demonstrate that Òvoters 
are aware of the differences between the programmes of different political partiesÉ 
[and that] elections are more likely to function as a meaningful vehicle for mass-elite 
communicationÓ (Van der Brug & Van der Eijk 1999, p. 129). These findings 
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undermine individualsÕ use of ideology as a significant determinant when examining 
the dimensions of political parties and support for the EU, which contributes to the 
disconnection between individuals and democratic representation.  
The limitation of using political parties as a determinant of EU support is 
twofold. Firstly, when framed within the democratic deficit debate the absence of a 
party government within the European Parliament hinders political partiesÕ electoral 
competition and does little to encourage individuals to engage in a Europe-wide 
political debate. As we have seen from analyses above, this subsequently leads to 
(minimal) debate at the national-level rather than the EU-level. Secondly and in 
conjunction with the absence of a party government is the inability of European party 
groupings to successfully and efficiently represent EU citizens. This limits the 
left/right ideology with which individuals identify and therefore the understanding of 
EU policy positions. Overall, the deficiency in discourse about the EU by national 
political parties fails to provide individuals with meaningful and informed positions 
on the EU and therefore limits political parties being used as an effective determinant 
in examining support for the EU.  
Mass Media  
Mass media has also been analysed as a determinant in order to examine 
individualsÕ comprehension and orientation towards the EU. De Vreese et al (2006) 
analyse the news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary elections in all 
twenty-five member states of the EU. Their research provides a pan-European 
overview of the campaign coverage based on analysis of three national newspapers 
and two television broadcasts in the two weeks preceding the European Parliament 
elections. Their findings demonstrate that the European Parliament elections Òwere 
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more visible in the ten new member states than in the old fifteen member states7É 
[and that overall] the news in the old EU fifteen was generally negative towards the 
EU, whereas in the new countries a mixed pattern was foundÓ (De Vreese et al 2006, 
p. 477). De Vreese et al (2006) posit that mass media is an effective intermediary of 
European politics as a result of the second-order nature of the European election 
process and the detachment from the EU project which individuals perceive.  De 
Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) build upon this earlier research by analysing the 
differential effects of news media exposure on both political knowledge and political 
participation. Their findings demonstrate that Òthe positive effects of news media 
exposure outweigh the negative effects and that the effects are conditional upon actual 
contentÓ (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2006, p. 317). These findings suggest that 
exposure to news outlets with high levels of political content directly contributes to 
individualsÕ knowledge about the EU and in turn increases the likelihood that these 
individuals will vote in European Parliament elections. In contrast, De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden (2006) find that individualsÕ exposure to news outlets with less political 
content has either no effect or a marginally positive effect on individualsÕ knowledge 
of the EU depending on the type of content. Overall, the effect of news media on 
individualsÕ knowledge and participation in European parliament elections is positive.   
The examination of mass media and support for the EU has on the whole 
relied upon case studies. Meyer (1999) and Anderson and McLeod (2004) have 
highlighted the role of mass media as a contributor to weakening EU legitimacy via 
the debate on the communication deficit. MeyerÕs (1999) analysis of the 
                                                              
7 The 2004 Big Bang enlargement was the largest single expansion of the EU. The ten new member 
states were: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The old member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
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communication deficit centres upon the role of political communication in 
legitimating governance in the EU. In particular Meyer (1999, p. 617) examines Òthe 
CommissionÕs media communication and places it in the context of the EUÕs broader 
institutional set-up and decision making proceduresÓ. His findings demonstrate that 
the European Commission is positioned within a Òsystem of governance which 
depoliticises conflict and obfuscates political accountabilityÓ (ibid, p. 617) and this 
has been adopted by EU member states in order to avoid public scrutiny and convey 
public dissatisfaction with the EU. Building upon this, Anderson and McLeod (2004) 
analyse the communication deficit in the European Parliament. Their findings suggest 
that the European ParliamentsÕ Òpress and information service contains a mixture of 
highly competent and less able personnel and is handicapped severely by being led by 
senior officials who have no professional background in press and public relations 
mattersÓ (Anderson & McLeod 2004, p. 915). In addition, Anderson and McLeod 
(2004) state that the European ParliamentÕs communication performance Òhas 
seriously failed in recent years. But it should be remembered that a heavy 
responsibility also falls on member statesÕ governments and on the various national 
pro-European party machines to promote vigorously the role of the Parliament within 
their own territoriesÓ (ibid, p. 916).  
Overall, analyses of the communication deficit have highlighted the failed 
attempts to connect EU citizens to the European integration project. When this is 
combined with negative or opaque messages about the EU project, it contributes to 
the inability of the EU to prevail over the widespread challenge to the legitimacy of 
the EU. The absence of a transnational or EU press corps is likely to continue to 
weaken the ability of national media to exhibit a clear, concise and consistent role on 
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EU affairs as a result of a media milieu in which regional, national and transnational 
media are competing with one another.    
Research on mass media as a determinant for EU support has advanced in a 
fragmented manner, relying upon case studies and an adjustable set of dependent 
variables. The limitation of mass media as an effective determinant of EU support is a 
result of it being employed as a contributor to debates on the perceived 
communication deficit within the EU. The notion of the communication deficit 
derives from the perception that the EU has failed to connect EU citizens to the EU 
project and mass media is a function of this deficit. When this is combined with the 
belief that national and European media outlets have created a media environment in 
which regional, national and trans-national media are competing with one another the 
opaque and multi-layered nature of mass media as a determinant of EU support is 
further highlighted. Mass mediasÕ weakness in determining support for the EU is a 
result of the theoretical and conceptual difficulties in examining large-N cross-
national research in general. The theoretical deficit between the conceptualisation and 
comparability of mass media across audience members, new media technologies and 
context in the EU makes it all the more difficult to determine the correct effect that 
mass media has on support for the EU.   
2.5: Institutions and Institutional Performance  
From the onset of the EU project the popular perception by EU citizens has 
ben that EU institutions are largely insulated from direct public access (Loveless & 
Rohrschneider, 2008, p. 12). The conduit for linking EU representatives and EU 
citizens is through the European Parliament (EP), the only directly elected institution 
of the EU. However, EP elections are often considered as Ôsecond orderÕ as citizensÕ 
participation is much lower given that citizens perceive there to be much less at risk. 
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This gives rise to the popular perception that the EU is an institution that inadequately 
reflects the opinions of EU citizens.  
Assessments of institutional performance contain both an input and output 
element. The input element is designated through EU citizens voting in EP elections 
making EU institutions satisfactory organisations as a result of the democratic process 
in which they were founded and composed. The output element centres upon the EU 
institutionsÕ ability to produce robust policy and enforcement. However, Schmitt and 
Thommassen (1999, p. 3) state that despite the fact that the EUÕs supranational ability 
has increased there is a perception that an Òeffective system of political representation 
is missingÓ. In conjunction with this is the continuing debate over representation at 
the EU level. The democratic deficit focuses upon the inability of EP elections to 
deduce the election results into a logical distribution of power. The European 
Parliament, as the only directly elected institution of the EU, is not the most powerful 
institution8 in the EU and the processes by which EU policy is conducted and 
implemented fail to make the connection between MEPs and their constituents. The 
notion of the democratic deficit is emphasised further by unelected EU institutions 
such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council, and the inability of these institutions to create policies that are harmonious 
with EU citizensÕ preferences9.  
                                                              
8 The EP is becoming more powerful as a result of the Lisbon Treaty (1 Dec 2009), which increased the 
EPÕs legislative power. The EP now has equal rights with the Council of Ministers on deciding over 
forty new areas (including agriculture, energy security, immigration, justice and home affairs and 
health and structural funds) within the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. Along with the Council of 
Ministers, the EP will also decide on the entire EU budget.  
9 The European Parliament 2014 elections assured voters that the 2014 election would be different 
from previous years as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty a vote in the 2014 
European Parliament election was also a vote for the President of the European Commission with each 
political groups in the European Parliament nominating a lead candidate or Spitzenkandidat for the 
post. However the presidential candidates did not play a significant role in the election campaigns with 
the exception of Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg and had limited impact on voter participation and 
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However, scholars such as Majone (1998), Schmitt and Thommassen (1999), 
Moravcsik (2002) and Crombez (2003) have argued that the notion of the democratic 
deficit is unfounded and that the EU is as democratic as it needs to be. Moravcsik 
(2002, p. 603) argues that concerns about the EUÕs democratic deficit are misplaced 
and that Òits institutions are tightly constrained by constitutional checks and balances: 
narrow mandates, fiscal limits, super-majoritarian and concurrent voting requirements 
and separation of powersÉ [and]É on balance, the EU redresses rather than creates 
biases in political representation, deliberation and outputÓ. In conjunction with 
Moravcsik (2002) Crombez (2003, p. 101) demonstrates that Òthe institutional setup 
of the EU does not lead to policies that are fundamentally undemocratic and that the 
composition of its institutions is not inherently less democratic than that of the US 
political institutionsÓ. In addition, he states that the democratic deficit in the EU is 
Òowing to a lack of transparency and an excess of delegation on the legislative 
processÓ (ibid).  With indecision surrounding the impact of the democratic deficit, 
attention has turned to the role national-level variables play in shaping popular 
perceptions of the EU. Scholars such as Norris (1999), Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) and 
Rohrschneider (2002) have demonstrated in their analyses that popular perceptions of 
the EU are oriented by national institutional factors. The most fruitful strand of this 
argument has focused upon the notion that an individualÕs evaluation of the EU is 
subject to nation-state performance.  
Early research in this area converged upon Janssen (1991) and AndersonÕs 
(1998) analyses of the legitimacy and the efficacy of the nation state. Using cognitive 
approaches to measure individualsÕ awareness and knowledge about European 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
voter choices. See Hobolt, S. B. (2014) ÔA Vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 
2014 European Parliament electionsÓ, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 10, pp. 1528-
1540 
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integration, Janssen (1991) and Anderson (1998) demonstrate that the majority of 
individuals are uninformed about the essential and rudimentary aspects of the 
European integration process, which highlights individualsÕ inability to use proxies as 
a means to derive an opinion on the EU.  
Janssen (1991) explicitly analyses both post-materialism and cognitive 
mobilization through InglehartÕs ÔSilent RevolutionÕ theory, in order to examine 
support for the EU.  His findings demonstrate that Òpost-materialism appears to be 
unrelated to attitudes towards European integration while the concept of cognitive 
mobilization makes sense only at the individual levelÓ (Janssen 1991, p. 443) 
indicating that InglehartÕs cognitive mobilization theory is of little use in explaining 
attitudes toward support for the EU. As a result, and building upon JanssenÕs analysis, 
Anderson (1998) develops a model of mass public opinion towards the EU based on 
individualsÕ attitudes towards the political system, the incumbent government and 
establishment parties. His findings demonstrate that Òsystem and establishment party 
support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership of the 
European UnionÉ [This also suggests that] the relationship between economic 
factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward 
European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudesÓ 
(Anderson 1998, pp. 569). As a consequence of the findings outlined above, scholars 
such as Franklin, Van der Eijk & Marsh (1995) and Ray (2003a) have focused their 
research on national governments and have demonstrated that satisfaction with the 
performance of the EU has been understood in terms of satisfaction with the 
incumbent government and positive evaluations of national government.  
However, the institutional proxy argument does have its limits. Sanchez-
CuencaÕs (2000) analysis highlighted that the proxy argument functions as a 
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conflicting mechanism producing an inverted perception between both national and 
supranational institutions. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000, p. 147) argued that rather than 
considering national and EU institutions as a singular set of political institutions Òthe 
higher citizensÕ opinion of the functioning of supranational institutions and the lower 
that of national institutions, the greater their support for integrationÓ. This in turn 
allows for better democratic governance as individuals support for the EU is 
perceived as being not only a transfer of sovereignty to the EU but also the 
opportunity to eradicate corruption at the nation state level.  Rohrschneider (2002) 
builds upon these findings stating that arbitrary institutions such as judiciaries and 
bureaucracies shape individualsÕ perceptions of how governments are in representing 
the interests of citizens. These are the institutions with which individuals will be the 
most familiar with and to which they will have the most exposure and it is from the 
interactions with these institutions that individuals base their positioning towards the 
EU.  
Both Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) and Rohrschneider (2002) demonstrate that 
evaluations of EU institutions derive from evaluations of the quality of national 
institutions. However, their analysis contradicts previous research on proxy 
evaluations. Sanchez-CuencaÕs (2000) analysis uses the speed of European integration 
as the dependent variable, which in turn explains varying levels in individualsÕ 
perceptions of national level corruption and social protection. This allows an 
examination of EU institutions as a means of comparison, as opposed to regarding EU 
institutions as an extension of national level institutions. Rohrschneider (2002), 
meanwhile, makes the connection between individualsÕ perception of the lack of 
representation at the EU level and finds that individualsÕ support for the EU decreased 
regardless of individualsÕ economic perceptions. When placing RohrschneiderÕs 
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(2002) findings against the proxy argument, individualsÕ decreased support for the EU 
is more pronounced in EU member states with well-functioning institutions which 
suggests that it is necessary to undertake an arbitrated assessment of the function and 
quality of democratic institutions at both the national and supranational level.  
Contributing to the growing body of literature that uses multi-level studies 
(Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a & 1998b; Sancez-Cuenca 2000, Rohrschneider 2002, 
Whitefield 2006), Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) modelled EU member state 
characteristics as mechanisms to understand mass opinion attitudes towards support 
for the EU. Their macro-salience model demonstrates that previous models used to 
predict individualsÕ perceptions of the democratic deficit are contradictory, insofar as 
variables measuring economic and political performance are highly correlated across 
the EU. Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) find that models using prospective 
economic prosperity at either the individual or national level and models of national 
political performance advocate conflicting expectations at the individual level when 
aiming to predict support for the EU in the same EU member states. Rohrschneider 
and Loveless (2010) argue that a EU member stateÕs affluence and quality of 
governance establish the salience of issues and subsequently influenc the criteria that 
citizens use when evaluating the EU on an attitudinal basis. Their results demonstrate 
that citizens in less affluent member states evaluate the EU on the basis of economic 
prospects whereas in more affluent member states, citizens rely on political criteria to 
evaluate the EUÕs democratic deficit.  
The limitation of institutions and institutional performance as a determinant of 
EU support is a result of the increasing evidence at the national level as outlined 
above of the national level in the variation in the quality of democratic institutions in 
determining support for the EU. The variation in the quality of this institutional 
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support for the EU can derive from alternative institutions, either in the form of a sub-
national or supranational context, as well as cross-national and non-governmental 
organisations. Overall, institutions and institutional performance is not an inadequate 
determinant of EU support, however it needs to be reconfigured to address the 
changing demands of both national political structures and the demands of EU 
citizens in the broader context of the EU project. EU citizens need to consider further 
integration of the nation state into pan-European institutional governance, particularly 
in light of the financial crisis of 2007/8. In doing so, EU citizens will be coerced into 
addressing the role of the nation state in the emerging supra-national organisation of 
the EU project.  
2.6: Social and Economic Status and Social Location  
Social and Economic Status (SES) 
Social and economic status (SES) has been used to create structural 
differences by offering access to information or attitudes that provide a preference for 
specific political consumption options. SES effects originate from the economic 
models of EU support by Gabel (1998a & 1998b), Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and 
Gabel and Whitten (1997), which incorporated the broad model of individualsÕ 
support for the EU in terms of a cost/benefit analysis.  
The utilitarian, cost/benefit approach surmises that as material gains within a 
nation state increase, in particular through market liberalization as part of the EU, 
support for the EU will increase. This was indeed true for those who are positioned to 
take advantage of European integration, distinguished by socio-economic status 
(Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel & Whitten; 1997, Gabel 1998a & 1998b).  Gabel and 
Palmer (1995) initiated the idea of utilising mass public opinion in determining 
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support for European integration and their individual-level results demonstrate that 
individualsÕ support for the EU is positively related to the Òpersonal potential to 
benefit from liberalised markets for goods, labour and moneyÓ (Gabel & Palmer, p. 
3). Building upon these earlier findings Gabel and Whitten (1997) analyse economic 
conditions and support for the EU at the individual-level by investigating how 
subjective economic evaluations influence attitudes towards European integration. 
Their findings support their hypothesis that it is the Òsubjective economy as perceived 
by EU citizens, rather than the objective economy as measured by economic 
indicators that influences support for integrationÓ (Gabel & Whitten, 1997; p. 92) 
reiterating that the determinant of socio-economic status is a predictor of mass public 
opinion support towards the EU. Finally, Gabel (1998a and 1998b) applies these 
findings to occupation-based economic interests at the individual-level (Gabel 1998a) 
and to five prominent theories of European integration: cognitive mobilization, 
political values, utilitarianism, class partisanship and support for government (Gabel 
1998b). In the former, Gabel (1998a) finds that support for the EU is Òpositively 
related to intra-occupational differences in economic benefits of EU membershipÓ 
(Gabel 1998a, p. 936), while in the latter he finds that Òthe partisan context of 
integrative reforms and the utilitarian consequences of integrative policy provide 
robust explanations for variation in supportÓ (Gabel 1998b, pp. 333) while political 
values and cognitive mobilization exert only a small, yet substantive impact on 
support for the EU. 
All in all, this instrumental approach estimates that higher income earners 
benefit from continued European integration as it creates investment opportunities. 
Lower income earners meanwhile are subjected to diminishing welfare as a result of 
increased capital liberalization. Gabel (1998a and 1998b) demonstrated that 
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individuals with high SES and low SES saw the EU differently. Those individuals 
with high SES regard the EU as the expansion of the market therefore as something 
that brings opportunities. Conversely those individuals with low SES consider the EU 
in relation to weakening welfare as a result of deteriorating patterns of national 
redistribution within the enlarged, liberalised economy of the EU.  
Overall, this SES approach has focused upon the distributional consequences 
of economic integration for individuals in the EU. It demonstrates that both winners 
and losers can be identified and that they both differ in their support for the EU 
(Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel & Whitten; 1997, Gabel 1998a & 1998b). This explains 
both differentiated support for the EU as well as the process individuals employ in 
assessing the personal impact of European integration.  
Social Location  
In addition to instrumental self-interest, SES and broad utilitarian approaches 
outlined above, recent analyses include socio-economic perceptions and combine 
them with social location variables which allowing for a more complex and robust 
assessment of how economic evaluations affect individualsÕ attitudes and support for 
the EU.  
Post-materialist theory argued that an increase in an individualÕs political 
sophistication created a value system of appreciation for the democratic system of 
which those individuals were a part of. In his analysis of cognitive mobilization 
Inglehart (1970) hypothesizes that rising levels of formal education tend to favour 
European integration. InglehartÕs (1970) findings confirm this hypothesis yet more 
interesting is his finding that the views expressed by the mass public of a given 
member state may vary when reacting to current events, and that individuals who are 
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most exposed to political sophistication are more supportive of European integration. 
Inglehart (1997) extended his thesis to encompass support for the EU, which resulted 
in a more refined rejection of materialist considerations. However, the process of 
individualsÕ political sophistication was centred upon the notion that individualsÕ 
cognitive mobilization increased political awareness, which in turn reduced the risks 
of European integration. In this instance, cognitive mobilization was operationalized 
in terms of high levels of political awareness and sophistication and it was based on 
the assumption that high levels of cognitive skills are needed in order to understand 
the complex and abstract nature of the EU. More information acquired by individuals 
with regards to the EU project will therefore encourage increased support for the EU.  
Overall, however, scholars have demonstrated that post-materialism is a weak 
determinant of EU support (Anderson & Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998a). Anderson & 
Reichert (1995) analysis of economic benefits and support for membership of the EU 
concludes that Òpost-materialists are significantly and consistently more supportive of 
their countryÕs EU membership than materialists among citizens of the original six 
member states, the reverse is true among citizens of new member statesÓ (Anderson & 
Reichert 1995, pp. 245-6). This means that the material aspects of European 
integration dominate value judgements of EU citizens from new member states, while 
more idealistic notions dominate public perceptions of the EU among citizens of the 
original six member states. The implications this has for cognitive mobilization, 
increases in political sophistication and interest as well as the ability to obtain and 
process accessible information with regards to the EU, have resulted in a more 
comprehensive approach.  
The weakness of the socio-political and the socio-economic approaches to 
support for the EU in terms of either SES or social location is that while they focus 
  61 
upon individual-level characteristics in the variation of support for the EU at the 
national level, they ignore the supranational character of the EU. The over emphasis 
on materialist and post-materialist explanations for support for the EU during the 
1990s obscured contemporary political issues such as the social policies of European 
integration. In addition, an overreliance on the purely utilitarian approach in 
explaining individual-level support for the EU is also limited, as it is based explicitly 
on the notion that the EU has the capacity to deliver the goods. Overall, while this 
instrumentalist approach may have provided a robust examination for support for the 
EU during the 1990s it has failed to incorporate and analyse continued integration 
beyond economic policy, which has had a vigorous effect on individual-level support 
for the EU. 
Scholarly research has moved from purely economic and utilitarian 
determinants to analysis of identity, political intermediaries, institutional 
performance, SES and social location all with an appeal to normative values.  
2.7: Why Inequality? 
In order to address support for the EU scholarly research has moved from 
purely economic and utilitarian determinants to the analysis of identity, political 
intermediaries, institutional performance, SES and social location. While these 
determinants are not bad predictors of EU support, their inadequacies highlight the 
need to expand their ability to further address individualsÕ normative notions and 
values in support for the EU. Since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8, EU citizens have been forced to address the role of the nation state in the sui 
generis and supranational EU, which has highlighted the relative strength of each 
member stateÕs governing structure and national institutional robustness. This has 
indirectly led to debates on equality/inequality, fairness, and justice in society 
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between member states of the EU, which has filtered down to the individual level. 
The individual level debate on inequality has been analysed through the lens of the 
liberal market economy of the EU. This has emphasised the need for inequality to be 
addressed and thus used as an effective determinant in examining support for the EU.  
Liberal market economies unavoidably produce inequalities and diverging 
levels of growth. When this fact is coupled with the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8, it becomes politically problematic for the stability and the legitimacy of the 
liberal market economy and democratic political institutions. Therefore, inequality 
becomes problematic when EU citizens perceive it to be excessive and when these 
perceptions are transferred to valuations of the liberal market economy and 
democratic political institutions. Inequality needs to be addressed at the individual 
level, with individuals in a given EU member state and society differing in how they 
perceive inequality depending on SES, social location and normative values. By 
addressing inequality at the individual level through normative notions of fairness and 
justice in society, inequality can be identified as an effective determinant in gauging 
support for the EU.  
Concerns about inequality are closely related to the emerging literature on 
social justice, in which individualsÕ perceptions of excessive inequality are driven by 
normative evaluations of ÔfairnessÕ and ÔjusticeÕ in society. In their analysis on social 
inequality and the perceived income-justice gap Verwiebe and Wegener (2000, p. 
123) examine Òwhether justice evaluations of income inequality in a society are 
determined more by country differences or by the social position an observer 
occupiesÓ. Their findings demonstrate that individualsÕ social positions are significant 
in shaping justice evaluations and that the variation in the perception of income 
justice must be attributed to the positional differences of individuals. Verwiebe and 
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Wegener (ibid, p. 123) conclude, Òthe characteristics of the transformation processes 
decrease in importance for determining public views about social justiceÓ. Building 
upon this, Osberg and SmeedingÕs (2006, p. 450) analysis of fair inequality10 
Òcompares attitudes in different countries toward what individuals in specific 
occupations Ôdo earnÕ and what they Ôshould earnÕ and to distinguish value 
preferences for more egalitarian outcomes from other confounding attitudes and 
perceptionsÓ. Their findings demonstrate that: (1) there is less awareness with regards 
to the extent of inequality at the top of the income distribution, (2) that attitudes are 
more polarised among individuals and (3) there is much less concern for reducing 
income differentials at the bottom of the distribution. These findings suggest that 
individualsÕ value-based attitudes towards inequality are affected by individualsÕ 
personal cognitive estimates of the extent of inequality.   
Beckfield (2006) builds upon these findings and applies the debate 
surrounding inequality to European integration. He argues that regional integration, or 
the construction of an international economy and polity within negotiated regions 
should matter for inequality, as Òregional economic integration should raise income 
inequality as workers are exposed to international competition and labour unions are 
weakenedÓ (Beckfield 2006, p. 964). Beckfield (2006) hypothesises that political 
integration should drive a reduction in welfare state expenditure in market-oriented 
regional polities as states adopt liberal policies in a context of fiscal austerity. His 
findings support these claims and the results demonstrate that Òregional integration 
                                                              
10 Inequality can be interpreted in terms of income ratios or income shares. IndividualsÕ value-based 
attitudes towards inequality (put simply, how much inequality individuals believe to be ÔfairÕ) is 
conditioned on an individuals personal cognitive estimates of the extent of inequality (again put 
simply, how much inequality individuals believe actually exists).  
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explains nearly half of the increase in income inequality in the Western European 
countries analysedÓ (ibid, p. 964).  
Solt (2008), meanwhile applies the principle of inequality to individualsÕ 
democratic political engagement. Solt (2008, p. 48) Òtests the theory that greater 
inequality increases the relative power of the wealthy to shape politics in their own 
favour against rival arguments that focus on the effects of inequality on citizensÕ 
objective interests or the resources they have available for political engagementÓ. His 
findings demonstrate that increased levels of inequality reduce political interest, the 
frequency of political discussion and participation in elections among all but the most 
affluent citizens.   
Building upon SoltÕs (2008) examination of inequality and political 
engagement, Loveless (2011), Loveless and Whitefield (2011) and Karakoc (2012) 
analyse the role inequality plays in terms of both political significance and civic 
engagement in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
subsequently influences support for the EU. Loveless (2011) builds upon GabelÕs 
(1998a; 1998b) arguments that utilitarianism is an extension of individualsÕ social 
location and that the perceptions individuals display with regards to their own 
economic experience and expectations in their respective market economies will 
influence support for the EU. Loveless (2011) argues that individualsÕ perception of 
inequality is established on the inability of market reform to produce social mobility 
and increased opportunities, which in turn has highlighted and emphasised 
inequalities via the institutions of the EU. He posits that in order to assess individualsÕ 
economic perceptions it is essential to evaluate individualsÕ perceptions of the 
opportunities available as a result of EU membership, Òrather than assuming that 
having an unsatisfactory (or satisfactory) income determines the lack (or wealth) of 
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their opportunities.Ó (Loveless 2011, p. 1090). Loveless is explicit in stating that the 
perception of inequality Òis thus linked to support for the EU by assessing the actual 
experiences of integration, that is, how it is ÔfeltÕ regardless of an overall preference 
for market economiesÓ (ibid, p. 1090). His findings demonstrate that there is in fact an 
increasingly nuanced economic criterion at the individual level, yet nevertheless the 
perception of inequality both strongly and independently influence support for the 
EU. Simultaneously, Loveless and Whitefield (2011) aim to analyse the connection 
between perceptions of inequality and citizensÕ views of new markets and democracy. 
Loveless and Whitefield (2011) state that market economies inevitably generate social 
inequalities and their results demonstrate that perceptions of inequality are driven by 
individual-level assessments of market and democratic performance but not by the 
market or democratic ideals. Put simply, while member stateÕs of the EU should 
display concerns about improving citizensÕ perceptions of their nation state economic 
and political performance, member states should not be concerned that citizens who 
realise that there is in fact too much inequality are not opponents of both democracy 
and the liberal market economy. Finally, Karakoc (2012) examines the effects of 
inequality on participation in civil society. His findings demonstrate that Òinequality 
has a drastically demobilizing effect on associational participation in countries with 
lower income inequality; meanwhile high inequality has a slightly weak mobilizing 
effect on associational participationÓ (Karakoc 2012, p. 1).  
All of these views are not strictly egalitarian, which therefore diminishes 
GabelÕs argument of pure Ôwinners and losersÕ across the European integration project 
and almost permits individuals to accept inequality to a point. More importantly, these 
views closely correspond to normative notions that, in societies, democratic 
institutions have an obligation to attain fair and just outcomes, emphasising the need 
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for inequality to be used as an effective determinant when examining support for the 
EU.  
2.8: Conclusion  
The understanding of support for the EU has increasingly encroached upon 
mass public opinion support and in particular upon individual level support for the 
EU. Overall this survey of the literature has highlighted that perhaps the demand for 
analyses on popular support for the EU is perhaps a result of EU citizens becoming 
more sophisticated in their demands of the EU as it comes to affect aspects of their 
daily lives. Scholars have therefore moved away from analyses on purely economic 
and utilitarian evaluations of the EU to examine potential new determinants of EU 
support such as national and European identity, the role of political intermediaries: 
elites, political parties and mass media, institutions and institutional performance.  
What has not been considered sufficiently is the prospect of inequality as a 
determinant for EU support. Since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8 EU citizens have been forced to address the role of the nation state in the sui 
generis EU which has highlighted the relative strength of each member stateÕs 
governing structure and national institutional robustness. This has indirectly led to 
normative debates on inequality, including fairness and justice in society between 
member states of the EU, which has filtered down to the individual level. An 
individual-level analysis of inequality is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, in order to 
address how individuals in a given EU member state differ in how they perceive 
inequality depending on social and economic status, social location and normative 
values and secondly, to examine how individuals perceive themselves to be ÔwinnersÕ 
or ÔlosersÕ of the EU project. In doing so, inequality will be an effective determinant 
of individual-level support for the EU.  
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The following chapter introduces the basis for individual-level effects on 
perceptions of inequality and how this can play a significant role when analysing 
mass public opinion support for the EU. The chapter also outline the approach used to 
produce individual-level effects on perceptions of inequality in the complex social 
setting of the post-economic crisis period of 2007-8 by examining the important role 
the determinant of inequality can play when analysing support for the EU.  
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Chapter 3: Theory 
 
3.1: Introduction  
This chapter introduces the basis for individual-level effects on perceptions of 
inequality and how this can play a significant role when analysing mass public 
opinion support for the European Union (EU) in the 27 EU member states11. I develop 
a set of hypotheses that provide the basis for empirical analysis in the following 
chapters. This chapter outlines the approach used to produce individual-level effects 
on perceptions of inequality in the complex social setting of the economic and 
financial crisis period of 2007-8, by discussing the important role the variable 
inequality can play when analysing support for the EU. This chapter theoretically 
grounds this analysis within the larger inequality, political behaviour and EU mass 
public opinion literature, which was outlined in Chapter Two.  
The principal function of the EU has been to create widespread and relatively 
equitable economic growth in Europe for the sake of continental stability, which over 
time has also come to include both social and political integration (Lindberg & 
Scheingold 1970; Inglehart 1971:  Shepherd 1975; Inglehart & Klingemann 1976; 
Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991; Hooghe 2003;  & Hooghe & Marks 2005). Overall, 
economic growth and political stability in Europe has been achieved with EU citizens 
understanding of support for the EU in terms of personal and aggregate economic 
growth which in turn produces higher support for the EU project (Anderson & 
Reichert 1995; Gabel & Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a & 1998b; McLaren 2002; 
                                                              
11 Data used in the analysis in Chapter five and Chapter six is the European Election Studies 2009 (EES 
2009) dataset, which collected data from all 27 EU member states following the 2009 European 
Parliament elections. Data used in the analysis in Chapter seven is Standard Eurobarometer data (72.4, 
74.2, 76.3, 78.1 and 80.1) 2009-2013, which collected data from all 27 EU member states in autumn of 
year stated. From 1st July 2013 Croatia joined the EU. Croatia is omitted from this analysis due to data 
unavailability in both European Election Study 2009 and Standard Eurobarometer 2009-2013.  
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Loveless 2010). However, recent trends suggest that the EU citizenry is becoming 
more critical of the EU. Since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007-8 there is a greater percentage of people who may not be objectively ÔpoorÕ but 
feel themselves to be at a heightened risk of economic adversity due to rising 
inequality and economic problems both in their respective countries and the EU (See 
Chapter seven). These individuals are likely to be more supportive of income 
redistribution as a means to minimize their own economic insecurity. 
This chapter will build upon previous explanations of individual-level support 
for the EU (outlined in chapter two) such as national versus European identity, 
political intermediaries and institutional performance. In doing so this chapter will 
analyse how theoretical determinants such as instrumental self-interest, SES, social 
location, democratic political institutions and the liberal market economy play a 
fundamental role in determining how inequality can be identified as the central 
independent variable in this inquiry of how individuals in the EU perceive both the 
notion of inequality and the way in which individualsÕ normative notions of inequality 
affect support for the EU.  
3.2: Instrumental Self-Interest  
The economic considerations of EU citizens have long been the most 
thoroughly examined approaches when analysing mass public support for the EU. 
Attitudes regarding support for the EU have been explained initially by personal 
economic considerations (Gabel 1998a, 1998b). In his analysis on economic 
integration and mass politics, Gabel (1998a) assesses how domestic politics influence 
international economic policy and how this may differ in the treatment of mass public 
opinion. Central to this argument is the question of whether individuals form attitudes 
about international economics that reflect their own economic interests. Gabel 
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(1998a) examines this premise using international economic theory to identify the 
variation in economic interests regarding international economic policy, 
hypothesising that as EU citizens form attitudes towards the EU, an institution based 
upon an international economic policy, these attitudes are consistent with individualsÕ 
occupation-based economic interests. Gabel (1998a, p. 936) finds that positive 
evaluations of support for the EU are positively related to Òintra-occupational 
differences in economic benefits from EU membershipÓ. In order to make this 
conclusion (Gabel 1998a) identifies how the occupation-based benefits of the liberal 
market economy are distributed among skilled and unskilled workers. He finds that 
the economic benefits of an internal market for an unskilled and skilled worker 
depends on how well he/she can compete with workers in his/her occupation 
throughout the market and not with other factors of production in his/her nation 
(Gabel 1998a, p. 939).   
Building upon these findings, Gabel (1998b) aims to explain the variation in 
mass public opinion towards the EU. He empirically examines five prominent 
theories of support for European integration: cognitive mobilization, political values, 
utilitarianism, class partisanship and support for government and demonstrates that 
the partisan context of integrative reforms and the utilitarian consequences of 
integrative policy provide robust explanations for in variations in individual support 
for the EU. However, the findings for two other prominent theories-cognitive 
mobilization and political values-produce a small, substantive impact on support for 
the EU and are only valid in a limited context as a ÒcitizenÕs support for integration is 
based on personal political characteristics that are generally immutable throughout 
adulthoodÓ (Gabel 1998b, p. 352). Meanwhile, the remaining theories of 
utilitarianism, class partisanship and support for government demonstrate that EU 
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citizens may change their support for the EU depending on specific factors such as 
how integrative policy affects their welfare (utilitarianism), how their political party 
portrays European integration (class partisanship) and their support for the governing 
political party (support for government). These results indicate that across all member 
states of the EU and across time it is the latter group of theories, which account for 
greater variance in support for the EU. Put simply, EU citizens differ in their support 
for the EU as a result of factors that may change over time.  
In conjunction with individual-level analysis of economic considerations as an 
indicator of EU support, analyses of individualsÕ perceptions of their own economic 
wellbeing and national economic performance have also been investigated 
(Eichenberg & Dalton 1993 & 2007; Gabel & Whitten 1997).  In their analysis of the 
dynamics of public support for European integration, Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) 
conceptualise public opinion as a function of both domestic and international 
conditions, in simple terms an individualÕs economic and political surroundings. They 
argue that if the EU Òis to deal forcefully with issues such as monetary union, social 
policy, foreign policy and constitutional reform, it will require active public support 
for political changeÓ (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, p. 508). Their findings suggest that 
European integration has both a direct and indirect impact on individualsÕ attitudes. 
The direct impact derives from both market integration and from extensive publicity 
and positive evaluations that result from policy activity as reforms at the EU level 
unfold. The indirect impact comes in the form of policy measures such as European 
Monetary Union (EMU), which contributes to citizensÕ support. All in all, Òcontinued 
integration is not the problem - it may very well be the solutionÓ (Eichenberg & 
Dalton 1993, p. 531).  
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Gabel and Whitten (1997) build their argument on Eichenberg & DaltonÕs 
(1993) investigation of how objective national economic conditions and national net 
return from the EU budget relate to national-level variation in support for European 
integration. Gabel and Whitten (1997, p. 82) believe that Eichenberg & Dalton (1993, 
pp. 522 & 527) produce limited empirical evidence that objective conditions influence 
support for the EU with only inflation (when analysing macroeconomic factors such 
as GDP, inflation and unemployment) having a statistically significant relationship 
with national-level variation in support for the EU. Gabel and Whitten (1997, p. 82) 
believe that one reason for these findings may be that Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) 
over-specified the link between economic conditions and support for the EU. While 
citizens may be sensitive to economic conditions in forming attitudes toward 
integration, objective measures of the national economy may be weak proxies for 
citizensÕ economic sensitivities. They argue that objective measures of national 
economic conditions do not always capture the often large and sub-national variation 
in economic conditions to which EU citizens may attach greater importance. 
Therefore ÒcitizensÕ perceptions of the economy may be inconsistent with the 
objective economic reality (local or national)Ó (Gabel & Whitten 1997, p. 82). In 
order to correct these potential sources of misspecification Gabel and Whitten (1997, 
p. 82) analyse the effects of both subjective evaluations of national and personal 
economic fortunes and objective regional and national economic conditions on 
support for European integration at the individual-level. Their findings indicate that it 
is the subjective economy as perceived by EU citizens, rather than the objective 
economy as measured by economic indicators, that influences support for the EU.  
This in turn has several implications for individual-level support for the EU: (1) as 
citizensÕ economic perceptions change their support for the EU will ultimately vary, 
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(2) support for the EU will also vary with perceptions of the economy and (3) the 
level of support for future reforms will depend on citizensÕ perceptions of their 
national and personal welfare.   
Building upon their existing findings (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993), Eichenberg 
and Dalton (2007) analyse the transformation of aggregate citizen support towards 
European integration from 1973-2004.  Their findings produce three predominant 
results for instrumental self-interest in evaluating support for the EU: (1) there has 
been considerable cross-national convergence in citizen support for the EU, (2) while 
economic factors indeed influence individuals support for the EU the impact of the 
cost/benefit approach is weaker, (3) the effect of inflation and trade concerns virtually 
disappeared following the Maastricht Treaty and (4) individualsÕ support for specific 
policy areas suggests that a decline in support for the EU started in 1991 with 
budgetary implications outlined by EMU. Overall Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, p. 
128) Òargue that the politics of European integration are now animated by distributive 
concerns as well as by evaluations of absolute economic performanceÓ  
The analyses of both personal economic situations and individualsÕ 
perceptions of their own economic well-being and national economic performance 
suggests a broader classification of EU citizens into Ôwinners and losersÕ of the 
European integration process. These explanations centre upon the notion that support 
for the EU comes from an implicit cost/benefit analysis by individuals assessing 
whether they are likely to benefit (i.e. be a ÔwinnerÕ) or lose (i.e. be a ÔloserÕ) from the 
European integration process, and this in turn has created a more specific form of 
egocentric utilitarianism.  
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3.3: Social & Economic Status  
SES variables provide robust cues to an individualÕs position in the social 
structure (for example, education and income) and individual characteristics that 
shape their behaviour (for example, age). SES has been used to create structural 
differences by providing access to information or attitudes that provide a preference 
for specific political consumption choices. SES effects derive from the economic 
models of EU support by Gabel (1998a), Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Gabel 
and Whitten (1997), which incorporated the broad model of individualsÕ support for 
the EU in terms of cost/benefit analysis.  
The utilitarian, cost/benefit approach implies that as material gains within a 
nation state increase, in particular through market liberalization as part of the EU, 
support for the EU will increase. This indeed proved true for those who are positioned 
to take advantage of European integration because, distinguished by SES (Gabel & 
Palmer 1995; Gabel & Whitten; 1997, Gabel 1998a & 1998b).  This instrumental 
approach estimates that higher income earners benefit from continued European 
integration as it creates investment opportunities. Lower income earners, meanwhile, 
are subjected to diminishing welfare as a result of increased capital liberalization. 
Gabel (1998a and 1998b) demonstrated that individuals with high SES and low SES 
saw the EU differently. Those individuals with high SES regard the EU as the 
expansion of the market and therefore that brings opportunities, while those 
individuals with low SES regard the EU in terms of diminishing welfare due to 
declining patterns of national redistribution within the expanded, liberalized economy 
of the EU  (Brinegar & Jolly 2005).  
In conjunction with the utilitarian approach, individualsÕ social and economic 
status in terms of occupation and working sector (public or private) will play a role, 
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with younger European citizens being more likely to benefit from integration, as they 
are more cosmopolitan, mobile and flexible. In their assessment of public opinion in 
relation to economic uncertainty, Inglehart and Rabier (1978) find a positive 
correlation between support for the EU and a member stateÕs level of industrial 
production as well as the occurrence of post-materialist values. Overall, this SES 
approach has focused upon the distributional consequences of economic integration 
for individuals in the EU; it demonstrates that both winners and losers can be 
identified and that they both differ in their support for the EU (Gabel & Palmer 1995; 
Gabel & Whitten; 1997, Gabel 1998a & 1998b). This explains both differentiated 
support for the EU and the process individuals employ in assessing the personal 
impact of European integration.  
In relation to specific socio-economic status variables, education is perhaps 
the most salient socio-economic variable that has been examined in mass public 
opinion support. Higher education teaches one to think in a more conceptual manner 
(Almond & Verba, 1963). Converse (1964) builds upon Almond & VerbaÕs (1964) 
thesis by stating that individuals who are better educated should be more likely to pay 
attention to political information because politics is a complex subject that requires a 
particular level of interest, ability and motivation which would be displayed in further 
or higher political sophistication. More recent work by Zaller (1992) continued on the 
lines of education as a SES but suggested that the most informed individuals about 
public affairs are more likely to absorb and therefore interpret new information. 
Income has consistently been a strong intervening variable for mass public opinion 
support. This variable is subject to much less variation and serves as a semi-
permanent feature in models of public opinion support. Age is a valuable theoretical 
distinction that relates to the long-standing arguments of socialisation (Inglehart 
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1978). Given different generationsÕ different socialisation experiences in the political 
world, we would expect younger generations to be more in favour of new political 
orientations such as the EU.  
3.4: Social Location 
In addition to the instrumental self-interest, SES and broad utilitarian 
approaches outlined above, recent analyses include socio-economic perceptions and 
combine them with social location variables allowing for a more complex and robust 
assessment of how economic evaluations affect individualsÕ attitudes and support for 
the EU.  
From the outset, post-materialist theory argued that an increase in an 
individualÕs political sophistication created a value system of appreciation for the 
democratic system of which those individuals were a part. In his analysis of cognitive 
mobilization, Inglehart (1970) hypothesizes that rising levels of formal education tend 
to favour European integration. InglehartÕs (1970) findings confirm this hypothesis 
however, perhaps more interesting is his finding that Òthe opinions expressed by the 
public of a given nation may fluctuate distinctively in response to current eventsÓ 
(Inglehart 1970, p. 69) and that individuals who are most exposed to political 
sophistication are more supportive of European integration. He argues that, while this 
pattern is linked to differences in social class, it cannot be explained through 
differences in political party preference or perceptions of economic benefits (Inglehart 
1970, p. 70). Rather, mass public support for European integration can be explained 
through individualsÕ rising levels of income, education and support for the 
supranational institutions of the EU. His findings of 1970 are replicated by Inglehart 
& Rabier (1978), with their results suggesting that long-term influences continue to 
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dominate the effects of the immediate economic context through cognitive 
mobilization.  
Inglehart extended his thesis to encompass support for the EU (Inglehart 
1997), which resulted in a more refined rejection of materialist considerations. 
However, the process of individualsÕ political sophistication was centred upon the 
notion that individualsÕ cognitive mobilization increased political awareness, which in 
turn reduced the risks of European integration. In this instance, cognitive mobilization 
was operationalized in terms of high levels of political awareness and sophistication, 
and it was based on the assumption that high levels of cognitive skills are needed in 
order to understand the complex and abstract nature of the EU. More information 
acquired by individuals with regards to the EU project will therefore encourage 
increased support for the EU.  
However, post-materialism as a determinant of EU support has demonstrated 
to be a weak relationship (Anderson & Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998a). While Anderson 
& ReichertÕs (1995) analysis of economic benefits and support for membership in the 
EU concludes that Òpost-materialists are significantly and consistently more 
supportive of their countryÕs EU membership than materialists among citizens of the 
original six member states, the reverse is true among citizens of new member statesÓ 
(Anderson & Reichert 1995, p. 245-6). This means that the material aspects of 
European integration dominate value judgements of EU citizens from new member 
states, while more idealistic notions dominate public perceptions of the EU among 
citizens of the original six member states. The implications this has for cognitive 
mobilization, increases in political sophistication and interest as well as the ability to 
obtain and process accessible information with regards to the EU, has resulted in a 
more comprehensive approach. As individuals develop a more cosmopolitan outlook, 
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their apprehension towards the EU project decreases. Janssen (1991) further tests the 
theory of cognitive mobilization and post-materialism. While he is critical of the links 
between post-materialism, cognitive mobilization and support for the EU (stating that 
from his analysis on cross-national differences in support for the EU his findings 
demonstrate that post-materialism is unrelated to attitudes towards European 
integration, and that the concept of cognitive mobilization is only applicable at the 
individual-level), his findings produce a positive correlation between political 
involvement and knowledge and support for the EU.   
The analysis above forms part of the social basis in which political 
sophistication and skills develop. Variables such as age, income, occupation and 
political values are not control variables but have become independent variables that 
contribute to an individualsÕ cognitive development and their understanding of the EU 
project (Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991). Through his analysis of whether support for 
European integration is driven by elite opinion or mass public opinion, Weβels (1995) 
established that variables such as education, age gender and individualsÕ SES are 
significant contributors to an individualÕs support for the EU. Gabel (1998a) has also 
supported the insertion of an individualÕs social location as an indicator of support for 
the EU highlighting specifically socio-demographic characteristics and political and 
ideological preferences, in particular centre versus left/right cleavages, while 
Anderson and Reichert (1995) have focused upon an individualÕs ideological 
positions.  
The limitation of both socio-political and socio-economic approaches when 
assessing support for the EU in terms of either SES or social location is that while 
they link individual-level characteristics to changes in support for the EU at the nation 
state level, they ignore the supranational character and nature of the EU. The 
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overemphasis on materialist and post-materialist explanations for support for the EU 
during the 1990s obscured new political issues such as social aspects and social 
policies of European integration. The cost/benefit analysis is the most cross-
temporally robust when analysing support for the EU at both the individual-level and 
the nation state-level as it is the EU which has made the most vigorous impact in 
terms of economic outcomes and economic considerations. However, the purely 
utilitarian approach is limited, as it is based explicitly on the notion that the EU has 
the capacity to deliver the goods of society. This instrumentalist approach may have 
provided a robust analysis for EU support during the 1990Õs but the EU has continued 
to integrate beyond economic policy, which has in turn had an effect on individual-
level support for the EU.  
3.5: Democratic Political Institutions & the Market 
Several scholarly works have presented evidence that popular perceptions of 
the EU are contextualized by national institutional factors (Easton 1975; Anderson 
1998; Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Sancez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002; 
Kritzinger 2003; Dalton 2005; Loveless 2010). Anderson (1998) argues that citizens 
employ proxies embedded in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to 
questions about the European integration process. He then develops a model of mass 
public opinion support toward European integration based on attitudes towards the 
political system, the incumbent government and the establishment of political parties. 
AndersonÕs (1998) results demonstrate that the political system and the establishment 
of political party support are the most powerful determinants of support for the EU. In 
addition, the results highlight that the relationship between economic factors and 
support for the EU are likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.   
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Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) builds upon AndersonÕs (1998) thesis and believes 
that previous research on mass public opinion support for the EU assumes that 
support is a function of economic calculations. He challenges this by proposing a 
model that demonstrates that support for the EU is the consequence of the interplay 
between supranational politics and national politics. In simple terms, the higher a 
citizenÕs opinion of the functioning of supranational institutions and the lower a 
citizenÕs opinion of national institutions, the greater an individualÕs support for the 
EU. In conjunction with this hypothesis, it may be postulated that the worse an 
individualÕs opinion of the national system is the lower the opportunity cost of 
transferring sovereignty to the EU. In his analysis, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) shows that 
levels of national support for the EU at the individual level are higher in those 
countries that suffer greater corruption and have less-developed welfare states.  
Finally, Rohrschneider (2002) suggests that the representation deficit in the 
EU undermines mass support for the EU, especially when national institutions are 
functioning well. In his analysis, Rohrschneider (2002) finds that when citizens 
perceive that they are unrepresented, their support for the EU is reduced, independent 
of economic perceptions, with this reduction being particularly pertinent in nations 
with well-functioning political institutions.  
Building upon the national institutional factors that determine mass public 
opinion support toward the EU, the standard model of support for the EU now relies 
heavily on national-level variables that play a role in shaping popular perceptions of 
the EU. Kritzinger (2003) seeks to explain variations in mass public opinion support 
towards the EU, arguing that national factors are believed to be more important than 
European ones as a result of the lack of knowledge about the EU and the direct 
influence of the nation state on citizens. She states that the evaluation of the EU 
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depends on the performance of the nation state, as citizensÕ perceptions of the nation 
state are used as a proxy for the formulation of attitudes towards the EU. Her findings 
confirm that support for the EU reflects national attitudes and that the EU is the 
institution citizens look towards to manage surmounting national problems.  
It is argued that when individuals display dissatisfaction with democracy, they 
want more democracy, not less democracy. In his analysis, Dalton (2005) highlights 
this and demonstrates that public dissatisfaction about politics and government are in 
fact spreading across advanced industrial democracies. Dalton (2005, p. 149) analyses 
social correlates to illustrate individuals dissatisfaction with democracy and produces 
findings that demonstrate that support for democracy Òis decreasing most among 
groups that have benefited most from the progress of democratic governments during 
the late twentieth centuryÓ while Klingemann (1999, pp. 42 & 46) has suggested that 
we are witnessing a new pattern of Ôdissatisfied democratsÕ or Ôcritical citizensÕ who 
are committed to democratic ideals, but critical of how contemporary democracies 
fulfill their own ideals. In addition, Norris (1999) states that democratic institutions 
are a better indicator of public dissatisfaction with democracy, as they are the basic 
pillars of society. NorrisÕs (1999) thesis is an extension of EastonÕs (1975) 
reassessment of the concept of political support, which analyses political community, 
regime and authorities. Norris (1999) draws a line between the political community, 
regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors and 
demonstrates that, in order to confront citizensÕ dissatisfaction with democracy, and in 
tandem with Klingemann (1999) and Dalton (2005), there are demands from both 
elites and the mass public to reform the institutions of democratic governance.   
When examining the interplay between the three facets of (1) satisfaction with 
democracy, (2) the liberal market economy and (3) inequality in order to assess 
  82 
individual-level support for the EU, it is the liberal market economy which distorts 
the distribution of goods of society. Put simply, the distribution of the goods of 
society is represented by income and attendant socio-economic supports to income, 
such as social welfare benefits, pensions and the ability to spend disposable income 
and access to complementary aspects of income such as health and education. It is 
from the distribution of the goods of society that individuals will evaluate whether 
there is in fact more inequality or perceive that there is more inequality since the onset 
of the economic crisis of 2007-8. As Dalton (2005), Klingemann (1999) and Norris 
(1999) state, institutional involvement and more democracy not less democracy, is 
favoured among the mass public. This allows an examination in the changes in 
individual-level support for the EU and a re-examination as to whether the sui generis 
EU is valued more for its democratic (i.e. institutions, social issues, politics) character 
rather than its liberal market (i.e. economic) character when addressing inequality.  
Since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007-8, national level contextual 
factors matter in differing ways. As countries move from lower levels of economic 
and political performance, citizens move from economic to political criteria. 
Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010)12 argue that analyses of contextual effects do not 
explain how EU citizens evaluate conflicting information arising from national 
contexts. They hypothesize that an EU nation stateÕs affluence and quality of 
governance creates the salience of issues which in turn influences the criteria that EU 
citizens use when evaluating attitudinal factors to determine support for the EU. 
When this is applied to EU citizens in less affluent nation states these individuals 
evaluate the EU on the basis of economic prospects. However, in more affluent 
                                                              
12 Like other scholars: (for example, Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998; Carrubba 2001) 
Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) included whether a nation state is a beneficiary of the net transfers 
from the EU to the national level.  
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nations mass publics rely on political criteria to evaluate the EU. The findings by 
Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) strongly support this hypothesis. In the least 
affluent EU member states, individuals generalise their perceptions of national and 
personal economic conditions to the EU level. Since these conditions are generally 
unfavourable, individuals believe that the EU does not represent their economic 
interests. In contrast, in the most affluent EU member states individuals are equally 
critical of the EU but base their judgements on the comparative quality of national 
governments and EU institutions. The underlying assumption remains that further EU 
expansion implies continued market liberalization. However, since the economic and 
financial crisis began in 2007/8, what the EU citizenry may regard as excessive 
inequality may have little to do with inequality per se but depend on whether the 
economy as a whole provides high living standards and dynamic economic 
development.  
3.6: Inequality  
Concerns about inequality are more closely related to the emerging literature 
on social justice, in which individualsÕ perceptions of excessive inequality are to some 
degree driven by normative values such as ÔfairnessÕ and ÔjusticeÕ in society. In their 
analysis on fair inequality13, Osberg and Smeeding (2006, pp. 451) compare attitudes 
toward what individuals in specific occupations Òdo earnÓ and what they Òshould 
earnÓ in order to distinguish between value preferences for more egalitarian outcomes 
from attitudes and perceptions. Their findings suggest that individualsÕ value-based 
                                                              
13 By distinguishing between what individuals Ôdo earnÕ and Ôshould earnÕ Osberg & Smeeding (2006) 
offer a focused way of distinguishing between individuals value preferences for more egalitarian 
outcomes and other confounding attitudes and perceptions. This is necessary because inequality as a 
term amalgamates the perceptions of income differences between the top and the middle of the income 
distribution, attitudes toward the gap in the middle classes and poor and preferences for general 
redistribution of wealth. In order to determine whether inequality is a noteworthy determinant of EU 
support it is necessary to consider the normative notion embedded within inequality as a concept and 
note what individuals believe to be acceptable and ÔfairÕ.  
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attitudes toward inequality (i.e. how much inequality respondents think would be 
ÔfairÕ) are also influenced by individualsÕ personal cognitive estimates of the extent of 
inequality (i.e. how much inequality individuals believe actually exists). Overall, 
Osberg and Smeeding14 (2006) find that there is less awareness concerning the extent 
of inequality at the top of the income distribution, there is less concern for reducing 
differentials at the bottom of the income distribution and there is a polarization of 
attitudes among individuals. Kreidl15 (2000) builds upon the thesis of Osberg and 
Smeeding (2006) and applies merited, unmerited and fatalistic types of poverty and 
wealth. KreidlÕs (2000) findings demonstrate that preferences for each type of poverty 
and wealth centre upon stratification-related experiences and the social position of 
each individual. Verwiebe and Wegener16 (2000) also analyse whether social justice 
evaluations of income inequality in a society are determined by national level country 
differences or by the social position of the individual. In their inquiry, Verwiebe and 
Wegener (2000) find that most of the variation in the deviation in the perception of 
income justice must be attributed to the positional differences of individuals. They 
conclude that the characteristics of the transformation processes decline in importance 
when determining public opinion about social justice. Finally, in Central and Eastern 
Europe specifically, Loveless and Whitefield (2011) state that market economies 
inevitably generate social inequalities, and they aim to make a connection between 
perceptions of social inequality and citizens views of new markets and democracy. 
Their findings also suggest that perceptions of social inequality are driven by 
                                                              
14 Osberg & Smeeding (2006) use the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) micro data from 
1999, which compares the United States with other industrialised nations. EU member states included 
in this study are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany (East and West), Great Britain, 
Hungary, Latvia, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.  
15 Kreidl (2000) uses International Social Justice Project (ISJP) data from 1991 and 1996. EU member 
states included in this study are: West Germany, the Netherlands and Czech Republic.  
16 Verwiebe & Wegener (2000) use International Social Justice Project (ISJP) data from 1991 and 
1996. EU member states included in this study are: Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany 
and West Germany.  
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individual-level assessments of market and democratic performance but less so by the 
market or democratic ideals.  While EU member states should display concerns about 
improving citizensÕ perceptions of their nation state and economic performance, 
member states should not be concerned that citizens realise that there is in fact too 
much inequality and are not opponents of both democracy and the liberal market 
economy.  
All of these views (Kreidl 2000; Verwiebe & Wegener 2000; Osberg & 
Smeeding 2006; Loveless & Whitefield 2011) are not strictly egalitarian, therefore 
diminishing GabelÕs argument of pure Ôwinners and losersÕ of the European 
integration project and almost permitting individuals to accept inequality to a point. In 
Europe, Kaltenhaler et al. (2008, p. 218) contend that individualsÕ orientation to 
income inequality is Òlargely a product of the ideas that they hold about politics and 
society and not solely a product of their economic self-interestÓ, incorporating views 
of equality and fairness versus strict egalitarianism. More importantly, these views 
closely correspond to normative notions that in societies, democratic institutions have 
an obligation to attain fair and just outcomes (Rohrschneider 2005) 
The market and democracy are mutually reinforcing mechanisms, such that 
markets can produce better economic outcomes for a greater number of EU citizens. 
This is achieved in conjunction with strong and efficient democratic institutions. If an 
economy, or EU member state, has high living standards and dynamic economic 
development, individuals will accept higher or perhaps objective levels of inequality. 
Major theoretical arguments that link political democracy with economic inequality 
have argued that, Òby reducing inequalities in the distribution of political power, 
democracy in turn helps to reduce inequalities of wealth and statusÓ as well as 
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exploring the view that Òextreme inequalities in wealth undermine political 
structuresÓ (Bollen & Jackman 1985, p. 438).  
Discussions on the effect of democracy on inequality have been refined in the 
works of Key (1949), Lipset (1960) and Lenski (1966). For Key (1949) democratic 
institutions are important because they give rise to organised political competition. He 
concludes that the lack of sustained competition between two clearly defined political 
groups makes governments more susceptible to individual pressures and favouritism 
and argues that Òsingle party politics has a status quo bias that benefits the ÔhavesÕ at 
the expense of the Ôhave notÕsÕÓ (Key, 1949 p. 307). LipsetÕs (1960) analysis extends 
KeyÕs argument by arguing that democratic political structures lead to elections that 
serve as the expression of the democratic class struggle. Lipset (1960) suggests that 
citizens vote for parties that appeal to either working-class or middle-class interests 
with elections serving as the expression of the democratic class struggle as political 
parties have come to reflect class interests. Lipset (1960) concludes that without 
democratic political institutions the role of elections is unlikely to be fulfilled, hence 
the importance of democracy. Finally, LenskiÕs (1966 p. 317) theory of social 
stratification parallels LipsetÕs (1960) argument. For Lenski, the Ònew democratic 
ideologyÓ (ibid, p. 317) is significant because it legitimates a major redistribution of 
political power in favour of the disadvantaged elements of society. This increased 
political equality has led to more social equality because the predominant electoral 
demand made on modern political elites has been made for a more egalitarian 
distribution of material goods.  
The effect of inequality on democracy centres upon the fact that economic 
inequality inhibits the emergence or performance of democratic political structures. 
Dahl (1971, Chapter 6) suggests that extreme inequalities in the distribution of 
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material goods produce hegemonic regimes for two reasons. Firstly, economic 
resources can be translated into political resources allowing the ÔhavesÕ to prevent 
political reforms that extend rights and liberties for those who are at a disadvantage in 
society. Secondly, economic inequalities may undermine democracies through the 
resentment and frustrations they generate. Dahl (1971) suggests that political 
democracies are particularly vulnerable because extreme disparities reduce the sense 
of community and legitimacy upon which democracy is based. In simple terms, the 
effect of inequality on democracy is anticipated because concentrated economic 
rewards lead to concentrated political resources, undermining political equality. In 
addition, economic inequality generates frustrations that undermine allegiance to 
democratic procedures. 
IndividualsÕ perceptions of excessive inequality do not necessarily drive 
dislike or distrustfulness of democratic institutions. Kaltenhaler et al (2008) seek to 
understand why attitudes vary among individuals regarding the issue of income 
distribution in EU member states17. They hypothesize that the issue of income 
inequality is a significant political cleavage that can influence European politics and 
focus their research on the national context as well as individual-level characteristics 
such as political attitudes, economic self-interest and general attitude toward society, 
in order to gauge how EU citizens view income inequality in their respective member 
states. Their findings suggest that the way in which EU citizens think about income 
inequality in their societies is a product of the ideas they embrace about politics and 
society and not solely economic self-interest.  
                                                              
17 Due to data limitations in the World Value Survey and the European Values Survey respondents 
from Cyprus and Portugal are omitted by Kaltenhaler et al (2008) in their analysis.  
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In Central and Eastern Europe specifically, Whitefield and Loveless (2013) 
provide an assessment of how EU citizens link inequality to both democracy and to 
the market and whether this generates social conflict. They control for ideological and 
experiential indicators and by country conditions such as the level of income 
inequality as well as economic and democratic development. Whitefield and Loveless 
(2013) demonstrate that there is indeed a link between individualsÕ perceptions of 
social inequality and expectations of market generated inequality, but not social 
conflict generated by democratic institutions.  
As outlined above, much of the comparative analysis on inequality has 
focused upon Central and Eastern European member states of the EU. In order to 
examine how inequality affects individual-level support for the EU cross-nationally 
analysis needs to be expanded to include all twenty-seven member states of the EU. In 
doing so, individual-level effects on the perceptions of inequality in the complex 
social setting of the economic crisis period of 2007/8 can be established in turn 
identifying the significant role inequality can play when analysing support for the EU.  
3.7: The Effects of Inequality: Broad Hypotheses  
This section outlines the broad hypotheses while the following empirical 
chapters will specifically address the effect of inequality as it pertains to support for 
the EU.   
DahlÕs (1989) in-depth analysis in Democracy and its Critics focuses upon the 
notion that democratic institutions are designed to perform in an egalitarian, or at least 
a modestly majoritarian manner. Following on from this thesis, scholars such as 
Bollen & Jackman (1985), Szelenyi & Kostello (1996) and Reuveny & Li (2003) 
have concluded in their analyses of the interplay between democracy and inequality 
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that individuals regard democratic institutions as the fundamental mechanism in 
addressing both excessive and inevitable distortions within the liberal market 
economy. If the attributes of democracy are regarded to be impartial and fair, then 
citizens having obtained what they want or what they do not want from the principles 
of democracy will be inclined to accept the outcome, in turn producing democratic 
legitimacy. RohrschneiderÕs (2005) analysis of institutional quality and representation 
in advanced industrial democracies supports this notion with his results inferring that 
Òwhen national administrative and judicial institutions work well, citizens are also 
more likely to believe that parliaments and governments account for their interests, 
net of economic factorsÓ (Rohrschneider 2005, pp. 850). Put simply, democratic 
institutions can be regarded to deliver some security from inherent, or perceived,  
inequalities of the liberal market economy, as it is the role of democratic institutions 
to serve as unbiased intermediaries of universal social welfare for citizens. It is also 
the role of democratic institutions, in the eyes of citizens, to reduce the effects of 
market-driven inequality.  
In order to link this to individual-level support for the EU, I make a 
connection between individualsÕ concerns about inequality and the changes in their 
level of support for the EU through the relationship inequality has both to democratic 
political institutions and the liberal market economy. Drawing upon the findings of 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006), I argue that EU citizens want democratic 
institutions and the liberal market economy to work effectively at both the national 
level and the EU level, as both democracy and the market are intertwined with one 
another and are therefore mutually reinforcing mechanisms. This in turn allows liberal 
market economies to produce enhanced economic outcomes for a larger number of 
individuals in conjunction with robust and effective democratic institutions.  
  90 
In a previous analysis Bollen and Jackman (1985) argued that, if an economy 
provides high living standards and dynamic economic development individuals are 
often willing to accept relatively high, objective levels of inequality. The balance 
between effective democratic institutions and market-generated inequalities is 
credible in EU member states with robust democratic political institutions as 
individuals regard these institutions as the mechanism, which will safeguard them 
from excessive inequality (Bollen & Jackman 1985; Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; 
Reuveny & Li 2003; Whitefield & Loveless 2013).  
I propose that in the wake of the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8, the EU can be regarded as both the guarantor of democracy and the institution 
best placed to combat and address market-driven inequalities. One the one hand, the 
belief of EU citizens that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-
generated inequality is based upon individual citizensÕ support for the EU project and 
its continuation. One the other hand, individualsÕ lack of support for the EU and 
disappointment with the EUÕs performance since the onset of the economic crisis may 
also highlight the EUÕs inability to address inequality and enforce democratic 
responses to individuals economic fragility. It is not irrational to make the connection 
between strong democratic responses by institutions and market-generated 
inequalities. As previous analysis has demonstrated (Kaltenhaler et al. 2008; 
Whitefield & Loveless 2013) individualsÕ perceptions of excessive inequality do not 
produce dislike or distrustfulness of democratic institutions. In fact, analyses by 
Dalton (2004) and Norris (1999), as outlined previously in this chapter, demonstrate 
that individuals who display dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy want 
more, not less, democracy.  
Therefore, broad hypotheses in this analysis include:  
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H1a: IndividualsÕ belief that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-
generated inequality is positively correlated with individualsÕ support for the 
EU project.  
H1b: IndividualsÕ belief that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-
generated inequality is negatively correlated with individualsÕ lack of support 
for the EU.  
H2a: IndividualsÕ belief that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-
generated inequality is negatively correlated with individualsÕ dissatisfaction 
with the EUÕs performance since the onset of the financial crisis in addressing 
inequality.  
H2b: IndividualsÕ belief that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-
generated inequality is negatively correlated with individualsÕ disappointment 
with its performance since the onset of the financial crisis in enforcing 
democratic responses to economic fragility.  
When the liberal market economy alters the distribution of the goods of 
society, democratic institutional remedies need to be available to address market-
generated inequalities, if indeed democratic institutions, including the EU, are the 
mechanism individuals expect to address inequality. This analysis allows an 
examination of the changes in individual-level support for the EU as well as a re-
examination of whether the EU is regarded more for its democratic character than its 
market character.  
In my analysis, I expect to find that individuals perceive that market-generated 
inequality is insufficiently addressed by their nation states and, as a result, individuals 
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now believe that the EU is the mechanism or institution best placed to deal with 
market-generated inequality. This will have a positive effect on EU support and 
increase support for the EU. It also implies that individuals regard the EU as the 
enforcer of democratic political institutions, and that these institutions are aiming to 
obtain more social justice (i.e. a demand for increased fairness and justice in society) 
for individuals. The negative effect on individual-level support for the EU, 
particularly among citizens sceptical about its ability to address inequality may work 
in conjunction with the notion of the perceived Ôdemocratic deficitÕ and worries of the 
efficacy of the EU. Or, the negative effect for EU support by individuals may be a 
preference by individuals to have their nation state play a more significant role in 
addressing inequality, and therefore it is the nation state, not the EU, that is the 
mechanism and source of action to address inequality. In either of these instances, 
individualsÕ concerns about inequality will decrease support for the EU, as individuals 
believe that the EU is either an institution inadequate to the task of addressing 
inequality, or simply that it is the role of the nation state to address inequality.  
When combining this, the theory that connects individualsÕ concerns about 
addressing inequality to both support for the EU and national governance focuses 
upon the notion that individuals pursue robust democratic politics to act as a 
safeguard against market-generated inequalities (Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; 
Reuveny and Li 2003; Whitefield and Loveless 2013). This entails the following 
broad hypothesis:  
H3: As individualsÕ desire for inequality to be addressed increases, individuals 
are more likely to support the EU and continuation of the EU project.  
 
  93 
3.8: Perceptions of Inequality: Direct Effects  
The emphasis in this section focuses on inequality and how it affects support 
for the EU both directly and indirectly at the individual-level. In my analysis the 
examination of inequality as a determinant of EU support is founded upon a value-
based position that reflects individualÕs support for democratic institutions to serve as 
an arbiter of market-generated inequality. In order to demonstrate that this measure of 
inequality is not a proxy for other value-based positions and can therefore be 
independently predictive of support for the EU, I analyse how inequality is both 
correlated with ideological and socio-economic positions (i.e. variables that centre 
upon instrumental self-interest, SES, social location and political institutions and the 
market). I use the on-going financial crisis of 2007/8 as a salient moment to activate 
citizensÕ concerns about overall economic performance suggesting that there are more 
individuals if not actually doing worse economically, then at least feeling or 
perceiving as if they are achieving less economically. As these evaluations are not 
only economic but also socio-tropic, it is possible to assess the liberal market 
economy via the spectrum of inequality highlighting that the market may in fact be 
too unfair. This makes inequality representative at the individual-level as individuals 
begin to assess societal opportunities in terms of access to and opportunity within the 
EU in turn making inequality a determinant for support for the EU.  
For individuals, the perception of inequality is centred upon Òthe failure of 
market reform to produce social mobility and increased opportunitiesÓ (Loveless 
2010, p. 1089).  The simplest form of relationship is that Òinequality produces 
perceptions of inequalityÓ (Loveless & Whitefield 2011, p. 241) and this relationship 
can be studied in two ways. Firstly, given empirical evidence by Marmot (2001) and 
Alesina et al (2004) in their analyses of life chances and happiness, individuals may 
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be more likely to perceive inequality in countries where absolute levels of inequality 
are objectively higher. Secondly, perceptions of inequality may be determined by 
changes in absolute levels of inequality in a nation state. A high level of inequality 
may in fact be constant and perceived by individuals as normal and is therefore 
unseen by citizens. As Kreidl (2000) infers, these objective measures of inequality 
may only shape an individuals perceptions when citizens notice a significant change 
in the extent of inequality from previous ÔnormalÕ levels. Both of these notions of 
individualsÕ perceptions of inequality will have a direct effect on support for the EU.  
The notion of normative commitments refers to individualsÕ stances on how 
the economy, welfare state and political system should operate. Normative values 
reflect and reply to SES and social locations in an important way. However as 
Almond and Verba (1963) deduced, normative values are difficult to pinpoint and 
only alter slowly over time. Individuals who are normatively opposed to liberal 
markets per se, or individuals who have robust, state-centred and welfare state 
orientated views of liberal market regulations, are more likely to view levels of 
inequality to be excessive. When these normative beliefs about the perceptions of 
inequality are combined with individualsÕ instrumental self-interest, SES, social 
location and views on democratic political institutions, these normative values will 
have a direct effect on support for the EU.  
3.9: Addressing Inequality, Economic Insecurity, Perceptions of Insecurity & 
Normative Preferences  
The theorised relationship between inequality, individualÕs perceptions of 
inequality, economic insecurity and a normative preference that redistribution is 
addressed centres firstly on the distribution of the goods of society. It is the 
distribution of the goods of society, that is to say income and attendant socio-
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economic supports to income such as social welfare benefits, pensions and the ability 
to spend disposable income and access to complementary aspects of income such as 
health and education, that allows individuals to evaluate whether there is either more 
or that they perceive more inequality since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2007/8. It is the unfair distribution of the goods of society which forms the 
basis of the theorised relationship tested in this inquiry-that it is either the unfair 
distribution of the goods of society which has placed more individuals in a more 
fragile socio-economic state, or it has made these individuals feel or perceive 
themselves to be in a more precarious socio-economic state.  The variations in how 
individuals in the EU benefit from and share in aggregate economic growth or in how 
those alterations in economic growth are distributed are revealed in individuals 
concerns about inequality. As the findings in Chapter Five and Chapter Six suggest, 
ÔlosersÕ of European integration are not only ÔlosersÕ with regards to European 
integration but they are also ÔlosersÕ as a consequence of EU member statesÕ reducing 
their own public sector capacity and political willingness to continue fundamental 
elements of the welfare state for individuals. This demonstrates that while many 
individuals may not be de facto ÔpoorÕ or ÔlosersÕ of the EU project in a stringent 
economic definition according to their individual income many individuals perceive 
themselves to be closer to this position since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2007/8.  
As a result, theoretically intertwined within this is individualÕs economic 
insecurity. The findings in Chapter Five and Chapter Six of this inquiry demonstrate 
that increased support for the EU and the continuation of the EU project suggests that 
individuals regard the EU as the enforcer of democratic political institutions, that is 
the enforcers of fairness, justice and transparency. Put simply, individuals believe that 
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the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-driven inequality, which in 
turn increases support for the EU. The theoretical rationale for individualÕs economic 
insecurity and increased support for the EU is highlighted in Chapter Seven when an 
examination of whether the EU is primarily responsible for the stabilisation of 
financial markets and domestic and international economics in order to address 
market-generated inequality. This determines whether individualÕs economic 
insecurity and therefore their expectation on either the EU or EU member states 
government to address their economic insecurity as a consequence of market-
generated inequality.  
The theoretical relationship between inequality, perceptions of inequality and 
economic insecurity is tested in each of the empirical chapters in this inquiry (in 
Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven) and highlights the theoretical rationale 
for individualsÕ normative preferences for redistribution.  Throughout this inquiry the 
theoretical mechanism has examined whether the liberal market economy is too 
unequal and whether individualsÕ economic insecurity via their perceptions of 
inequality as a result of the imbalanced distribution of the goods of society has an 
effect on individual-level support for the EU. When tested empirically, the theoretical 
mechanism is robust in all three analyses when controlling for all other existing 
explanations and demonstrates that individual-level support for the EU since the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 has in fact increased. All 
three empirical analyses demonstrate that there is a preference for the EU to take 
effective action against the economic and financial crisis and in turn address 
inequality from those individuals who feel or perceive themselves to be economically 
insecure. It is evident in all three empirical chapters that individuals in the EU want 
more, not less, action from the EU demonstrating that the EU is the institutional-
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driving force best placed to address individualsÕ economic insecurity as a result of 
market-generated inequality since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8. Overall, the normative preferences for redistribution highlight that the EU is 
widely presumed to be the remedy against the economic and financial crisis and that 
economic insecurity as a result of market-generated inequality which individuals are 
feeling, or indeed perceiving in their daily lives, needs to be addressed by the EU.  
The theorised relationship between individualsÕ preferences for redistribution 
by governmental institutions and support for the EU focuses upon the mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms of the market and democracy. These mutually reinforcing 
mechanisms demonstrate how the liberal market economy can produce better 
outcomes for a greater number of EU citizens, which is achieved in conjunction with 
strong and efficient democratic institutions. If a EU member statesÕ economy has high 
living standards and dynamic economic development, individuals will accept higher 
or objective levels of inequality. This theorised relationship derives from scholarly 
work on the effect of democracy on inequality (Key 1949; Lipset 1960; Lenski 1966) 
which demonstrates that democratic institutions are important because they give rise 
to organised political competition and the effect of inequality on democracy (Dahl 
1971) which highlights that economic inequality inhibits the emergence and 
performance of democratic political structures.  
In the case of support for the EU since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2007/8 individualÕs perceptions of inequality do not drive dislike or 
distrustfulness of institutions. Inequality is a significant political cleavage, especially 
since the onset of the crisis and influences European politics and the national context. 
As a consequence, it is the interplay between democracy and inequality which shows 
that individuals regard democratic institutions as the fundamental mechanism in 
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addressing both excessive and inevitable market-generated inequality. Democratic 
institutions are regarded to deliver security from actual or perceived inequalities of 
the liberal market economy as it is the role of democratic institutions to serve as 
unbiased intermediaries to reduce the effects of market-driven inequality. IndividualsÕ 
preference for redistribution leads to a preference for greater democratic institutions 
by theoretically linking individual-level support for the EU to individualsÕ concerns 
about inequality and the changes in their level of support for the EU through the 
relationship inequality has to both democratic political institutions and the liberal 
market economy. Individuals in the EU want democratic institutions and the liberal 
market economy to work effectively at both the national level and the EU level as 
both democracy and the liberal market economy are intertwined with one another and 
are mutually reinforcing mechanisms. Since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2007/8 the EU is regarded as both the guarantor of democracy and the 
institution best placed to address market-generated inequality with individuals 
displaying increased support for the EU. When the liberal market economy alters the 
distribution of the goods of society democratic institutional remedies need to be 
available in order to address market-generated inequalities. As a result of this, the 
theory in this inquiry tests how the theoretical determinants of instrumental self-
interest, SES, social location, political institutions and the liberal market economy 
determine how inequality can be identified as the central independent variable of how 
individuals perceive the notion of inequality and how the normative notions of 
inequality affect support for the EU. In conjunction with this, the theory also tests the 
premise that individualsÕ believe that the EU is the institution best placed to address 
market-generated inequality since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8 and as result this leads to positive support for the EU.  
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3.10: Conclusion  
This chapter has introduced the basis for individual-level effects on 
perceptions of inequality and how inequality can play a significant role when 
examining mass public opinion support for the EU since the onset of the economic 
crisis of 2007/8. As demonstrated in this chapter and Chapter 2 through analysis of 
the current literature on inequality, political behaviour and EU public opinion, the 
economic crisis of 2007/8 has highlighted that there is a greater proportion of 
individuals in the EU who may not be objectively ÔpoorÕ but who perceive themselves 
to be at an increased risk of economic adversity due to rising inequality and economic 
fragility in their EU member states and the EU as a whole. As a consequence of this 
economic adversity, risk and fragility, these individuals are more supportive of 
income redistribution (i.e. the need to address inequality) as a means to minimize their 
own economic insecurity. The following chapter will outline the methodological 
guideline necessary in order to examine the relationship between inequality and 
support for the EU through a cross-national and single case study. The 
methodological techniques employed in this inquiry will determine the influence of 
inequality on individualsÕ support for the EU and establish a theoretical claim on the 
influence of inequality as a determinant of individual-level support for the EU.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1: Introduction  
This chapter defines the methodological guideline of this research, including 
the selected case studies, data to be used and operationalization of indicators, 
analytical techniques and test implications that will support hypotheses. This research 
is interested in the influence of inequality on individualsÕ support for the EU and is an 
examination into the understanding of the relationship between inequality and support 
for the EU through a cross-national and single case study analysis. Statistical 
significance will demonstrate support for the hypothesised relationships under 
examination, which will be endorsed by theory to emphasise causality. This analysis 
will determine the influence of inequality on individualsÕ support for the EU and 
conclude by producing generalizable findings toward a theoretical claim of the 
influence of inequality as a determinant of individual level EU support.   
4.2: Case Selection  
Cross-National Case Study: EU 27 
The EU is often regarded as the economic instigator of the liberal market 
economies of Europe with scholarly research on mass public opinion support for the 
EU producing findings that emphasise the notion that personal and aggregate 
economic growth produces higher support for the EU project. However, these 
findings neglect the facets of both social and political integration, which have also 
been adopted within the EU project.  
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While inequality has been used as a predictor of support for the EU in Central 
and Eastern European states18, it has seldom been applied to Western Europe or all the 
twenty-seven EU member states19. The rationale for the cross-national case study of 
all EU twenty-seven member states and the critical juncture for the EU and 
individualsÕ perception of inequality, derives from the economic crisis of 2007-8. 
From the beginning of the economic crisis of 2007-8, support for the EU has 
concentrated on a more individualist and egocentric perspective, as individuals 
perceive the notion of inequality through the lens of fairness and justice in society. 
IndividualsÕ perception of inequality is important, as it suggests that the EU should 
reflect citizensÕ preferences for fairness and justice in society via strong and 
democratic governance. In addition, if the EU is perceived by individuals to have 
failed to create adequate economic and social opportunities or to have provided these 
prospects in an unequal manner, the examination of inequality as a determinant of EU 
support becomes all the more pertinent.  
Single Case Study: Republic of Ireland  
The Republic of Ireland has been an active participant in European integration 
since its accession to the EU in 1973, with membership of the EU providing Ireland 
Òwith a framework within which it could mediate the forces of growing 
interdependenceÓ (Laffan & Tonra 2005,pp. 459). From a utilitarian perspective, the 
Irish economy has experienced many highs and lows since accession to the EU: 
significant periods of growth (1970s, 1990-2007), as well as periods of stagnation and 
significant expenditure reduction (1980s, 2008 to the present). It was during the 1990s 
                                                              
18 For analysis of inequality in Central and Eastern Europe please consult Duke & Grime (1997); 
Orkeny & Szkelyi (2000); Kelley & Zagorski (2004); Loveless (2010); Loveless & Whitefield (2011); 
Karakoc (2012) & Whitefield & Loveless (2013)  
19 For analysis on inequality in Western Europe please consult Beckfield (2006); Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli 
& Gelleny (2008) 
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and 2000s that Ireland experienced an unparalleled period of economic growth, rising 
living standards, job creation and export performance that repositioned it away from 
the southern periphery of the EU with which it had long been associated. The Celtic 
Tiger became a global role model and evoked considerable, extensive and rapid 
changes, in both Irish society and Irish politics.  
The critical juncture in IrelandÕs relationship with the EU, and the rationale for 
a single case study analysis, focuses upon the economic crisis of 2007/8. The 
economic crisis of 2007/8 revised IrelandÕs relationship with the EU as a result of the 
economic downturn and the widening of individual economic disparities. The focus of 
support for the EU now concentrates on a more individualist and egocentric 
perspective, as individuals perceive the notion of inequality through the lens of 
fairness and justice in society. The theoretical mechanism that connects EU citizens to 
the debate on support for the EU is embedded within the perception of costs and 
benefits accruing from European integration in light of domestic capitalist institutions 
(Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, p. 64). Put simply, since the onset of the economic 
crisis of 2007/8, individuals are adopting normative notions towards inequality in 
order to assess whether they are a ÔwinnerÕ or a ÔloserÕ of the EU project. It is aimed 
through the single case study of the Republic of Ireland, to establish the link (by using 
inequality as an independent variable) between Irish respondentsÕ perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of European integration and the patterns of redistribution, in order 
to gauge individualsÕ evaluations of inequality and support for the EU.  
Membership of the EU has been central to IrelandÕs economic and political 
interests since accession to the EU in 1973. Ireland has been regarded by many as the 
shining example of how EU membership can benefit a small, peripheral and 
economically underdeveloped country and has successfully integrated the economy, 
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the currency and many aspects of Irish individualsÕ daily lives with its partners in the 
EU. Successive Irish governments have signed up to and participated in the 
continuing evolution of European integration through the Single European Act, the 
Treaty on the EU, the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon and the Fiscal Treaty. 
Membership of the EU has had a significant impact on Ireland in economic, social 
and political terms with the Irish economy benefiting significantly from membership 
of the Single European Market and additional developments within it.  
Overall, the Irish electorate has shown positive support for the EU (see Figure 
1 ÔMembership of the EU is a good thingÕ and Figure 2 ÔIreland has benefited from 
EU membershipÕ) however in 2001 and 2008 IrelandÕs relationship with the EU 
entered a new and uncertain phase with rejection of the Nice (2001) and Lisbon 
(2008) treaties. The Irish electorateÕs commitment to the European project can no 
longer be taken for granted. Intertwined within this latter rejection of a EU-related 
referendum is the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8, which has 
brought economic disorder to the EU. Ireland has not been exempt from this 
economic and financial turmoil as the collapse of the banking system along with the 
construction and property sectors and the subsequent EU/IMF demonstrated that 
individuals in Ireland were not protected from the uncertainty and risk of the liberal-
market economy. As a consequence of the changing relationship with the EU and the 
financial and economic uncertainty experienced from 2007/8 onwards Ireland 
provides an important case study in examining how national-level contextual factors 
matter for individuals in EU member states when assessing support for the EU. 
Individuals hypothesise that EU member statesÕ economic affluence and quality of 
governance creates the salience of issues.  Since the beginning of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8 what individuals regard as excessive inequality may have 
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little to do with inequality per se but whether the liberal market economy provides 
high living standards and dynamic economic development. Inequality as a macro-
political and economic determinant bridges the gap between economic and political 
systems at both the national and EU-level. Ireland therefore lends itself as an 
influential case study to examine if in fact economic insecurity, perceptions of 
inequality and normative concerns for democratic institutions ameliorate market-
generated inequality thus subsequently leading to increased support for the EU in two 
ways.  
Firstly, when assessing the economic and financial crisis, citizens consider its 
impact on their countryÕs economy, which also has an affect on support for the EU. 
Indicators of macro-economic growth, inflation and unemployment have an affect on 
aggregate support for the EU. As Ireland is a net beneficiary of EU transfers it is 
plausible that individuals in Ireland base their support for the EU based upon the 
implications for the national economy.  Secondly, individuals in Ireland recognised 
the heightened risk of economic adversity due to the specific economic problems they 
are experiencing at the national level therefore making these individuals more likely 
to be supportive of income distribution as a means to minimise their own economic 
insecurity. For individuals in Ireland experiencing the on-going economic and 
financial crisis, the EU can be regarded as the guarantor of democracy that can 
combat market-driven inequalities.  
Previous analyses by Brinegar & Jolly 2005; Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004; 
Ray 2003a & 2003b have argued that one would not expect a ÔdirectÕ relationship 
between a normative position from individuals who are either pro or anti wealth 
redistribution, or any other relationships located on a similar economic left-right 
spectrum, and attitudes towards the EU. The findings from these studies argue that 
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support for the EU would be expected to depend on the context of each individual EU 
member state. Ireland can be described as an economic free market with pro-equality 
citizens tending to be pro-EU given the belief by individuals in Ireland that the EU is 
a more equal political project than free market Ireland allowing the overall political 
and economic right-wing context of Ireland to be favourable to pro-equality views 
that would correlate with pro-EU views. However, this inquiry aims to tease out 
explicitly the empirical relationship between inequality and individual-level economic 
insecurity since the onset of the economic and financial crisis in Ireland and highlight 
the relationship between individuals in Ireland who are pro-equality and pro-EU.  
4.3: Data  
European Election Study (EES)  
The evidence to be used in testing the hypotheses is the European Election 
Studies (EES) data from 2009. The EES has examined electoral processes, including 
voting, candidates, media, manifesto and contextual data studies at the EP elections 
since 1979. These studies have focused upon the evolution of the EU political 
community and a European public sphere. The EES also emphasises the central 
processes of political representation at the time of the EP elections with regards to EU 
citizensÕ perceptions and preferences for the EU political regime and the evaluations 
of EU political performance.   
The 2009 EES survey was the first time a centrally coordinated research 
project covering all relevant aspects of the electoral process was conducted for all 
twenty-seven EU member states at the EP elections. The scientific objectives of the 
voter survey were to conduct a survey among representative samples of enfranchised 
citizens in all twenty-seven member states of the EU (N=approximately 1,000 realised 
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interviews per country) immediately after the European Parliament elections in June 
2009. The final selection includes questions on electoral behaviour including 
questions on party choices, past voting behaviour, voting behaviour at the national 
level, party preferences and propensity to support particular political parties. General 
political attitudes and behaviour are assessed through questions on: interest in politics, 
campaign, most important problems, attitudes regarding the EU, left/right placement, 
and placement of political parties. Background characteristics including age, gender, 
religion and media consumption were also analysed in the voter survey. The 
questionnaires for the study were identical in the various member states, apart from 
unavoidable differences generated by variances in political party names and country 
specific institutions. The sample size is approximately 1,000 interviews in each EU 
member state with the data being collected by computer assisted telephone 
interviewing (CATI). In seven member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) representative telephone 
sampling was not feasible. In these countries, 70 per cent of interviews were 
conducted face-to-face while the remaining 30 per cent were conducted by phone. 
The total sample is approximately 27,000 (N=27,000).  
The rationale for selecting the EES data of 2009 for my research is twofold. 
Firstly, the EES is the most recent data available20 and it captures the evolution of the 
political community of the EU and the European public sphere at both the individual-
level and the national-level. Consequentially, the EES data will inform both the cross-
national and single case study in my analysis. Secondly, the data captures the attitudes 
                                                              
20 The European Parliament elections took place on Thursday 4th June 2009 with data being released 
for analysis on 16th April 2010 online. Available at: www.piredeu.eu. The most recent European 
Parliament elections took place on Thursday 22nd May 2014. Data is expected to be released the 
following year, 2015.  
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and opinions at the individual-level and the national-level at the onset of the economic 
crisis of 2007/8. The economic crisis of 2007/8 is the critical juncture and theoretical 
basis in my research for using perceptions of inequality as a determinant of EU 
support.  
Standard Eurobarometer  
The Standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973 and is the longest 
running regular cross-national and cross-temporal opinion poll program. The Standard 
Eurobarometer regularly monitors mass public opinion in EU member states with 
each survey consisting of approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews in each of the 
twenty-seven member states of the EU with reports published twice a year (Spring 
and Autumn) based on new samples but with a repeated cross-section design. The 
standard modules ask for attitudes towards European unification, institutions and 
policies, in conjunction with measurements for socio-political orientations, as well as 
respondent and household demographics. Intermittently, Standard Eurobarometer 
extensively addresses Special Topics such as environment technology, health or 
family issues and social or ethnic exclusion. In Autumn 2009, Standard 
Eurobarometer 72.4 introduced a battery of questions (ten questions in total) on the 
financial and economic crisis. This Special Topic was included in Standard 
Eurobarometer 74.2 (Autumn 2010), Standard Eurobarometer 76.3 (Autumn 2011), 
Standard Eurobarometer 78.1 (Autumn 2012) and Standard Eurobarometer 80.1 
(Autumn 2013)21.  
                                                              
21 The Standard Eurobarometer data used in this analysis (Eurobarometer 72.4, 74.2, 76.3, 78.1 and 
80.1) are available to download at www.gesis.org. Main results are regularly published by the 
European Commission available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm  
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For each Standard Eurobarometer survey, new and independent samples are 
drawn with the basic sampling design in all EU member states based on a multi-stage, 
probability sampling design. The sampling is based on a random selection of 
sampling points after stratification by the distribution of the national, resident 
population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas, thus making the sample 
proportional to both population size and density. These primary sampling units are 
selected from each administrative region in every EU member state. A cluster of 
addresses is then selected from the primary sampling unit with addresses selected 
systematically using standard route procedures. In Great Britain, the Republic of 
Ireland and Luxembourg respondentsÕ addresses were selected from electoral 
registers. For the Eurobarometer questionnaire, basic bilingual questionnaires in 
English and French are developed and translated into other relevant languages. The 
interviews are conducted face-to-face in respondentsÕ homes with TNS Opinion and 
Social coordinating and running the interviews at the request of the Directorate-
General for Communication at the European Commission.  
The rationale for selecting the Standard Eurobarometer data from 2009-2013 
for my research is twofold. Firstly, by asking specific questions on the economic and 
financial crisis, the Standard Eurobarometer data is the most recent data available, and 
it captures the evolution of European mass public opinion at both the individual-level 
and the national-level. In addition, it compliments the European Election Study 2009 
data used in Chapter Five and Chapter Six and emphasises the findings from these 
two empirical chapters as well as individual-level support for the EU. Secondly, 
similar to the EES data, the Standard Eurobarometer data captures the attitudes and 
opinions at the individual-level and the national-level at the onset of the economic 
crisis of 2007/8 as well as tracing these attitudes cross-temporally from 2009-2013. 
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The economic crisis of 2007/8 is the critical juncture and theoretical basis in my 
research. In extending the analysis from 2009 to 2013 I am able to add specificity to 
individual-level support for the EU.  
4.4: Dependent Variables  
This study includes the political and economic attitudinal variables at the 
individual-level and provides analysis of support for EU membership, satisfaction 
with democracy in the EU, attitudes toward European unification, EU enlargement 
and satisfaction with member states democracy. These five dependent variables 
capture the multi-faceted nature of new political attitudes that are both theoretically 
and substantively important when examining individual level support for the EU from 
the EES data. In addition, one independent variable from the Standard Eurobarometer 
data (2009-2013) will capture individual-level support for the EU. This section will 
operationalize the common dependent variables from the EES voter survey of 2009 
and the dependent variable from the Standard Eurobarometer voter survey from 2009-
2013 and present the indicators.  
Attitudes towards the European Union (European Election Study) 
This dependent variable consists of ordered categorical responses to question 
79 in the EES 2009 voter survey. The question asks respondents ÔGenerally speaking, 
do you think that [your countryÕs] membership of the European Union is a good thing, 
a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?Õ In its original form the variable is coded 1 for a 
Ôgood thingÕ, 2 for a Ôbad thingÕ and 3 for Ôneither good nor badÕ. The ordinal variable 
has been renamed for the purpose of this analysis to EU Membership: Good or Bad 
and has been reverse coded: 1 for a Ôbad thingÕ, 2 for Ôneither good nor badÕ, and 3 for 
a Ôgood thingÕ to make findings intuitive. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ 
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(7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to 
the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union (European Election Study) 
This dependent variable also comprises categorical responses to question 85 in 
the EES 2009 voter survey. Respondents were asked ÔHow satisfied are you, on the 
whole, with the way democracy works in the European Union?Õ This ordinal level 
variable is coded as 1 for Ôvery satisfiedÕ, 2 for Ôfairly satisfiedÕ, 3 for Ônot very 
satisfied, and 4 for Ônot at all satisfiedÕ. The variable has been renamed for the 
purpose of my analysis to ÔSatisfaction with Democracy in the EUÕ. Respondents who 
Ôrefused (7=refused) to answer the question or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the 
answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
Attitudes towards European Unification (European Election Study) 
This dependent variable uses a ten-point scale to examine attitudes towards 
European unification. Question 80 in the EES 2009 voter survey asks respondents: 
ÔSome say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has 
gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. 
On this scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should 
be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?Õ For the 
purpose of my analysis this variable has been renamed ÔAttitudes towards European 
UnificationÕ. Respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (77=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid 
not knowÕ (88=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
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Attitudes towards EU Enlargement (European Election Study) 
This dependent variable comprises categorical responses to question 83 in the 
EES 2009 voter survey. Respondents to the survey were asked ÔIn general, do you 
think that enlargement of the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, 
neither good nor bad?Õ This ordinal level variable is originally coded as 1 is a Ôgood 
thingÕ, 2 is a Ôbad thingÕ, 3 is Ôneither good nor badÕ. The variable has been renamed 
for the purpose of this analysis to ÔEU Enlargement: Good or BadÕ and has been 
reverse coded: 1 for a Ôbad thingÕ, 2 for Ôneither good nor badÕ and 3 for a Ôgood 
thingÕ to make findings intuitive. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to 
answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are 
recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
EU is in Nation States Interest (European Election Study) 
This dependent variable comprises categorical responses to question 91 in the 
EES 2009 voter survey. Respondents were asked ÔHow much confidence do you have 
that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of [respondentÕs 
country]? The variable was originally coded 1 for Ôa great deal of confidenceÕ, 2 for Ôa 
fair amountÕ, 3 for Ônot very muchÕ and 4 for Ôno confidence at allÕ. For the purpose of 
my analysis, this variable has been renamed to EU in our Interest and has been 
reverse recoded so that 1 for Ôno confidence at allÕ, 2 for Ônot very muchÕ, 3 for Ôa fair 
amountÕ and 4 for Ôa great deal of confidenceÕ.  Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ 
(7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to 
the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
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EU Effective Action (Standard Eurobarometer) 
This dependent variable comprises categorical responses to question QC3 in 
Standard Eurobarometer 72.4 and 74.2 and responses to question QC3a in Standard 
Eurobarometer 76.3, 78.1 and 80.1. Respondents were asked ÔIn your opinion, which 
of the following is best to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and 
economic crisis?Õ The variable was originally coded 1 for Ôthe [Nationality] 
governmentÕ, 2 for Ôthe EUÕ, 3 for Ôthe United StatesÕ, 4 for Ôthe G20Õ, 5 for the 
ÔInternational Monetary Fund (IMF)Õ, 6 for ÔotherÕ, 7 for ÔnoneÕ and 8 for ÔdonÕt 
knowÕ. For the purpose of my analysis this variable has been renamed EU Effective 
Action and has been recoded to 0 for Ônation stateÕ and 1 for Ôthe EUÕ and turned into 
a dichotomous variable. Those respondents who responded to the question with the 
United States (3=United States), the G20 (4=the G20), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (5=IMF), ÔotherÕ (6=other) ÔnoneÕ (7=none), or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt 
know), the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
In order to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of EU support empirically this 
inquiry includes both political and economic attitudinal variables at the individual-
level, which encompass issues of EU support. These political and economic 
attitudinal variables examine support for EU membership, satisfaction with 
democracy in the EU, attitudes towards European unification, attitudes towards EU 
enlargement and satisfaction with democracy in EU member states.  The rationale for 
using a disaggregated measure of EU support, rather than constructing a continuous 
measure in this inquiry, centres primarily upon the Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(HLM) and OLS Multiple Regression analysis used in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
The political attitudinal variables Ôsupport for EU membershipÕ and Ôattitudes towards 
European unificationÕ have been used in much of the previous work on EU support 
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(see Janssen 1991; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel & Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a & 
1998b; Wessels 1995).  
However, by using only two measures of EU support (support for membership 
and European unification) these analyses of EU support have only examined 
individual-level political attitudes towards EU support resulting in one-dimensional 
results for EU support. Put simply, previous analyses find that individuals either 
display attitudes that are pro or anti-EU and that these individuals are either in favour 
or against further European unification. By using a disaggregated measure of EU 
support, it was possible to examine how specific subgroups, in this inquiry (1) support 
for the EU status quo/as it is and (2) EU enlargement/deepening, perform. When 
individual-level opinions about the EU are disaggregated into these two subgroups it 
is possible to determine individualsÕ distinctive opinions on support for the EU as a 
whole and whether this support for the EU in addressing inequality is for the EU 
status quo/as it is currently constructed or for the EU as an institution which will 
enlarge/deepen further in the future.  
By disaggregating the measures of EU support the analysis is able to highlight 
the critical problems and issues that individuals believe to be important. In this 
inquiry that is that individuals believe that since the onset of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8 the EU is the best institution to address market-generated 
inequality and that this can be achieved by a stronger EU presence. In other words, 
further EU enlargement via widening and deepening of European integration in EU 
member states results in positive support for the EU.  
Overall, these political and economic attitudinal dependent variables capture 
individualsÕ attitudes towards support for the EU. When these dependent variables are 
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combined with the central independent variable of inequality, along with independent 
variables from the standard model of EU support such as communication, identity, 
institutional performance, economic insecurity and socio-demographic variables (see 
section below). I develop a statistical model which highlights the necessity to address 
market-driven inequality since the onset of the economic crisis and financial crisis of 
2007/8 in order to gauge mass public opinion support for the EU. In addition, a 
statistical model will also give specificity to individual-level support for the EU since 
the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 up until the present.  
4.5: Independent Variables  
The standard model of support for the EU contains a wide variety of 
independent variables. When used as an independent variable, communication 
incorporates an analysis of social communication, watching mass media, and interest 
in politics (Meyer 1999; Anderson & McLeod 2004; De Vreese et al 2006; De Vreese 
& Boomgaarden 2006). Identity as an independent variable has focused upon feelings 
about being described as European and fear of immigrants (Carey 2002; Kritzinger 
2003; McClaren 2002 & 2004; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; De Vries & Van 
Kersbergen 2007). Independent variables which have captured ideological congruence 
and institutional performance include analyses of both retrospective and prospective 
socio-tropic economic evaluation, normative preferences for the market and 
satisfaction with democracy (Janssen 1991; Franklin, Van der Eijk & Marsh 1995; 
Anderson 1998; Majone 1998; Norris 1999; Schmitt & Thommassen 1999; Sancez-
Cuenca 2000; Moravcsik 2002; Rohrschneider 2002; Crombez 2003; Ray 2003; 
Loveless & Rohrschneider 2008; Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). While socio-
demographic variables are comprised of self-reported social class, subjective standard 
of living, age, gender, ideology, and education (Boomgaarden et al. 2011).  Also 
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included are variables that analyse individual-level economic insecurity. The 
economic insecurity variables build upon the central independent variable of 
inequality operationalizing the understanding of governance and whether this is 
supranational or national (Orkeny & Szekelyi 2000; Rehm 2009; Rehm, Hacker & 
Schlesinger 2012).  
The central independent variable for my analysis is inequality. In order to 
operationalize inequality as an independent variable, respondents are asked how they 
consider the importance of addressing inequality. From a theoretical standpoint, 
which has been outlined in Chapter 3, inequality is regarded as a value position that 
reflects respondentsÕ support for democratic institutions. Individuals regard these 
democratic institutions as the mechanism to address market-generated inequality since 
the beginning of the economic crisis in 2007/8. In order to demonstrate that this 
measure of inequality is not a proxy for other value positions and can be 
independently predictive of support for the EU, I examine how inequality correlates 
with ideological and socio-economic positions. 
Central Independent Variable: Inequality (European Election Study) 
The central independent variable of inequality comprises of categorical 
responses to question 63 in the EES 2009 voter survey. Respondents were asked 
whether or not ÔIncome and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary peopleÕ. 
This ordinal level variable is originally coded as 1 for Ôstrongly agreeÕ, 2 for ÔagreeÕ, 3 
for Ôneither agree nor disagreeÕ, 4 for ÔdisagreeÕ, 5 for Ôstrongly disagreeÕ. For the 
purpose of my analysis the variable has been renamed to Address Inequality and has 
been reverse coded: 1 for Ôstrongly disagreeÕ, 2 for ÔdisagreeÕ, 3 for ÔneitherÕ, 4 for 
ÔagreeÕ and 5 for Ôstrongly agreeÕ. This is to make findings intuitive. Those 
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respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ 
(8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔneitherÕ.  
Communication (European Election Study) 
Communication is examined in the model by two separate independent 
variables. The first independent variable, which examines social communication, is 
comprised of responses to question 18 in the EES 2009 voter survey. Respondents 
were asked: ÔHow often did you talk to friends or family about the election?Õ 
Respondents were asked to respond to this question in the context of four weeks 
before the EP election of 2009. The variable is originally coded as 1 for ÔoftenÕ, 2 for 
ÔsometimesÕ, and 3 for ÔneverÕ. For the purpose of my analysis, the variable has been 
renamed ÔSocial CommunicationÕ and has been reverse coded 1 for ÔneverÕ, 2 for 
ÔsometimesÕ and 3 for ÔoftenÕ. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to 
answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are 
recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
The second independent variable which analyses mass media is comprised of 
responses to question 16, question 17 and question 20 in the EES voter survey. All of 
the questions asked respondents to answer the question in the context of four weeks 
before the EP election. Question 16 asked respondents: ÔHow often did you watch a 
program about the election of television?Õ Question 17 asked respondents: ÔHow often 
did you read about the election in a newspaper?Õ Finally, question 20 asked 
respondents: ÔHow often did you look into a website concerned with the election?Õ All 
three of these questions were originally coded as 1 for ÔoftenÕ, 2 for ÔsometimesÕ and 
3 for ÔneverÕ. All three questions have been combined and renamed as the 
independent variable ÔMass MediaÕ. All three questions have been reverse recoded: 1 
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for Ônever, 2 for ÔsometimesÕ and 3 for ÔoftenÕ. This is to make findings intuitive. 
Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not 
knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. Simple 
arithmetic has been carried out to get the sum of all three questions and produce a 
single independent variable that examines these three forms of mass media: 
television, newspapers and internet.  
Political Interest (European Election Study) 
This independent variable consists of responses to question 78 in the EES 
voter survey. Respondents were asked ÔTo what extent would you say you are 
interested in politics?Õ The variable is originally coded as 1 for ÔveryÕ, 2 for 
ÕsomewhatÕ, 3 for Ôa littleÕ, 4 for Ônot at allÕ. For the purpose of my research, the 
variable has been renamed ÔInterest in PoliticsÕ and has been reverse coded: 1 for Ônot 
at allÕ, 2 for Ôa littleÕ, 3 for ÔsomewhatÕ and 4 for ÔveryÕ. This is to make findings 
intuitive.  Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question, or 
Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
Identity (European Election Study) 
Identity as an independent variable is examined by two separate independent 
variables. The first independent variable examines European identity and is comprised 
of responses to question 82 in the EES voter survey. Respondents were asked ÔDo you 
see yourself as 1 ÔNationality onlyÕ, 2 ÔNationality and EuropeanÕ, 3 ÔEuropean and 
nationalityÕ or 4 ÔEuropean onlyÕ. The variable has been renamed European Identity 
for the purpose of my analysis and has been reverse recoded: 1 for ÔEuropean onlyÕ, 2 
for ÔEuropean and NationalityÕ, 3 for ÔNationality and EuropeanÕ and 4 for 
ÔNationality onlyÕ to make findings intuitive. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ 
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(7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to 
the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
The second independent variable that examines identity focuses upon 
immigration and is comprised of responses to question 67 in the EES voter survey. 
Respondents were asked whether or not ÔImmigration to [country] should be 
decreased significantly?Õ The variable was originally coded as 1 for Ôstrongly agreeÕ, 
2 for ÔagreeÕ, 3 for Ôagree nor disagreeÕ, 4 Ôfor disagreeÕ and 5 for Ôstrongly disagreeÕ. 
For the purpose of my analysis the variable has been renamed ÔCultural FearÕ and has 
been reverse recoded: 1 for Ôstrongly disagreeÕ, 2 for ÔdisagreeÕ, 3 for Ôagree nor 
disagreeÕ, 4 for ÔagreeÕ and 5 for Ôstrongly agreeÕ. This is to make findings intuitive. 
Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not 
knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔneitherÕ. 
Economic Insecurity (Standard Eurobarometer) 
Economic insecurity as an independent variable is examined by two separate 
variables. The first independent variable examines economic insecurity in relation to 
individualsÕ economic and financial situation within their household and is comprised 
of responses to question QC2 in Standard Eurobarometer 72.4 74.2, 76.3, 78.1 and 
80.1. Respondents were asked ÔWhich of the following statements best reflects your 
household situation?Õ The variable was originally coded as 1 for ÔYour current 
situation does not allow you to make any plan for the future. You live day to dayÕ, 2 
for ÔYou know what you will be doing in the next six monthsÕ and 3 for ÔYou have a 
long term perspective of what your household will be in the next 1 or 2 yearsÕ.  For 
the purpose of my analysis the variable has been renamed ÔEconomic Insecurity: 
HouseholdÕ and the original coding has been retained, as findings are intuitive. 
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However, those respondents who answered the question as ÔotherÕ (4=other), or Ôdid 
not knowÕ (5=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
The second independent variable examines economic insecurity in relation to 
individualsÕ perception of the impact of the economic and financial crisis on the job 
market and is comprised of responses to question QC1 in Standard Eurobarometer 
72.4 74.2, 76.3, 78.1 and 80.1. Respondents were asked: ÔSome analysts say that the 
impact of the economic crisis on the job market has already reached its peak and 
things will recover little by little. Others, on the contrary, say that the worst is still to 
come. Which of the two statements is closer to your opinion?Õ The variable was 
originally coded as 1 for Ôthe impact of the crisis on jobs has already reached its peakÕ 
and 2 for ÔThe worst is still to comeÕ. For the purpose of my analysis the variable has 
been renamed ÔEconomic Insecurity: Impact of CrisisÕ and the original coding has 
been retained, as findings are intuitive. However, those respondents who Ôdid not 
knowÕ (3=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
Ideological Congruence and Institutional Performance (European Election Study and 
Standard Eurobarometer) 
The independent variables in the EES 2009 data, which examine ideological 
congruence and institutional performance, are analysed by four different independent 
variables, including individual-level retrospective and prospective socio-tropic 
economic evaluations, market preference and satisfaction with national-level 
democracy. The first independent variable examines retrospective socio-tropic 
economic evaluations and is comprised of individualsÕ responses to question 48 in the 
EES voter survey. Respondents were asked ÔWhat do you think about the economy? 
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in 
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[respondentÕs country] is 1 Ôa lot betterÕ, 2 Ôa little betterÕ, 3 Ôstayed the sameÕ, 4 Ôa 
little worseÕ and 5 Ôa lot worseÕ.  For the purpose of my research, the variable has 
been renamed Retrospective Socio-tropic Economic Evaluation and has been reverse 
recoded: 1 for Ôa lot worseÕ, 2 for Ôa little worseÕ, 3 for Ôstayed the sameÕ, 4 for Ôa 
little betterÕ and 5 for Ôa lot betterÕ to make findings intuitive. Those respondents who 
ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the 
answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
The second independent variable examines individualsÕ prospective socio-
tropic economic evaluations and is comprised of responses to question 49 in the 
European Election Studies survey. Respondents were asked: ÒOver the next 12 
months, how do you think the general economic situation in [your country] will be?Õ 
The variable is originally coded as 1 for Ôget a lot betterÕ, 2 for Ôa little betterÕ, 3 for 
Ôstay the sameÕ, 4 for Ôa little worseÕ and 5 for Ôget a lot worseÕ. For the purpose of my 
research, the variable has been renamed Prospective Socio-tropic Economic 
Evaluation and has been reverse coded so that 1 is Ôget a lot worseÕ, 2 is Ôa little 
worseÕ, 3 is Ôstay the sameÕ, 4 is Ôa little betterÕ and 5 is Ôget a lot betterÕ. Those 
respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ 
(8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
The third independent variable addresses individualsÕ market preference for 
how to solve economic problems of the nation state, and is comprised of responses to 
question 57 in the EES voter survey. Respondents were asked whether or not ÔPrivate 
enterprise is the best way to solve [countryÕs] economic problems?Õ The question is 
originally coded as 1 for Ôstrongly agreeÕ, 2 for ÔagreeÕ, 3 for Ôneither agree nor 
disagreeÕ, 4 for ÔdisagreeÕ and 5 for Ôstrongly disagreeÕ. The variable has been 
renamed ÔMarket PreferenceÕ for the purpose of my analysis and has been reverse 
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recoded: 1 for Ôstrongly disagreeÕ, 2 for ÔdisagreeÕ, 3 for Ôneither agree nor disagreeÕ, 
4 for ÔagreeÕ and 5 for Ôstrongly agreeÕ.  Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) 
to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to the question, 
are recoded to ÔneitherÕ.  
Finally the fourth independent variable, which captures individualsÕ 
ideological congruence and institutional performance, is comprised of responses to 
question 84 in the EES voter survey. Respondents were asked: ÔHow satisfied are you, 
on the whole, with the way democracy works in [your country]?Õ The question is 
originally coded as 1 for Ôvery satisfiedÕ, 2 for Ôfairly satisfiedÕ, 3 for Ônot very 
satisfiedÕ and 4 for Ônot at all satisfiedÕ. For the purpose of my analysis the variable 
has been renamed ÔSatisfaction with DemocracyÕ and has been reverse recoded: 1 for 
Ônot at all satisfiedÕ, 2 for Ônot very satisfiedÕ, 3 for Ôfairly satisfiedÕ and 4 for Ôvery 
satisfiedÕ. This is to make findings intuitive. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ 
(7=refused) to answer the question, or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer to 
the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
The independent variables in the Standard Eurobarometer data 2009-2013 
which examine ideological congruence and institutional performance are analysed by 
two different independent variables, including prospective socio-economic evaluation 
and satisfaction with democracy. The first independent variable which examines 
prospective socio-economic evaluation is comprised of responses to question QA4a_2 
in Standard Eurobarometer 72.4 and Standard Eurobarometer 74.2, QA5a_2 in 
Standard Eurobarometer 76.3 and Standard Eurobarometer 78.1 and question QA3a_2 
in Standard Eurobarometer 80.1. Respondents were asked: ÔWhat are your 
expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse 
or the same when it comes to the economic situation in [your country]?Õ For the 
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purpose of my research the variable has been renamed ÔProspective Socio-Economic 
EvaluationÕ and has been reverse recoded: 1 for ÔsameÕ, 2 for ÔworseÕ, 3 for ÔbetterÕ. 
This is to make findings intuitive. Those respondents who Ôdid not knowÕ (4=donÕt 
know) the answer to the question are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. 
The second independent variable which examines satisfaction with 
democracy, is comprised of responses to QA18a in Standard Eurobarometer 72.4, 
Standard Eurobarometer 76.3 and Standard Eurobarometer 80.1, and, question QA19a 
in Standard Eurobarometer 78.122. Respondents were asked the question ÔOn the 
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy works in [your country]?Õ For the purpose of my research the 
variable has been named ÔSatisfaction with DemocracyÕ and has been reverse recoded 
to make findings intuitive: 1 for Ônot at all satisfiedÕ, 2 for Ônot very satisfiedÕ, 3 for 
Ôfairly satisfiedÕ and 4 for Ôvery satisfiedÕ. Those respondents who Ôdid not knowÕ 
(5=donÕt know) the answer to the question are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
Socio-Demographic Variables (European Election Study and Standard 
Eurobarometer) 
The socio-demographic independent variables are analysed by six different 
independent variables in the European Election Study, which include age, gender, 
left/right self-placement, education, social class and subjective standard of living. The 
first independent variable examines age and is comprised of individualsÕ responses to 
question 103 in the EES voter survey. Respondents were asked: ÔWhat year were you 
born?Õ This raw data has been transformed and a new variable entitled ÔAgeÕ has been 
created for the purpose of my analysis. The variable was created by subtracting 
                                                              
22 Please note that this question was not asked in Standard Eurobarometer 74.2 
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respondentsÕ age from 2009 to generate ÔAgeÕ. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ 
(7777=refused) to answer the question are recoded to ÔmissingÕ.  
The second independent variable examines gender and is comprised of 
individual responses to question 102 in the EES Survey. Respondents were as asked: 
ÔAre youÉ 1, ÔmaleÕ or 2, ÔfemaleÕ? This variable has been renamed Gender for the 
purpose of this analysis and has been recoded to 0 for ÔfemalesÕ and 1 for ÔmalesÕ. 
Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) to answer the question are recoded to 
ÔmissingÕ.  
The third socio-demographic independent variable examines individualsÕ self-
placement on the political spectrum and is comprised of responses to question 46 in 
the EES voter survey. Respondents were asked ÔIn political matters people talk of 
Òthe leftÓ and Òthe rightÓ. What is your position?Õ This variable uses a scale from 0 to 
10, where 0 means ÔleftÕ and 10 means ÔrightÕ. The variable has been renamed ÔLeft-
Right Self-PlacementÕ for the purpose of my analysis and has been recoded into 
dummy variables so that the ÔLeftÕ is represented by 0, 1, 2 and 3, the ÔCentreÕ is 
represented by 4, 5 and 6 and the ÔRightÕ is represented by 7, 8, 9 and 10.  
The fourth independent variable examines individualsÕ education and is 
comprised of responses to question 101 and 101b in the EES voter survey. Question 
101 and 101b provide detailed information on education, notably the highest level 
completed, through member state specific answer options. V200 provides a cross-
country comparative indicator of education level based on the International Standard 
Classification of Education23 (ISCED). For the purpose of my analysis the variable 
                                                              
23 The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) is a statistical framework for 
organizing education, which is maintained by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
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has been renamed ÔEducationÕ and has been recoded to reflect the ISCED 
classification, 0 for Pre-primary level of education, 1 for Primary level of education, 2 
for Lower secondary level of education, 3 for Upper secondary level of education, 4 
for Post-secondary, non-tertiary level of education, 5 for First stage tertiary education, 
6 for Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research 
qualification)Õ. 
The fifth socio-demographic independent variable examines individualsÕ 
social class and is comprised of responses to question 114 in the EES voter survey.  
Respondents were asked ÔIf you were asked to choose one of these five names for 
your social class, which would you say you belong to?Õ The variable has been 
recoded: 1 for Ôworking class, 2 for Ôlower middle classÕ, 3 for Ômiddle classÕ, 4 for 
Ôupper middle classÕ, and 5 for Ôupper classÕ. Those respondents who answered 
ÔotherÕ (6=other), ÔrefusedÕ (7=refused) or Ôdid not knowÕ (8=donÕt know) the answer 
to the question, are recoded to ÔmissingÕ. For the purpose of my analysis the variable 
has been renamed ÔSocial ClassÕ.  
Finally, the sixth socio-demographic independent variable examines EU 
citizensÕ standard of living and is comprised of responses to question 120 in the EES 
voter survey. Respondents were asked: ÔTaking everything into account, at about what 
level is your familyÕs standard of living? If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 
means a poor family, 7 a rich family and the other numbers are for the positions in 
between, about where would you place your family?Õ For the purpose of my analysis 
the variable has been renamed Subjective Standard of Living and has been recoded so 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Organisation (UNESCO). The ISCED is an instrument suitable for assembling, compiling and 
presenting statistics of education within countries and internationally.  
Guidelines for the ISCED are available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm Accessed: 24/04/14 
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that 1 is a Ôpoor familyÕ and 7 is a Ôrich familyÕ with those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ 
(77=refused) or Ôdid not knowÕ (88=donÕt know) the answer to the question recoded 
to ÔmissingÕ.  
The socio-demographic independent variables are analysed by five different 
independent variables in the Standard Eurobarometer data 2009-2013, which include 
age, gender, education, left/right ideology self placement and self-reported social 
class. The first independent variable examines age and is comprised of individualsÕ 
responses to question D11 in the Standard Eurobarometer 72.4, 74.2, 76.3 78.1 and 
80.1. Respondents were asked: ÔHow old are you?Õ This raw data has been 
transformed and a new variable entitled ÔAge_7 categoriesÕ has been created for the 
purpose of my analysis: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 95-74 and 75+. Those 
respondents who Ôdid not knowÕ the answer to the question are recoded to ÔmissingÕ 
(99=donÕt know).  
The second independent variable examines gender and is comprised of 
individualsÕ responses to question D10 in the Standard Eurobarometer 72.4, 74.2, 
76.3 78.1 and 80.1 data. Respondents were as asked the question ÔAre youÉ 1, ÔmaleÕ 
or 2, ÔfemaleÕ? This variable has been renamed ÔGenderÕ for the purpose of my 
analysis and has been recoded to 0 for ÔfemalesÕ and 1 for ÔmalesÕ. Those respondents 
who ÔrefusedÕ to answer the question are recoded to ÔmissingÕ (99=donÕt know). 
The third independent variable examines individualsÕ education and is 
comprised of responses to question D8 in the Standard Eurobarometer 72.4, 74.2, 76.3 
78.1 and 80.1 voter survey. Respondents were asked: ÔHow old were you when you 
stopped full-time education?Õ This raw data has been transformed into a new variable 
entitled ÔEducationÕ and has been recoded to that 1 for Ôno full time educationÕ, 2 for 
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Ôless than 15 years oldÕ, 3 for Õ16-19 years oldÕ, 4 for Õ20 years old +Õ and 5 for Ôstill 
studyingÕ. Those respondents who ÔrefusedÕ or ÔdidnÕt knowÕ the to answer the 
question are recoded to ÔmissingÕ (0=refuse, 99=donÕt know).  
The fourth socio-demographic independent variable examines individualsÕ self 
reported social class and is comprised of responses to question D61 in the Standard 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 74.2, 76.3, 78.1 and 80.1 voter survey. Respondents were asked: 
ÔOn the following scale, step 1 corresponds to the Òlowest level in societyÓ, step 10 
corresponds to the Òhighest level in societyÓ. Could you tell me on which step you 
would place yourself?Õ The variable has been recoded so that 1 is Ôlowest level in 
societyÕ, 2 is Ômiddle level in societyÕ and 3 is Ôhighest level in societyÕ. Those 
respondents who ÔrefusedÕ (97=refused) to answer the question are recoded to 
ÔmissingÕ. For the purpose of my analysis the variable has been renamed ÔSelf-
Reported Social ClassÕ.  
The fifth and final socio-demographic independent variable examines 
individualsÕ self-placement on the political spectrum and is comprised of responses to 
question D1 in the Standard Eurobarometer voter survey 72.4 and 74.2 24 . 
Respondents were asked: ÔIn political matters people talk of Òthe leftÓ and Òthe rightÓ. 
How would you place your views on this scale?Õ This variable uses a scale from 1 to 
10 where 1 means ÔleftÕ and 10 means ÔrightÕ. The variable has been renamed ÔLeft-
Right Self-PlacementÕ for the purpose of my analysis and has been recoded so that the 
ÔLeftÕ is represented by 0, 1, 2 and 3, the ÔCentreÕ is represented by 4, 5 and 6 and the 
ÔRightÕ is represented by 7, 8, 9 and 10.  
                                                              
24 Please note that this question was not asked in Standard Eurobarometer surveys 76.3, 78.1 and 80.1. 
The question closest to political ideology is question D61, which captures an individualsÕ level in 
society. This variable is used to gauge individualsÕ self-reported social class. Therefore it cannot be 
duplicated or replicated in the analysis to encapsulate anther variable.  
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4.6: Empirical Methodology  
There are three types of statistical methods which will be used in the 
proceeding empirical chapters. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Multiple Regression 
analysis will be used when examining the effects of inequality in addressing support 
for the EU in the Republic of Ireland. A Binary Logistic Regression model will be 
used when investigating individual-level preferences for addressing economic 
insecurity in a cross-national study of the twenty-seven member states of the EU. 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) will be used when analysing the effects of 
inequality and support in the twenty-seven EU member states of the EU. All analyses 
will incorporate a combination of dependent variables and all independent variables, 
which have been outlined above.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Multiple Regression  
Multiple regression analysis is used in order to isolate the effect of one 
independent variable on the dependent variable while controlling for all other effects 
of other independent variables. Multiple regression produces a partial regression 
coefficient for each independent variable. A partial regression coefficient estimates 
the mean change in the dependent variable for each one-unit change in the 
independent variable, all the while continuing to control for all other variables in the 
model. Thus, a multiple regression models take the general form of:  
. 
In my analysis on support for the EU in the Republic of Ireland, a multiple 
regression model which uses inequality (central independent variable) and satisfaction 
with democracy (one of the ideological congruence and institutional performance 
y =α + β
1
x
1
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independent variables) as independent variables will report two partial regression 
coefficients: one that estimates the effect of inequality, controlling for satisfaction 
with democracy, and one that estimates the effect of satisfaction with democracy, 
controlling for inequality.  
When interpreting multiple regression analysis both R/R-Squared and 
Adjusted R-Squared play a significant role. Firstly, R represents the total correlation 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. R-Squared is R which 
has been squared. The square of a correlation is the same as a proportion of variance 
and the same can be said of R-Squared: it represents the total amount of variance , it 
is very unlikely that the correlation between that independent variable and the 
dependent variable will be exactly zero, even if it is zero in the population. Adjusted 
R-Squared will almost always fluctuate around zero due to sampling error. As a 
result, Adjusted R-Squared will always increase when another independent variable is 
added. Adjusted R-Squared is altered downwards in order to compensate for the 
increase in R-Squared. Therefore there are two things to note: firstly, the larger the 
number of independent variables, the greater downward adjustment in R-Squared will 
occur secondly, the smaller the sample size the greater the random variation from zero 
will be, and thus a larger downward adjustment in R-Squared is required.  
When interpreting multiple regression one of the predominant limitations is 
the possible effect of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when the independent 
variables are related so strongly that it becomes difficult to estimate the partial effect 
of each independent variable on the dependent variable in the model. In the attempt to 
statistically control for one independent variable so that it can estimate the partial 
effect of the other independent variable, regression runs into the problem that there 
are too few cases. It is acceptable that the independent variables are related: the 
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principle aim of multiple regression is its ability to partial out shared variance of the 
independent variables and arrive at estimates of the regression coefficients. The 
problem in terms of multicollinearity is the degree to which the independent variables 
are related.  If the magnitude of the correlation coefficient between the independent 
variables is less than .8, then multiple regression will operate normally. However, if 
the correlation coefficient is .8 or higher, multiple regression will not return good 
estimates.  
Binary Logistic Regression  
Logistic regression is used to analyse the relationship between an interval-
level independent variable- or in this inquiry several independent variables- and a 
binary dependent variable. A binary variable can only assume two values. When the 
dependent variable is expressed simply in two values (e.g. Yes/No, Nation State/EU) 
it is difficult to make a prediction about how an individual will respond to it therefore 
it cannot be conceptualised that the relationship between the dependent variable and 
the independent variable(s) is positive or that the relationship is linear. However, it 
can be posited that a linear relationship between the independent variable and the 
logged odds of the dependent variable. Therefore, a logistic regression model takes 
the general form of:  
Logged odds (dependent variable) = a + b1 (independent variable) + b2 
(independent variable) +b3 (independent variable)É 
The logistic regression model is similar in appearance to OLS regression. In 
logitistic regression, the constant, or intercept, (a) estimates the dependent variable, 
(in my research, the logged odds of EU effective action) when the central independent 
variable, (in my inquiry, the economic insecurity variable) is equal to 0. The logistic 
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regression coefficient, (b), will estimate the change in the logged odds of the 
dependent variable for each unit increase in the independent variable. The analysis 
will also produce a standard error for (b), allowing me to test the null hypothesis. 
Logistic regression will also provide R-Square measures providing an indication of 
the strength of the relationship.  
Logistic regression is more difficult to interpret that OLS results. In logistic 
regression, the coefficients of interest are expressed in terms of logged odds of the 
dependent variable. The constant (a) will provide the logged odds of the dependent 
variable when the central independent variable is 0. The logistic regression coefficient 
(b) will estimate the change in the logged odds for each unit change in the 
independent variable. Unfortunately, logged odds have no intuitive appeal and 
therefore it is necessary to transform the logged odds into predicted probabilities.  
Logistic regression assumes that all of the independent variables in the model 
have an additive effect on the logged odds of the dependent variable (i.e. ÔEU: 
effective actionÕ.) However, logistic regression also assumes that the independent 
variables in the model have an interactive effect on the probability of the dependent 
variable. Therefore, the effect of any independent variable will vary depending on the 
level of the dependent variable (i.e. EU: effective action) being analysed. In order to 
summarise these interaction effects, I use the Sample Averages Method, to compare 
probabilities across groups.  By using the Sample Averages Method, I examine the 
effects of each independent variable in the model while holding all other independent 
variables constant at their sample means. This allows an analysis to take place in 
order to determine the effect of each variable on individuals who are ÔaverageÕ on all 
the other variables being studied.  
  131 
The following equation converts the logged odds of ÔEU: effective actionÕ into 
a predicted probability:  
Equation: Probability of EU: Effective action = Exp (Logged odds of EU: Effective 
action)/1 + Exp (Logged odds of EU: Effective Action)) 
According to this equation, I retrieve the probability of ÔEU: effective actionÕ 
by first raising the natural log base (e) to the power of the logged odds of ÔEU: 
effective actionÕ. We then divide this number by the quantity one plus e raised to the 
power of the logged odds of ÔEU: effective actionÕ.  
Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling is a flexible approach that is applied in my 
research to evaluate individualÕs perceptions of inequality in assessing support for the 
EU in the twenty-seven member states of the EU. HLM is hierarchical because it 
allows modelling within and between individual variations. At level-1, each 
individualÕs data is fitted to a regression line. Level-1 coefficients are empirical 
Bayesian estimates, which are optimal estimates based on data from both the 
individual and the entire population. Individual data are weighted by the number of 
data points and the reliability of the regression analysis. This approach then shrinks 
the individualsÕ coefficients toward the population means; the degree of shrinkage is 
inversely proportional to the reliability of the individual data (Raudenbush & Bryk 
2002). At level-2, the dependent variables are the level-1 regression coefficients, and 
the independent variables are the characteristics of level-2 units, i.e. the individuals. 
At level-2 individual difference variables are used to explain between subject 
variation in both the intercept and the linear slope.  
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In my analysis of individualÕs perception of inequality and support for the EU 
in the twenty-seven EU member states, a random intercept, random slope hierarchical 
linear model (HLM) focuses on the regression coefficient between individualsÕ 
perception of inequality and their level of support for the EU. In the equation (1) and 
(2) below, the intercept is allowed to vary across groups, in this case, cross-nationally 
among the twenty-seven EU member states. While the level of support for the EU is 
likely to be different (e.g. support for the EU status quo and support for the EU in 
terms of ÔdeepeningÕ), we are less interested in explaining the level of support for the 
EU per se (i.e. the dependent variable) than we are in explaining the change in the 
strength of the relationship between individualsÕ perceptions of inequality and support 
for the EU, i.e. β1j.  Therefore,  
 (1) 
  
 (2) 
 
 (3) 
Here, zj  is the variable that explains group differences (in this case, support for 
the EU status quo and support for the EU in terms of ÔdeepeningÕ). The symbol γ11 is 
the coefficient of the relationship between the grouping variables and the individual-
level variation (i.e. inequality). To model this process simultaneously, substitution of 
equation 2 (random intercept) and 3 (random slope) into (1) produces the following 
equation:  
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           (4) 
 
When  is the cross-level interaction term that highlights a significant 
relationship between the strength of inequality and support for the EU, it also varies 
by the types of support for the EU (i.e. status quo or deepening). The model also 
includes the theoretically important socio-economic controls (i.e. ) as 
outlined above in the section on independent variables.  
One strength of HLM is that the methodology is suited to examining Ôcross-
level moderator effectsÕ. In my analysis, this means that models where support for the 
EU (i.e. group level) is expected to have an impact on the task significance (i.e. the 
inequality slope). A second strength of HLM is that the method allows both the 
identification and partition of different sources of variance in outcome variables. The 
magnitude of between group variance in the dependent variable can be estimated 
using HLM (Hofmann 1997, pp. 732-733). However, a weakness of HLM is that the 
variance in independent variables and in moderators cannot be partitioned and 
evaluated. This prevents a robust examination of where the variance in the 
independent variables and or the moderator variables truly lies (i.e. between groups, 
within groups, both between and within groups, or neither between nor within 
groups).  
There are two predominant limitations with using HLM. First, is the 
assumption of multivariate normality that is involved in the use of maximum 
likelihood estimation. This assumption is problematic when interactions are present as 
they are likely to violate the normality assumption. In my analysis of support for the 
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EU in the twenty-seven EU member states, there are no interaction terms. 
Nevertheless, in conjunction with the debate on multivariate normality, HLM treats 
independent variables as random variables. This raises the possibility that independent 
variables can be correlated with their associated residuals, and it violates the 
assumption of multivariate normality. The second limitation of HLM is that it restricts 
the dependent variable to being operationalized at the lowest level of analysis. The 
weakness associated with this requirement is that it limits the applicability of HLM to 
theories that hypothesise the dependent variable at a lower level of analysis.  
4.7: Conclusion  
The outline of my inquiry focuses upon the following questions: How do 
individuals perceive inequality? What effect do individualsÕ perceptions of inequality 
have on support for the EU? Do individualsÕ perceptions of inequality differ cross-
nationally among the twenty-seven EU member states when examining EU support? 
What is the effect of individualÕs perceptions of inequality in the Republic of Ireland 
when analysing support for the EU? Finally, do individuals believe the EU or the 
national governments of EU member states are best placed to take effective action 
against the economic and financial crisis? To answer these questions in the 
proceeding chapters, I take the following approach:  
I pose the simple question: have individualsÕ perceptions of inequality had an 
effect on mass public opinion support for the EU? I ask this question in the context of 
the 2007/8 economic crisis, allowing the crisis to act as the salient moment in which 
individuals will focus more on the perceptions of inequality as a result of the 
economic downturn. The first empirical chapter addresses individualsÕ concerns about 
inequality and support for the twenty-seven EU member states of the EU. Following 
the 2007/8 economic crisis, the subsequent economic downturn and the widening of 
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economic disparities among individuals it would be expected to find lower support for 
the EU among individuals across all 27 member states of the EU. This reduced 
support for the EU would be strongest among those individuals poised to lose the 
most, which draws upon the Ôwinners and losersÕ theory outlined in chapter 3. These 
claims seek correlations that prove clues to causation. Do individualsÕ perceptions of 
inequality correlate in the ways expected? If this is the case, then why do they 
correlate in this way? If this is not the case, then why do they not correlate in this 
way? The answers to these questions establish that while individuals may perceive 
inequality, individualsÕ perceptions of inequality are not correlated to inequality per 
se. This distinction will have an effect on individualsÕ concerns about inequality (and 
perceptions of inequality), support for the EU and the future of the EU project since 
the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
The second empirical chapter focuses upon the question: what is the effect of 
individuals perceptions of inequality in the Republic of Ireland upon support for the 
EU? Once again, this question is posed in the context of the beginning of the 
economic crisis of 2007/8, as the crisis can be regarded as a critical juncture in 
IrelandÕs relationship with the EU, as a result of the widening economic disparities 
individuals have experienced. Ireland is a critical case in examining support for the 
EU because since its accession to the EU in 1973, it has often been considered as an 
exemplar of what the EU could offer small member states with a strongly pro-
integrationist mass public. However, in the wake of national political responses to 
austerity in Ireland and individualsÕ perceptions of inequality, I would expect to find 
reduced support for the EU in Ireland. Once more, this decreased support for the EU 
in Ireland would be expected to be among those individuals in an economic position 
to lose the most, again drawing upon the Ôwinners and losersÕ theory outlined in 
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chapter 3. These claims seek correlations that prove clues to causation. Do 
individualsÕ perceptions of inequality correlate in Ireland as they do in the analysis of 
the twenty-seven EU member states? If individualsÕ perceptions of inequality 
correlate in the same way as the twenty-seven EU member states then why do they 
correlate in this way? If they do not correlate in this way, then why do they not 
correlate? The answers to these claims will emphasise that individualsÕ concerns 
about inequality in Ireland have a wide-ranging effect that not only addresses, and 
indeed revises, the principle of the Ôwinners and losersÕ theory but also highlights the 
robust individual-level support for the EU in Ireland. Findings suggest it is the EU 
which becomes the institutional driving force to address market-generated inequality 
in the eyes of individuals in Ireland.   
Finally, the third empirical chapter centres upon the question: do individuals 
believe that it is the EU or the national governments of EU member states which are 
the mechanisms best placed to take effective action against the economic and 
financial crisis? Again, I pose this question in the context of the beginning of the 
2007/8 economic crisis, allowing the crisis to act as the salient moment in which 
individuals will focus more on their own support for the EU as a result of the 
economic downturn. In addition, through the use of Standard Eurobarometer data 
these individual-level attitudes towards support for the EU are traced cross-temporally 
from the onset of the economic and financial crisis up until 2013.  
The third empirical chapter addresses individualsÕ concerns about inequality 
via their own economic insecurity, which in turn influences individual-level support 
for the twenty-seven member states of the EU. Since the beginning of the economic 
and financial crisis of 2007/8, the subsequent economic downturn and the widening of 
economic disparities among individuals, I would expect to find lower support for the 
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EU among individuals across all twenty-seven member states of the EU. It would be 
expected that individuals believe that their EU member state is best placed to take 
effective action against the economic crisis, thus reducing individual-level support for 
the EU. This reduced support for the EU would be strongest among those individuals 
who feel or perceive themselves to be economically insecure and poised to lose the 
most, which draws upon the Ôwinners and losersÕ theory outlined in chapter 3. These 
claims seek correlations that prove clues to causation. Do individualsÕ perceptions of 
their own economic insecurity correlate in the ways expected? If this is the case, then 
why do they correlate in this way? If this is not the case, then why do they not 
correlate in this way? The answers to these questions establish that while individuals 
may perceive personal economic insecurity via inequality, individualsÕ perceptions of 
inequality are not correlated to inequality per se. This distinction will have an effect 
on individualsÕ support for the EU and the future of the EU project since the onset of 
the economic crisis of 2007/8. 
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Tables  
Table 1 Dependent Variables from the European Election Study 2009 data 
Dependent Variable Survey Question 
EU Membership: Good or bad  <EU GOOD OR BAD> Generally speaking do you think that 
{country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad 
thing or neither a good or bad thing? 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
in EU  
<SAT W DEM IN THE EU> How satisfied are you, on the whole, 
with the way democracy works in the European Union? 
Attitude to European 
Unification  
<MORE UNIFICATION> Some say European unification should be 
pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your 
opinion? 
EU Enlargement is good or 
bad  
<EU ENLARGED GOOD OR BAD> In general, do you think that 
enlargement of the European Union would be a good thing, a bad 
thing, neither good nor bad? 
EU in our Interest <EU IN OUR INTEREST>How much confidence do you have that 
decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of 
[respondent's country]? 
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Table 2: Independent Variables from the European Election Study 2009 data 
Independent Variable Survey Question 
Inequality <ADDRESS INEQUALITY> Income and wealth should be 
redistributed towards ordinary people 
Communication <SOCIAL COMMUNICATION> How often did you talk to friends 
or family about the election? 
<MASS MEDIA>How often watch program about election on TV? + 
Read about election in newspaper?+ Look into website concerned 
with election? Often, Sometimes, Never 
Political Interest <INTEREST IN POLITICS>To what extent would you say you are 
interested in politics?  
Identity <EUROPEAN IDENTITY>Do you feel not only [country] citizen, but 
also a European citizen?  
<IMMIGRATION FEAR>Immigration to [country] should be 
decreased significantly 
Ideological Congruence and 
Institutional Performance 
<RETRO SOC ECON EVAL>What do you think about the economy? 
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic 
situation in [respondentÕs country] is a lot better, a little better, stayed 
the same, a little worse, a lot worse 
<PROS SOC ECON EVAL> Over the next 12 months, how do you 
think the general economic situation in [your country] will be? get a 
lot better, a little better, stay the same, a little worse, get a lot worse 
<MARKET PREFERENCE> Private enterprise is the best way to 
solve [countryÕs] economic problems? 
<SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY> How satisfied are you, on 
the whole, with the way democracy works in [your country]? 
Socio-demographic Variables <AGE> What year were you born? 
<GENDER> Are youÉ Male? Female? 
<LEFT IDEOLOGY> In political matters people talk of Òthe leftÓ and 
Òthe rightÓ. What is your position? 
<RIGHT IDEOLOGY> In political matters people talk of Òthe leftÓ 
and Òthe rightÓ. What is your position?  
<EDUCATION ISCED> What is the highest level of education you 
have completed? 
<SR SOCIAL CLASS> If you were asked to choose one of these five 
names for your social class, which would you say you belong to? 
<SUBJEC STAND OF LIVING>Taking everything into account, at 
about what level is your familyÕs standard of living? 
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Table 3: Dependent Variable & Independent Variables from the Standard 
Eurobarometer Data 2009-2013 
 
Dependent Variable Survey Question 
Effective action against 
financial & economic crisis 
<EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST CRISIS> In your opinion, which 
of the following is best able to take effective actions against the 
effects of the financial & economic crisis? 
 
Independent Variables Survey Question 
Economic Insecurity <ECONOMIC INSECURITY HOUSEHOLD> Which of the following 
statements best reflects your household situation? 
<ECONOMIC INSECURITY IMPACT OF CRISIS> Some analysts 
say that the impact of the economic crisis on the job market already 
reached its peak and things will recover little by little. Others on the 
contrary say that the worst is still to come. Which of the two statements 
is closer to your opinion? 
Ideological Congruence and 
Institutional Performance 
<PROS SOC ECON EVAL> What are your expectations for the next 
twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same 
when it comes to [the economic situation in your country]? 
<SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY> On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy works in [our country]? 
Socio-demographic 
Variables 
<AGE> How old are you? 
<GENDER> Are youÉ Male? Female? 
<LEFT IDEOLOGY> In political matters people talk of Òthe leftÓ and 
Òthe rightÓ. What is your position? 
<RIGHT IDEOLOGY> In political matters people talk of Òthe leftÓ and 
Òthe rightÓ. What is your position?  
<EDUCATION> How old were you when you stopped full-time 
education? 
<SR SOCIAL CLASS> Do you see yourself and your household 
belonging to working class of society, middle class of society, upper 
class of society? 
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Chapter 5: IndividualsÕ Concerns about Inequality & Support for the 
European Union 
 
5.1: Introduction  
The origin of the EU was as an economic instigator to free markets in Europe 
and traces its origins back to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 1952-
1957 with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 under 
the Treaty of Rome. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the EU has come to include 
both political and social integration with the aim of creating widespread and equitable 
economic growth in order to preserve stability and tranquillity in Europe. IndividualsÕ 
support for the EU has echoed this with both personal and aggregate economic growth 
producing support for the EU project.  
However, recent trends suggest that EU citizens are becoming more critical of 
the EU (Franklin, Van der Eijk & Marsh 1995; Anderson & Reichert 1995; Norris 
1999; Bringear & Jolly 2005; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; Eichenberg & Dalton 
2007; Loveless 2010; Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010; Kuhn & Stoeckel 2014). This 
criticism of the EU has been exemplified further by the economic and financial crisis 
which began in 2007/8, which has demonstrated that there are a larger proportion of 
individuals who may not be objectively ÔpoorÕ but perceive themselves to be at an 
increased risk of economic hardship due to intensifying inequality and economic 
problems in both their member state and the EU. These individuals are more likely to 
be supportive of income redistribution as a method through which to reduce their own 
economic insecurity.  While these preferences for increased economic security may 
not be unanticipated, what this would create in terms of variation in support for the 
EU is uncertain.  Do individuals regard the EU as the institutional mechanism for 
economic security? Or do individuals consider the EU to be an extension of both the 
  142 
political and economic decisions that have created substantial economic difficulties 
for a majority of the EU population?  
This chapter will examine two facets with regards to individualsÕ concerns 
about inequality and support for the EU. Firstly, the analysis will highlight the 
importance individuals place on addressing inequality. Secondly, it will show that the 
importance individuals place on addressing inequality is positively correlated with 
support for further European integration but not for the EU as it is currently 
constituted.  These findings indicate that current levels of individual support for the 
EU may be in a precarious state but they can be reaffirmed.  
This is a provocative outcome suggesting that there are two predominant 
issues emerging in the understanding of popular support for the EU at the individual-
level. Firstly, views about the political responsibility to address inequality are 
autonomous and predictive. Secondly, there is little evidence to suggest that this 
effect is related to the economic Ôwinners and losersÕ of European integration thesis 
via the lens of individualsÕ SES and social location. Instead of a new group of 
economic ÔlosersÕ whose support for the EU is reduced, individualsÕ concern for both 
inequality and the role of the EU in the present and in the future is much more 
extensive.  
This is vital for the understanding of individualsÕ changing support for the EU. 
In conjunction with emerging literature on social justice, the extensive nature of 
individualsÕ support for the EU suggests that the EU should reflect EU citizensÕ 
preferences for fairness and justice in society via strong and effective democratic 
institutions. These institutions will then act and function in order to diminish 
excessive market distortions. It appears that, following the onset of the economic and 
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financial crisis of 2007/8, if the EU is regarded by individuals to have failed to create 
adequate economic and social opportunities, or has provided these prospects in an 
unequal manner, membership of the EU may still represent assurance for individuals 
that both economic and political institutions can and will work effectively in order to 
address inequality.  
As previously stated, the EU is an economic project combined with a 
democratic normative framework. This suggests that support for the EU can shift with 
a desire for politics-in this instance democratic politics-to play a robust role in 
stabilising the economy. As a consequence, it would appear that rising economic 
difficulties and the need to address inequality have prompted individuals in the EU 
towards the preference for a stronger state role and one that corresponds to a stronger 
affinity for the EU.  
5.2: Attitudes towards the European Union  
As outlined in Chapter Two there is a substantive and diverse literature which 
aims to explain individualsÕ attitudes toward support for the EU. The determinants of 
EU support have included social location (Inglehart 1970; Anderson & Reichert 1995; 
We§els 1995; Inglehart 1997; Gabel 1998a; Hooghe et al. 2007), social and economic 
status (Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a & 1998b; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; 
Gabel & Whitten 1997), national versus European identities (Moravcsik 1993; 
Franklin & Wlezien, 1997; de Winter & Swyngedouw 1999; Scheuer 1999; Schmitt 
& Thomassen, 1999; Cederman 2001; Carey 2002; McClaren 2002; Kritzinger 2003; 
De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; Schmitt 2005; De Vries & Van Kersbergen 2007; 
Loveless & Rohrschneider 2008) and evaluations of institutional performance 
(Janssen 1991; Franklin, Van der Eijk & Marsh 1995; Anderson 1998; Majone 1998; 
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Norris 1999; Schmitt & Thommassen 1999; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Moravcsik 2002; 
Rohrschneider 2002; Crombez 2003; Ray 2003a; Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). 
Support for the EU has also been examined through the lens of political 
intermediaries such as elites (Dalton 1985; Franklin, Marsh, & McClaren, 1995; 
Weβels 1995; Thomassen & Schmitt 1997; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a, Schmitt & 
Thomassen 1999; Schmitt & Thomassen 2000; Carrubba, 2001; De Vreese 2002; 
Hooghe 2003), political parties (Mair 1990; Katz & Mair 1994; Franklin, Marsh & 
McClaren 1994; Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996; Taggart 1998; Van der Brug & Van 
der Eijk 1999; Marks & Wilson 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray 2002; Hooghe, Marks & 
Wilson 2003; Ray 2003a & 2003b; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Hooghe & Marks 2006; 
Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards 2006) and mass media (Meyer 1999; Anderson & 
McLeod 2004; De Vreese et al 2006; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2006).  
The initial individual-level models of support for the EU were constructed on 
a utilitarian approach, which hypothesised that individuals assess EU membership 
based on their social position, assessment of their own economic experience and 
expectations of their member statesÕ market economy. Under this principle of 
utilitarianism there are ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ of European integration (Gabel 1998a, 
1998b).  These groups which are defined by individuals social position, for example 
economic positions, education, occupational skills and proximity to borders, 
distinguishes between those who would either benefit or lose from further European 
integration (see also Gabel & Whitten 1997).  
The ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ thesis demonstrates that individuals with high SES 
and low socio-economic status regarded the EU in different manners. The ÔwinnersÕ 
regard the EU as the expansion of the liberal market economy and thus a source of 
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opportunities, a perspective which is pronounced among cosmopolitan, mobile and 
flexible individuals. Conversely, the ÔlosersÕ view the EU in terms of diminishing 
welfare as a result of declining patterns of national-level redistribution within the 
expanded liberal market economy (Gabel 1998a & 1998b; Brinegar & Jolly, 2005). 
In the context of the economic crisis of 2007/8 one would expect to find 
resurgence in GabelÕs (1995; 1997; 1998a & 1998b) ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ thesis. 
This resurgence derives from the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 
and continuing economic recession in Europe, which has created a new group of 
ÔlosersÕ in the EU project. This new group of ÔlosersÕ continues to be socio-
economically secure but it includes those individuals who perceive themselves to be 
pushed closer to the economic edge of ÔlosingÕ. Put simply, following the 2007/8 
economic crisis there is a greater percentage of people who may not be objectively 
ÔpoorÕ but who nevertheless feel themselves to be at a heightened risk of economic 
adversity due to rising inequality and economic problems both in their respective 
member states and the EU as a whole. These individuals are likely to be more 
supportive of income redistribution as a means to minimize their own economic 
insecurity.  
5.3: Inequality in the European Union 
As outlined in Chapter Three, the examination of inequality as a determinant 
of EU support is founded upon a value-based position that reflects individualsÕ 
support for the idea that democratic institutions should serve as an arbiter of market-
generated inequality. In order to demonstrate that this measure of inequality is not a 
proxy for other value-based positions and can therefore be independently predictive of 
support for the EU, I analyse how inequality is correlated with both ideological and 
socio-economic positions (i.e. variables that focus upon instrumental self-interest, 
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SES, social location, and political institutions and the market). The on-going 
economic crisis of 2007/8 is used as the salient moment to activate individualsÕ 
concerns about overall economic performance, which will highlight that there are 
more individuals if not actually doing worse, then at least feeling or perceiving as if 
they are achieving less economically.    
Individuals perceptions of feeling as if they are achieving less economically 
since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8 comports with the Revisionist School 
within welfare state research which focuses upon political cleavages based on risk 
exposure. Revisionists argue that the fundamental basis for the welfare state is not 
redistribution but demand for social insurance that cuts across class lines (Baldwin 
1990; Iversen & Soskice 2001; Moene & Wallerstein 2001; Swenson 2002; Mares 
2003; Cusack, Iverson & Rehm 2006). These scholars demonstrate that major welfare 
state programs represent social insurance that protects individuals from economic 
risks. Exxamples of social insurance include health insurance, unemployment benefits 
and retirement pensions (i.e. the goods of society). Although social insurance is 
redistributive, its principal goal is to guard people from major economic dislocations 
provoked by interruptions to income or volatile non-discretionary expenditure.  
For the Revisionist School, social insurance programmes are not only 
desirable for those individuals with low incomes but also those individuals facing 
higher economic risks. This creates the basis for cross group coalitions (i.e. between 
the ÔwinnersÕ and the ÔlosersÕ of the EU project) in support of social protection. The 
Revisionist scholarship is used as an alternative to traditional arguments that 
emphasise the primacy of class position. As Baldwin (Baldwin 1990, p. 20 & 28) 
highlights, Òrisk and fortune have bound some groups togetherÉ [and] split others 
apartÓ (Baldwin 1990, pp. 20 & 28). The inter-relationship between different socio-
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economic groups (i.e. the ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ) shapes preferences for redistribution 
and thus a renewed role of the nation state. This renewed role of the nation state 
produces the expectation that SES and social location (i.e. income) as an indicator of 
economic security would preserve or increase its strength as a predictor of support for 
the EU project. As Gabel (1998a & 1998b) posits, the effect of SES and social 
location is based upon the EU being regarded as a guarantor of economic growth25 
whereby individuals are able to determine what continued European integration 
means to them as either ÔwinnersÕ or ÔlosersÕ of the EU project.  
It must be noted, however, that ÔlosingÕ may not be restricted to variations in 
individual income.  It is the distribution of the goods of society that may have put 
more individuals in a more fragile socio-economic state, or made those individuals 
feel that they are in a more precarious socio-economic state. Variations in how 
individuals benefit from and share in aggregate economic growth, or in how those 
alterations in growth are distributed, can be reflected in individualsÕ concerns about 
inequality. Put simply, while many individuals may not be de facto ÔpoorÕ or ÔlosersÕ 
in a stringent economic definition (i.e. income), many individuals may feel closer to 
such a position since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
The perception that an individual is not apportioned the ÔfairÕ benefits of 
society is likely to affect how individuals think about the current political and 
economic status of both the EU and their respective member states. Inequality is 
therefore viewed through the lens of the distribution of economic growth and/or the 
changes in the distribution of economic growth. This in turn plays a role in gauging 
support for the EU along with individualsÕ actual SES and social location. The 
                                                              
25 For related analysis in Central and Eastern Europe see Tucker et al 2002; Rohrschneider & 
Whitefield 2006 and Loveless 2010.  
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perceived improvement or perceived deterioration in an individualÕs socio-economic 
well-being can be an effective determinant of an individualÕs support for continued 
European integration. It can also be used as an evaluation of how to assess support for 
the EU as it is currently constituted (i.e. status quo).  
Concerns about inequality are more closely related to the emerging literature 
on social justice in which individualsÕ perceptions of excessive inequality are to some 
degree driven by normative values such as ÔfairnessÕ and ÔjusticeÕ in society (Kreidl 
2000; Wegener 2000; Verwiebe & Wegener 2000; Osberg & Smeeding 2006; 
Loveless & Whitefield 2011). All of these views are not strictly egalitarian, which 
therefore diminishes GabelÕs (1998a; 1998b) argument of pure ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ 
of the European integration project and almost permits individuals to accept 
inequality to a point. In Europe, Kaltenhaler et al. (2008, p. 218) contend that 
individualsÕ orientation to income inequality is ÒÉlargely a product of the ideas that 
they hold about politics and society and not solely a product of their economic self-
interestÓ, incorporating views of equality and fairness versus strict egalitarianism. 
More importantly, these views closely correspond to normative notions that posit that, 
in societies, democratic institutions have an obligation to attain fair and just 
outcomes.  
Given the notion that democratic institutions are designed to function in a 
roughly egalitarian or nominally majoritarian manner (Dahl, 1989), these institutions 
are the principal mechanism available for individuals to contend with excessive and 
inevitable distortions of the liberal market economy (Bollen & Jackman 1985; 
Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996; Reuveny & Li 2003). If the process of democracy is 
regarded as impartial and fair, individuals are inclined to accept the outcome whether 
they have received what they wanted from these democratic institutions or not which 
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in turn produces legitimacy for the democratic process (Rohrschneider, 2005). As a 
result, democratic institutions can be considered to provide protection from the 
perceived inequalities of the liberal market economy by functioning as impartial 
intermediaries of social welfare and reducing the effects of market-driven inequality 
in the EU.  
In order to relate this to individualsÕ support for the EU, I make a connection 
between individualsÕ concerns about inequality and changes in individuals level of 
support for the EU through the relationship inequality has to both democratic political 
institutions and the liberal market economy.  I do not posit that EU citizens want an 
alternative arrangement with political democracy and the free market economy of the 
EU, but rather that EU citizens want democratic institutions and the liberal market 
economy to both function effectively (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2006). It is much 
more productive to consider the market and democracy as mutually reinforcing 
mechanisms, so that the liberal market economy can produce improved economic 
outcomes for a larger proportion of individuals in the EU in conjunction with robust 
and efficient democratic institutions.  
For example, if an economy provides high living standards and vigorous 
economic development, individuals will often accept comparatively high, objective 
levels of inequality (Jackman 1975; Bollen & Jackman 1985). This makes the balance 
between market-generated inequalities and effective democratic institutions a 
plausible connection to formulate because EU citizens will regard EU member states 
with strong, democratic political institutions as a safeguard against excessive 
inequalities (Bollen & Jackman 1985; Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny & Li 2003; 
Whitefield & Loveless 2013). 
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I propose that, in the wake of the on-going crisis, the EU can be seen primarily 
as the guarantor of democracy that can combat market-driven inequalities. This 
expressed desire is apparent in citizensÕ support for the EU project and its 
continuation. In addition, perhaps individuals regard the EU as the mechanism to 
enforce democratic responses to economic woes in the context of rising inequality. It 
is not unreasonable to make this connection between strong democratic responses and 
market inequalities. IndividualsÕ perceptions of excessive inequality do not drive 
dislike or distrustfulness of democratic institutions: in fact, it is nearly always the 
opposite (for Europe as a whole see Kaltenhaler et al. 2008; for Central and Eastern 
Europe, see Whitefield & Loveless 2013) corresponding to long-standing academic 
enquiries which demonstrate individuals who exhibit dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy want more, rather than less, democracy (Norris 1999; 
Dalton 2004). 
Thus, when the market distorts the distribution of goods in society, 
(democratic) institutional remedies need to be available. That is to say, if effective 
democratic institutions are the presumed remedy for inequality, this inquiry allows us 
to not only to examine changes in the level of support for the EU, but also to re-
examine a longstanding question of whether the EU may be valued more for its 
democratic character than its market character. Given earlier findings which 
demonstrated that perceptions of excessive inequality lowered individualsÕ support for 
the EU (for Central and Eastern Europe, Loveless 2010); I expect to find that 
individualsÕ perceptions that market-driven inequality is insufficiently addressed are 
likely to increase support for the EU. 
When the liberal market economy distorts the distribution of the goods of 
society, democratic institutional solutions need to be available. Put simply, if effective 
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democratic institutions are the remedy for inequality, this inquiry allows an 
examination of the changes in the level of support for the EU, but also a re-
examination of the question as to whether the EU is regarded more for its democratic 
character than its liberal market economy character. Given earlier findings which 
demonstrate that perceptions of excessive inequality lowered individualsÕ support for 
the EU in Central and Eastern Europe (Loveless, 2010) I expect to find that 
individualsÕ perceptions that market-driven inequality is inadequately addressed is 
likely to increase support for the EU in the 27 member states of the EU in this study.  
5.4: Methods: Operationalization  
Increased support for the EU and the continuation of the EU project suggests 
that individuals regard the EU as the enforcer of democratic political institutions, 
which appeal to justice, fairness and transparency.  Decreased support for the EU is 
considered in conjunction with increased concerns among individuals that the EU is 
ill equipped to address inequality. This is suggestive of the on-going battle with the 
perceived democratic deficit of the EU, concerns about the efficacy of the EU, and a 
preference for member-state governments to be the basis of effective action against 
inequality. In any of these latter cases, individualsÕ concerns with inequality depress 
support for the EU. 
The theory that combines individualsÕ concern about addressing inequality 
with support for the EU and national governance rests on the notion that citizens seek 
strong democratic politics to serve as a safeguard against market-generated 
inequalities (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny & Li 2003; Whitefield & Loveless 
2012). As broadly outlined in chapter three (see hypothesis H1a) his leads to the 
hypothesis that:  
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H1: IndividualsÕ belief that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address 
market-generated inequality is positively correlated with individuals support for the 
EU project. 
To operationalize this I use the EES 2009 data to examine support for the EU. 
A limitation to the study of support for the EU is the variety of determinants for 
support (See Chapter Two). In order to test the robustness of the inquiry I include four 
determinants of EU support:  
(1) EU membership is good or bad 
(2) Satisfaction with democracy in the EU  
(3) EU enlargement is good or bad  
(4) Support for more or less European unification 
By including these four determinants of EU support it is possible to group the 
first two determinants (ÔEU membership is good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction with 
democracy in the EUÕ) in order to capture individual respondentsÕ orientation to the 
EU as it is in its current form (i.e. status quo). Simultaneously, I group the latter two 
determinants (ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ and ÔSupport for more or less European 
unificationÕ) in order to capture individual respondentsÕ positioning on the deepening 
or intensifying of EU membership. Put simply, the latter two determinants are 
grouped together to report individualsÕ support for the EU as it moves towards its goal 
of continued European integration.  
Table 4 demonstrates the co-variation of these dependent variables. Each 
dependent variable varies from one another yet none of the four variables are 
substantively correlated with one another. In addition, two conceptual groups can be 
shaped: Ôthe EU status quoÕ and ÔEU enlargementÕ. However, I do not formally 
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impose this conceptualisation on either the EES 2009 data or the theory to be tested 
other than to highlight the possible distinctiveness of the variables between the EU 
status quo (i.e. in its current form) and deepening or intensifying of EU membership.  
 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, there are numerous approaches to the 
understanding of EU support. The standard model of EU support includes 
communication (social communication, watching mass media, and interest in 
politics), identity (feeling about being described as European, and fear of 
immigrants), ideological congruence and institutional performance (including 
retrospective and prospective socio-tropic economic evaluations, as well as normative 
preferences for the liberal market economy and satisfaction with democracy), socio-
demographic variables (including self-reported social class, subjective standard of 
living, age, gender, ideology, and education).  
The central independent concerning inequality is asked in the context of the 
post-economic crisis, therefore founding the conceptual basis for inequality on the 
principle that inequality is generated by liberal market economies, and institutions are 
expected to disperse political power  (Bartels 2008; Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli,  & Gelleny 
2008). Put simply, I base my understanding on individualsÕ existing normative 
attitudes that the liberal market economy should be fair versus purely equal, and that 
democracy should function in a roughly egalitarian or minimally majoritarian manner 
in order to prevent inevitable market distortions.  
To operationalize this rationale, individual respondents were asked how 
important they deem the principle of addressing inequality to be using the question 
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Òincome and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary peopleÓ. As outlined 
theoretically above (see Chapter Three for a comprehensive outline of the theory to be 
tested) I take this to be a value position that demonstrates individual respondentsÕ 
support for the idea that democratic institutions should serve as the arbiter of liberal 
market-generated inequality. In order to show that this measure of inequality is not a 
proxy for other value positions and can be independently predictive of support for the 
EU, I analyse how the variable of inequality correlates with both ideological and 
socio-economic positions.  
Individuals with left-leaning ideological positions often consider support for 
intervention by a nation state in the liberal market economy while individuals with 
right-leaning ideological positions are often associated with conservative ideological 
positions. Using individualsÕ left-right ideological self-placement it is demonstrated 
that there is little correlation between individualsÕ concerns with addressing inequality 
of r=-0.13 (p≤0.001, N=23,647).  
Using a direct measure of individualsÕ non-normative preferences for the role 
of an EU member state which asks respondents whether Òpolitics should abstain from 
intervening in the economyÓ I find an even lower correlation with individualsÕ 
concerns about addressing inequality of r=0.07 (p≤0.001, N=27,069). It may be 
intuitive to consider Ôaddress inequalityÕ to be related to attitudes regarding the liberal 
market economy. However, the correlation between Ôaddress inequalityÕ and Ômarket 
preferenceÕ is r=-0.05 (p≤0.001 N= 25,130) suggesting that these two variables do not 
move together.26 This demonstrates that individualsÕ support for addressing inequality 
is neither a proxy for ideology nor a preference for markets to address inequality.  
                                                              
26 All models were tested for multi-collinearity with no significant problems. 
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Using individualsÕ self reported standard of living, the preliminary evidence 
suggests that as individuals move toward a more precarious economic position, the 
concern for addressing inequality is in fact more pronounced among those individuals 
who are economically affluent (r=-0.13, p≤0.001, N=26,567). Therefore, while the 
standard of living may capture existing economic vulnerability, it does not 
demonstrate results about what to expect with regards to individualsÕ views about 
addressing inequality. This is not surprising given findings from previous research, 
which highlight that the distribution of skills, pre-existing non-economic cleavages 
(for example, ethnicity and religious orientation) and subjective attitudes toward 
welfare and social justice distort the direct connection between policy preferences and 
economic interests (Benabou 2000; Benabou & Tirole 2006; Osberg & Smeeding 
2006).  
The direct test of the effect of individualsÕ attitudes toward addressing 
inequality is to first run the models as pooled regressions controlling for cross-
national differences using country dummies. For the three dependent variables ÔEU 
membership is good or badÕ, ÔSatisfaction with democracy the EUÕ and ÔEU 
enlargement is good or badÕ, I use ordered Logit. For the fourth dependent variable, 
ÔSupport for more or less European unificationÕ, I use OLS regression.  
 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
 
Interpretation of Theoretically Relevant Independent Variables in HLM Model  
Across all four dependent variables (ÔEU membership is good or badÕ, 
ÔSatisfaction with Democracy in the EUÕ, ÔEU enlargement is good or badÕ and ÔMore 
Unification, see Table 5) the main theoretically relevant variables of inequality and 
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ideological congruence and institutional performance perform well. The central 
independent variable of ÔAddress inequalityÕ is positively correlated with both ÔEU 
enlargementÕ and ÔMore unificationÕ and is statistically significant at the 99% level, 
! ! !!01 respectively. For both of these models for every one unit increase in the 
need to address inequality both models predict that ÔEU enlargementÕ and ÔMore 
Unification will increase by 0.0773 and 0.101 units respectively holding all other 
independent variables constant. This means that in these two models individuals in the 
EU believe that further enlargement of the EU and more European unification are 
factors, which increase the need to address market-generated inequality and as a 
consequence this increases mass public opinion support for the EU. However, in the 
models ÔEU membership is good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction with Democracy in the EUÕ 
the central independent variable of ÔAddress inequalityÕ is negatively correlated yet 
statistically significant at the 99% level ! ! !!01  and 95% level ! !
!!05!respectively. Thus, for every one unit decrease in the need to address inequality 
the model predicts that ÔEU Membership good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction with 
Democracy in the EUÕ will decrease by -0.0426 and -0.0267 units holding all other 
independent variables constant. This infers that those individuals who believe that 
membership of the EU is neither a good or bad thing and those who are dissatisfied 
with democracy in the EU decreases support for inequality to be addressed and 
therefore decreases support for the EU.  
However, given the concern of individuals in the EU about the issue of 
inequality and its apparent and differential effect on support for the EU since the 
onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 it is evident that inequality is a 
meaningful political, rather than merely economic, issue and one that needs 
substantive consideration. For individuals in the EU, evaluations of support for the 
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EU are not only economic but socio-tropic with many people believing that the liberal 
market system functions in an unfair and unjust manner as they assess societal 
differences based upon both access and opportunity to the EU. This is reiterated 
theoretically by the ideological and institutional performance variables as they are 
uniformly positive and theoretically as expected as outlined in this inquiry.  
In testing the robustness of the theoretical design in this inquiry, prospective 
socioeconomic evaluation and satisfaction with democracy are the best performing 
ideological congruence and institutional performance variables. Prospective 
socioeconomic evaluation and satisfaction with democracy is positively correlated 
and statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001!across all three models. The 
correlation coefficients reflect the theoretical strength of this inquiry with prospective 
socioeconomic evaluation reporting coefficients across all three models of 0.204, 
0.0876, 0.0991 and 0.113 respectively and satisfaction with democracy reporting 
coefficients across all three models of 0.530, 1.608, 0.367 and 0.366. This is to say 
that for every one-unit increase in individualsÕ prospective socioeconomic evaluation 
and satisfaction with democracy all models predict that overall support for the EU 
will increase holding all other independent variables constant. This further 
demonstrates theoretically that individualsÕ evaluations of support for the EU are not 
only economic but socio-tropic with many individuals in the EU believing that the 
liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust manner as they assess societal 
differences based upon both access and opportunity to the EU.  
Market preference is also a theoretically relevant independent variable that 
performs well among the institutional performance and ideological congruence 
variables. It is uniformly positive across all four models and is statistically significant 
at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001!for ÔEU Membership is good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction 
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with Democracy in the EUÕ (i.e. the EU status quo) and statistically significant at the 
99% level, ! ! !!01!with ÔMore unificationÕ (i.e. further EU enlargement/deepening).  
This theoretically demonstrates that for every one unit increase in the need for the 
liberal market economy to address the economic problems in the EU three of the 
models (ÔEU Membership good or badÕ, ÔSatisfaction with Democracy in the EUÕ, 
and ÔMore UnificationÕ) predicts that support for the EU will increase by 0.0624, 
0.0511 and 0.0517 units respectively holding all other independent variables constant. 
Thus substantively, in conjunction with some of the most long-standing theories on 
EU support, it can be posited that the positive and predictive findings from 
prospective socio-tropic economic evaluations are consistent with the notion that 
individuals in the EU regard it as the institutional driving force to address market 
generated inequality and therefore improve individuals socio-tropic economic 
evaluations following the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
Similar conclusions can be drawn from retrospective socio-tropic economic 
evaluations which is also uniformly positive across all four models and is statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001!for ÔEU Enlargement is good or badÕ and 
statistically significant at the 99% level, ! ! !!01! with ÔSatisfaction with 
DemocracyÕ and ÔMore unificationÕ. This illustrates that for every one-unit increase in 
individualsÕ retrospective socio-tropic economic evaluation in the EU three model 
predicts that ÔSatisfaction with DemocracyÕ, ÔEU Enlargement good or badÕ and 
ÔMore unificationÕ will increase by 0.0462, 0.0866 and 0.0698 units respectively 
holding all other independent variables constant thus increasing support for the EU.  
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that individuals in the EU are concerned 
about inequality and its apparent and differential effect on support for the EU since 
the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. As a consequence of this 
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concern, it is evident that inequality is a meaningful political, rather than merely 
economic, issue and one that needs substantive consideration. For individuals in the 
EU, evaluations of support for the EU are not only economic but socio-tropic with 
many people believing that the liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust 
manner as they assess societal differences based upon both access and opportunity to 
the EU. This is reiterated theoretically by the ideological and institutional 
performance variables, which are uniformly positive, have strong correlation 
coefficients and in the expected theoretical direction.  
Interpretation of all Independent Variables in HLM Model  
Across all four dependent variables (see Table 5) the communication variables 
produce varied correlation and statistical significance.  Social communication is 
negatively correlated with the support for the EU variables (EU good or bad and 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU) and positively correlated with the EU 
enlargement variables (EU enlargement good or bad and support for more or less 
unification). Social communication is not statistically significant across all four 
dependent variables. Mass media is positively correlated across three dependent 
variables and is statistically significant at the 95% level (! ! !!05) for support for the 
EU (EU good or bad) and statistically significant at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) for 
EU enlargement/deepening (EU enlargement good or bad and support for more or less 
unification). IndividualsÕ interest in politics is statistically significant and positively 
correlated at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) with ÔEU membership is good or badÕ and 
is also statistically significant and positively correlated at the 95% level (! ! !!05) 
with ÔSupport for more or less unificationÕ. In congruence with some of the most 
long-standing theories of support for the EU, both prospective socio-tropic economic 
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evaluations and satisfaction with (national) democracy are consistently, positively and 
statistically predictive at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) of support for both EU 
membership and enlargement. The same can almost be said of for retrospective socio-
tropic evaluations, which only fail to reach statistical significance for ÔEU 
membership good or badÕ. Similarly, preferences for market economies which fail to 
reach statistical significance for support for EU enlargement. Therefore, the 
ideological congruence and institutional performance variables are nearly uniformly 
positive and as expected. Overall, the identity variables (ÔFeel EuropeanÕ and ÔFear of 
ImmigrationÕ) are the most consistent predictor of support for the EU and EU 
enlargement. ÔFeel EuropeanÕ is positively correlated and statistically significant at 
the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) across all four dependent variables. While ÔImmigration 
fearÕ is negatively correlated across all four dependent variables and is statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) for ÔEU membership good or badÕ, ÔEU 
enlargement good or badÕ and Ômore or less unificationÕ and statistically significant at 
the 99% (! ! !!01) level for ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ.  These variables are in 
the directions expected.  
For the socio-demographic variables, I note that the reliance on GabelÕs 
(Gabel 1998a & 1998b) Ôwinners and losersÕ thesis on static demographic variables 
may be deteriorating. The richer, younger, more educated males no longer appear to 
regard the EU and further European integration as a net positive. There is only a slight 
gender effect for ÔEU membership is good or badÕ (statistically significant at the 95% 
level, ! ! !!05), education is only positively correlated with the attitude that the EU 
is good (rather than bad) and statistically significant at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001), 
for age only in the case of ÔEU membership good or badÕ are younger respondents 
more supportive of EU membership with age being positively correlated and 
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statistically significant at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) with ÔEU membership good or 
badÕ. For ÔSatisfaction with democracy in the EUÕ and ÔSupport for EU enlargementÕ 
older respondents are more supportive as age is negatively correlated but statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level (! ! !!001) and 95% (! ! !!05) level respectively 
with ÔSatisfaction with democracy win the EUÕ and ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ. 
Social class is predominant in both ÔEU membership is good or badÕ (positively 
correlated and statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001) and ÔSupport for 
EU enlargementÕ  (positively correlated and statistically significant at the 95% level, 
! ! !!05). Self-reported Ôstandard of livingÕ is positively correlated and statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 across all three dependent variables with the 
exception of ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ.  
Ideology produces little consistency other than those who subscribe to left 
ideological positions are less likely to support the EU as it is and more likely to 
support enlargement (although not more unification) as Ôleft ideologyÕ is negatively 
correlated with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ and 
statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 and positively correlated and 
statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 with ÔEU enlargement good or 
badÕ. At the same time, those individuals who self-identify at the farthest right 
positions are also supportive of further unification and in contrast to those on the left, 
of the EU as it is. Right ideology is positively correlated across all three dependent 
variables with the exception of ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ and is statistically 
significant at the 99% level ! ! !!01 with ÔEU membership good or badÕ, 95% level 
! ! !!05 with ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ and at the 99.9% level ! ! !!001 with 
Ômore or less unificationÕ. These are the least clear of the findings although it may be 
posited that the negative support from the left and support from the right for the EU 
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status quo is indicative of a clear market position given the string positive effects of 
individualsÕ market preference and prospective socio-tropic economic evaluations. 
Thus it may be considered that the left and the right may both support expansion: the 
left would prefer to see more democracy while the right would prefer a continuation 
of the EUÕs market profile.  
This conclusion is not warranted given the individual-level findings for the 
inequality variable. As individuals agree with the notion that income and wealth 
should be redistributed towards ordinary people, support for the EU as it is declines 
yet support for further integration increases (ÔAddressing inequalityÕ is negatively 
correlated with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ and 
statistically significant at the 99% level, ! ! !!01  and 95% level, ! ! !!05 
respectively. While, ÔAddressing inequalityÕ is positively correlated and statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 with ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ and 
ÔMore unificationÕ). This is consistent with the theoretical expectation. IndividualsÕ 
attitudes toward addressing inequality increases support for the EU, therefore lending 
support to the theoretical notion that EU citizens regard the EU as a means to 
reinforce substantive democratic governance (at both the national level and within the 
EU itself), namely as a means to combat excessive inequality. 
While they are not presented in Table 5 for space considerations, nearly all of 
the EU member statesÕ dummy variables are statistically significant, which suggests 
cross-national variation in support for the EU and EU enlargement/deepening. In 
order to verify this claim, I examine the intra-class correlation coefficient in order to 
determine whether there is a higher within-study correlation (i.e. random effects), 
which would therefore suggest EU member state-level effects.  Each of the intra-class 
correlation coefficients in the empty models reach higher than 10%, which indicates a 
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low level of cross-national variation.  However, the proportional reduction of variance 
in models which include all of the individual-level variables for both ÔEU 
membership is good or badÕ and ÔSatisfaction with democracy in the EUÕ are 17.1% 
and 30.4% respectively, which suggests significant cross-national differences27.   
This is understandable as the standard model of EU support greatly relies on 
national-level variables that play a role in shaping popular perceptions of the EU 
(Kritzinger, 2003). Several scholarly works have presented evidence that popular 
perceptions of the EU are contextualized by national institutional factors (Anderson 
1998; Norris 1999; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002). Furthermore 
individualsÕ evaluation of the EU depends on nation-state performance (Anderson 
1998; Janssen 1991). As of recently, however, national-level contextual factors matter 
differently. As EU member states move from lower levels of economic and political 
performance, citizens move from economic to political criteria (Anderson & Reichert 
1996; Gabel 1998; Carrubba 2001; Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). The underlying 
assumption remains that further EU expansion implies continued market 
liberalisation. Yet what individuals may regard as excessive inequality may have little 
to do with inequality per se but may depend rather on whether the economy as a 
whole provides high living standards and dynamic economic development.  
Economic development adjusts the social structure, social relationships and 
individualsÕ the possibilities of social advancement afforded to individuals (Lipset 
1959; Jackman 1975). When individuals are prosperous in comparison to individuals 
in other EU member states, or are successful relative to their previous economic 
                                                              
27 Intra-class correlations indicate the tendency for potential clustering at level 1. For ÔEU membership: 
good or badÕ: 9.9%; ÔSatisfaction with democracy in EUÕ: 4.3%; ÔEU enlargement: good or badÕ: 8.5%; 
and ÔAttitude to European unificationÕ: 6.0%. For ÔEU enlargement: good or badÕ and ÔAttitude to 
European unificationÕ, the proportional reductions of variance in full models are 6.9% and 9.1% 
respectively. These are reasonable motivations to examine multi-level processes.   
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situation, individuals disregard objective levels of inequality because the predominant 
priority is their absolute economic situation. Put simply, individuals will perceive 
inequality created in EU member states with either a relatively wealthy economy or a 
high rate of economic growth as legitimate and acceptable. In this instance, 
individualsÕ perceptions of inequality are autonomous of the objective levels of 
inequality when considered in conjunction with robust democratic political 
institutions (Jackman 1985). 
As a result, I include macro-level predictors that are theoretically linked to 
individual-level variation in support for the EU and macro-economic and political 
performance. I include GDP per capita (2009), the World BankÕs Government 
Effectiveness measure (2009), and the Gini Index of income inequality (2009)28. This 
analyses the role of national-level effects on support for the EU and European 
integration as well as serving as a robustness test of individual-level findings. 
The second set of models are run as multi-level, fixed effect models that allow 
for random variation on the intercept as the mean level of support controlling for the 
individual-level effects by macro-indicator (i.e. EU member state). In Table 6, the 
substantive results of using OLS regression were the same as ordered Logit (as in 
Table 5) therefore I present the OLS regression output in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of results. 
                                                              
28 Macro-level Indicators are:  
GDP per capita (current US$): Source: http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Gini Index: Measure of income inequality. Source: EUROSTAT 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di12&lang=en 
Government Effectiveness: Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009).  "Governance Matters VIII: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2008". World Bank Policy Research June 2009 
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<<Table 6 about here>> 
 
In Table 6, self-reported class, standard of living, left and right ideology, and 
education are the same as in the previous models (see Table 5). That is to say self-
reported social class is positively correlated with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and is 
statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 and ÔEU enlargement good or 
badÕ with statistical significance at the 95% level, ! ! !!05. Standard of living is 
positively correlated and statically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 across all 
three dependent variables with the exception of ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ. Left 
ideology is negatively correlated with both variables of EU support yet statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level ! ! !!001 with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and the 
99% level ! ! !!01 with ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ. Left ideology is positively 
correlated and statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001  with ÔEU 
enlargement good or badÕ. Right ideology is positively correlated with both ÔEU 
membership good or badÕ and ÔMore unificationÕ and is statistically significant at the 
95% level, ! ! !!05, and 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 respectively. Education is only 
correlated in a positive direction with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and is 
statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001!! 
In addition to lower support for EU Enlargement and ÔSatisfaction with 
democracy in the EUÕ, youth can further be counted on to prefer European unification 
as it is negatively correlated with both EU enlargement dependent variables and 
Ôsatisfaction with democracyÕ, positively correlated with ÔEU membership good or 
badÕ and statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 with both support for 
the EU dependent variables and statistically significant at the 95% level, ! ! !!05 
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with both EU enlargement dependent variables. The effect of gender is now 
completely missing as it is neither correlated nor statistically significant across all 
four models.  
Ideological congruence and institutional performance variables are the same 
and continue to remain strong predictors with retrospective socioeconomic 
evaluations positively correlated across all four models with the exception of ÔEU 
membership good or badÕ and statistically significant at the 95% level, ! ! !!05 for 
ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ and 99% level, ! ! !!01 for ÔSatisfaction with 
democracyÕ and Ômore unificationÕ. Prospective socioeconomic evaluation being 
positively correlated and statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 across 
all four models. The identity variables are positively correlated and statistically 
significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 across all four models while two of the 
communication variables ÔMass mediaÕ and Ôinterested in politicsÕ are positively 
correlated across all models with the exception of Ôsatisfaction with democracyÕ and 
ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ. ÔMass mediaÕ is statistically significant at the 99.9% 
level, ! ! !!001 with both EU enlargement variables and at the 95% level, ! ! !!05 
with ÔEU membership good or badÕ. ÔInterested in politicsÕ is statistically significant 
at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and at the 95% 
level, ! ! !!05 with Ômore unificationÕ.  
Controlling for cross-national effects, I find that in every case that as 
ÔGovernment EffectivenessÕ increases across EU member states the mean level of 
support for the EU and EU enlargement/deepening decreases. For EU support, this 
corresponds to existing research in which the quality of EU member state-level 
democracy inversely affects support for the EU (Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). 
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For further European integration, this challenges the competencies argument that 
presents the conundrum of the EU versus EU member statesÕ governmentsÕ abilities 
to manage emerging economic challenges.  
Simultaneously, the changes in the level of aggregate income inequality (i.e. 
Gini index of income inequality) only reduce support for EU enlargement. At the 
individual-level, individualsÕ concern about addressing inequality are similar to the 
previous analyses being statistically significant for ÔSupport for the EUÕ and ÔSupport 
for EU Enlargement/DeepeningÕ (see Table 5) with the exception that the negative 
coefficient for ÔSatisfaction with democracy in the EUÕ has disappeared. However, it 
must be noted that it is only one hundredth of a per cent away from statistical 
significance (p<0.06). Put simply, when controlling for cross-national differences in 
economic performance, democratic institutional performance, and national levels of 
income inequality, the findings here are nearly unchanged. This indicates an 
empirically robust finding at the individual-level offering clear generalizability. What 
this suggests theoretically is that individuals may prefer a stronger EU presence (i.e. 
Ôunification,Õ ÔenlargementÕ) that does not exist status quo.  
5.5: Discussion  
The economic crisis has had an extensive and considerable effect on the 
economic welfare of individuals in the EU since it began in 2007/8. If the EU is 
primarily a promoter of the liberal market economy via integration of EU member 
state economies, it is reasonable to expect that those individuals who are pushed or 
perceive themselves or others to be pushed toward a more fragile personal economic 
situation to exhibit reduced support for the EU and on going European integration. 
Kriesi et al (2008) argue that economic competition which is guided by changes in the 
American economy, cultural diversity, competition between national governments 
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and the perceived encroachment of supranational politics have driven European 
societies in the theorized directions of GabelÕs (1998a & 1998b) initial contribution of 
Ôwinners and losersÕ of European integration. The 2012 Eurofound Report reiterates 
this and demonstrates that: 
ÒA combined review of indicators from the European Quality of Life 
Survey and those obtained from the Eurobarometer (for 2009 and 2010) 
highlights the fact that, on the whole, the economic and financial crisis has 
led to a decline in quality of life [in Europe]. This is more apparent for 
those living in countries most affected by the crisis. Vulnerable groups 
such as the unemployed, the elderly and the retired, as well as people 
suffering financial difficulties, have experienced a considerable drop in 
their well-being following the crisis.Ó (Eurofound, 2012). 
In conjunction with the Eurofound quote, it appears that ÔlosersÕ are not only 
ÔlosersÕ with regards to continued European integration but they are also ÔlosersÕ in 
the reduction of EU member statesÕ public sector capacity and political willingness to 
continue the welfare state. The findings of my research agree with this plausible 
understanding in three predominant ways.  
Firstly, those individuals who want inequality to be addressed appear to be 
receptive to further European integration and are dissatisfied with the current 
performance of the EU in this context. IndividualsÕ concerns with inequality depress 
support for the EU, suggesting that the perceived Ôdemocratic deficitÕ does continue to 
reinforce previous concerns about European governance (Rohrschneider, 2002). 
However, popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy tends to produce 
a desire for more, rather than less, democracy (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). The 
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findings here demonstrate that support for European integration via individualsÕ 
concerns about addressing inequality suggests a resilient connection between the 
strong democratic enforcement that the EU could potentially offer. It may be posited 
that individuals have disapproved of the EUÕs response to the economic crisis so far. 
However, the EES 2009 data (and the Standard Eurobarometer 2009-2013 data in 
Chapter Seven) shows that individuals believe that the EU has a positive possible role 
to play in addressing inequality since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
Whether the role to be played by the EU in addressing inequality supersedes the EU 
member state, or whether the EUÕs role is one that reinforces the European project is 
opaque, ambiguous and difficult to discern. It may be conceived that the EU is being 
called upon in order to address inequality in a substantive manner in addition to EU 
member state action or inaction.   
There is no direct way to assess the findings of whether it is either the EU or 
the national governments of EU member states which are primarily responsible for 
the stabilisation of the financial markets and both domestic and international 
economics. However, recent Eurobarometer data asked respondents: ÒIn your opinion, 
which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the 
financial and economic crisis?Ó29 The responses can be seen in Table 7. 
 
<<Table 7 about here>> 
 
                                                              
29 Question QC3a in the Eurobarometer 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 & 80 (Autumn 2009-Autumn 
2013). Available at: EUROPA Public Opinion Analysis - Standard Eurobarometer Archives - European 
Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm  
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IndividualsÕ responses are notable because the EU and national governments fare 
equally. By including previous Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer No. 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
77, 78, 79 & 80 Autumn 2009 - Autumn 2013) for comparison, the EU and EU 
member state governments fare equally with little variation from the previous period. 
It may be suggested that, in the minds of individuals in the EU, this question may not 
yet have a definitive answer. As a result, both the EU and EU member state 
governments may have another chance to prove to the EU citizenry their willingness 
and ability to contend with increasing levels of inequality. This would afford 
legitimacy to the responsible institution either nationally or supra-nationally. 
However, the absence of a principal contender able to address inequality, at least as it 
is perceived among EU citizens, emphasises ambivalence as both the EU and EU 
member state national governments are followed closely by individual preferences for 
Ôthe G20Õ and Ôthe International Monetary Fund (IMF)Õ and the aggregated ÔotherÕ, 
ÔnoneÕ, and ÔdonÕt knowÕ categories.  
These findings proceed to the second understanding in explaining inequality 
as a determinant of EU support. Despite the Eurofound quotation above, it is not 
merely those individuals that find themselves in a more precarious economic position 
whose concern about inequality affects their support for the EU project. It also 
appears that individualsÕ evaluations of EU support are not solely economic but also 
socio-tropic (Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). It is apparent from the finding 
demonstrated here that the economic crisis of 2007/8 has affected individual-level 
support for the EU and the continuation of the EU project. However, instead of a new 
group of concerned economic ÔlosersÕ who are more resistant to the EU project (Gabel 
1998a & 1998b), there is a more extensive concern about inequality and the role of 
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the EU (i.e. lower support for the EU as it is) as well as optimism for the EU project 
(support for the on going project) following the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
These widespread concerns about addressing inequality guides these findings 
to the third and final way in which we might understand support for the EU. By 
linking higher levels of individualsÕ concerns for addressing inequality with lower 
support for the EU as it is and higher support for further European integration, it is 
not unreasonable to draw a preliminary conclusion that the EU is perceived as a 
meaningful enforcer of democratic capacity for both the EU and EU member states to 
deal with excessive liberal market distortions (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2006). In 
addition, and in conjunction with the social justice literature that points to values of 
fairness and justice in society via strong and effective democratic institutions and 
processes that drive perceptions of inequality in societies, EU membership may 
represent more than mere economic integration in the minds of many EU citizens. For 
individuals, EU membership may represent assurance that both economic and 
political institutions function effectively. 
Using inequality as a determinant to understand individualsÕ orientation to 
politics is not innovative. However, in contrast to research in which perceptions of 
economic performance (including inequality) drive specific policy demands (Corneo 
& Gruner 2002; Kenworthy & McCall 2008; Rehm 2009; Finseraas 2012) this inquiry 
is not an assessment of how individuals perceive and advocate politically for or 
against specific national policies. This analysis is an examination of how individual 
support toward the supra-national project of the EU may shift. This manifests as a 
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normative preference for the EU project itself rather than a preference for specific 
policy outcomes.30  
5.6: Conclusion 
Overall, the findings here are suggestive of the fact that individual attitudes 
and orientations toward the EU are undergoing a predominant shift and that there is 
an inadequacy in the understanding of support for the EU in a period of dramatic and 
demanding economic change. The results demonstrate that individualsÕ support for 
the EU as a mechanism to address inequality is independently and strongly correlated 
with negative support for the EU as it is and positive support toward a deepening of 
European integration. This finding is seldom dependent on individualsÕ socio-
economic location, making it a common explanation of support for the EU as well as 
normatively supportive of stronger democratic institutional performance. This in turn 
allows an examination of the varying role of the EU in the eyes of EU citizens given 
the new economic realities for many individuals in the EU since the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
Inequality not only intensifies individual-level concerns about economic 
stability, but also increases demands in democratic politics (Whitefield & Loveless 
2013). In the context of increasing GDP and rising inequality, which describes many 
EU member states the vast majority of these member states want to share economic 
growth. Those EU member states which do not want to share economic growth, 
support the notion that democratic political institutions should address inequality. 
This is turn increases support for democratic regimes (i.e. the EU) and reinforces 
                                                              
30 Note: the question on ÔAddressing InequalityÕ asks respondents whether ÒIncome and wealth should 
be redistributed towards ordinary peopleÓ. This question makes no reference to country, party, or 
specific policy. 
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substantive democratic national governance (i.e. a substantial role for democratic 
institutions). In addition, increasing demands by individuals for re-distributional 
fairness and justice via EU regime legitimacy, whether perceived or actual, may be a 
means to address market-generated inequality in the EU since the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. 
The following empirical chapter will focus upon the effect of individualÕs 
perceptions towards inequality in the Republic of Ireland and support for the EU. 
Once again, this question is posed in the context of the economic and financial crisis 
of 2007/8, since the crisis can be regarded as a critical juncture in IrelandÕs 
relationship with the EU, as a result of widening economic disparities individualsÕ 
have experienced. The proceeding chapter will emphasise that individualsÕ concerns 
about inequality in Ireland have a wide-ranging effect that not only addresses, and 
indeed revises, the principle of the Ôwinners and losersÕ theory but also highlights the 
robust individual-level support for the EU in Ireland. The findings suggest that 
individuals in Ireland believe that it is the EU, which becomes the institutional driving 
force to address market-generated inequality.  
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Tables  
Table 4: Co-variation of EU Support Variables: EU 27 Member States 
 
 
EU is good 
Satisfaction with 
democracy in the EU 
EU enlargement 
is good 
Satisfaction with 
democracy in the EU 
r=0.33 
p≤0.001 
N=23445 
  
EU enlargement is good 
r=0.41 
p≤0.001 
N=25123 
r=0.26 
p≤0.001 
N=22925 
 
More European 
unification 
r=0.37 
p≤0.001 
N=24325 
r=0.22 
p≤0.001 
N=22420 
r=0.48 
p≤0.001 
N=23814 
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Table 5: Hierarchical Linear Modelling Analysis: Support for the EU & 
ÔDeepeningÕ of EU 27 Member States 
Support for the EU  EU Enlargement/Deepening 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                             (1)            (2)    |        (3)           (4)    
                           EU good      Sat w Dem   |  EU Enlarged    More  
        or bad       in the EU | good or bad Unification 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inequality:                                                                             
Address Inequality        -0.0426**       -0.0267*         0.0773***        0.101*** 
                          (-2.97)         (-2.02)          (6.24)          (5.49)    
Communication: 
Social Communication      -0.0231         -0.0128       0.0000505          0.0454    
                          (-0.90)         (-0.54)          (0.00)          (1.37)    
Mass Media                 0.0283*        0.00970          0.0435***       0.0634*** 
                           (2.08)          (0.79)          (3.75)          (3.73)    
Interested in Politics     0.236***      -0.0190         -0.0163          0.0585*   
                          (11.12)         (-0.96)         (-0.88)          (2.12)    
Identity: 
Feel European               0.623***        0.268***        0.383***        0.589*** 
                          (23.57)         (12.17)         (18.13)         (19.32)    
Immigration Fear           -0.217***      -0.0437**        -0.257***       -0.387*** 
                         (-14.61)         (-3.28)        (-20.21)        (-20.96)    
Ideological Congruence and Performance: 
Retro Soc Econ Eval        0.0104          0.0462**        0.0866***       0.0698**  
                           (0.56)          (2.76)          (5.45)          (3.00)    
Pros Soc Econ Eval          0.204***       0.0876***       0.0991***        0.113*** 
                          (13.07)          (6.09)          (7.35)          (5.66)    
Market Preference          0.0624***       0.0511***       0.0112          0.0517**  
                           (4.45)          (3.88)          (0.91)          (2.83)    
Satisfaction w Democracy   0.530***        1.608***        0.367***        0.366*** 
                          (24.34)         (67.99)         (19.35)         (13.25)    
Socio-Demographic Variables: 
SR Social Class             0.112***       0.0211          0.0313*         0.0162    
                           (6.20)          (1.24)          (1.96)          (0.68)    
Subj Stand of Living       0.0686***       0.0596***       0.0240           0.115*** 
                           (4.45)          (4.10)          (1.77)          (5.70)    
Age                       0.00567***     -0.00440***     -0.00199*       -0.00250    
                           (5.69)         (-4.76)         (-2.29)         (-1.93)    
Gender: 1=male             0.0734*        -0.0174         -0.0125          0.0205    
                           (2.29)         (-0.59)         (-0.45)          (0.50)    
Left Ideology              -0.200***      -0.0993**         0.156***       0.0238    
                          (-4.83)         (-2.58)          (4.28)          (0.44)    
Right Ideology              0.126**        0.0746*         0.0503           0.187*** 
                           (3.00)          (1.96)          (1.40)          (3.55)    
Education: ISCED            0.153***      0.00739          0.0120          0.0202    
                          (11.11)          (0.60)          (1.03)          (1.17)    
 
Country Dummies (not shown for space) 
 
Constant                                                                    3.455*** 
                                                                          (14.36)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cut1 (Constant)            1.611***        0.772***       -0.612***                 
                           (9.76)          (4.69)         (-4.17)                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cut2 (Constant)            3.522***        3.355***        0.970***                 
                          (21.17)         (20.23)          (6.62)                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cut3 (Constant)                            7.128***                                 
                                          (41.14)                                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Adj. R2                     0.1550          0.1749          0.0842          0.1327    
No. of Obs                  21170           19727           20696           20352    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Hierarchical Linear Modelling Analysis: Support for the EU & 
ÔDeepeningÕ Cross-National Variation of EU 27 Member States 
Support for the EU  EU Enlargement/Deepening 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                             (1)            (2)    |        (3)           (4)    
                           EU good      Sat w Dem   |  EU Enlarged    More  
        or bad       in the EU | good or bad Unification 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inequality:  
Address Inequality        -0.0116**      -0.00763           0.0293***        0.100*** 
                          (-3.17)         (-1.88)          (6.31)          (5.50)    
Macro-level Variables:                                                                
GDPpc 2009             0.00000355     -0.00000185     -0.00000363     -0.00000605    
                           (1.83)         (-1.42)         (-1.82)         (-0.86)    
GINI 2009                -0.00836        -0.00219         -0.0222*        -0.0534    
                          (-0.97)         (-0.38)         (-2.53)         (-1.70)    
GovEff                     -0.266***       -0.304***       -0.366***       -1.158*** 
                          (-3.61)         (-6.11)         (-4.84)         (-4.31)    
Communication: 
Social Communication     -0.00627        -0.00491        -0.00325          0.0440    
                          (-0.94)         (-0.67)         (-0.39)          (1.33)    
Mass Media                0.00728*        0.00311          0.0144***       0.0616*** 
                           (2.13)          (0.82)          (3.34)          (3.63)    
Interested in Politics     0.0552***     -0.00550        -0.00710          0.0589*   
                          (10.02)         (-0.90)         (-1.02)          (2.14)    
Identity: 
Feel European               0.149***       0.0865***        0.141***        0.590*** 
                          (24.29)         (12.88)         (18.30)         (19.37)    
Immigration Fear          -0.0546***      -0.0147***      -0.0973***       -0.387*** 
                         (-14.70)         (-3.60)        (-20.77)        (-21.01)    
Ideological Congruence and Performance: 
Retro Soc Econ Eval       0.00611          0.0133**        0.0315***       0.0718**  
                           (1.31)          (2.58)          (5.33)          (3.09)    
Pros Soc Econ Eval         0.0546***       0.0277***       0.0371***        0.114*** 
                          (13.62)          (6.24)          (7.31)          (5.68)    
Market Preference          0.0150***       0.0158***      0.00156          0.0515**  
                           (4.12)          (3.90)          (0.34)          (2.82)    
Satisfaction w Democracy   0.141***        0.470***        0.133***        0.369*** 
                          (25.42)         (76.82)         (19.05)         (13.39)    
Socio-Demographic Variables: 
SR Social Class            0.0319***      0.00745          0.0120*         0.0171    
                           (6.69)          (1.41)          (1.99)          (0.72)    
Subj Stand of Living       0.0194***       0.0196***      0.00987           0.117*** 
                           (4.81)          (4.37)          (1.93)          (5.81)    
Age                       0.00109***     -0.00139***    -0.000805*       -0.00254*   
                           (4.23)         (-4.85)         (-2.46)         (-1.96)    
Gender: 1=male            0.00713         -0.0128        -0.00990          0.0221    
                           (0.86)         (-1.40)         (-0.95)          (0.54)    
Left Ideology             -0.0562***      -0.0344**        0.0591***       0.0278    
                          (-5.19)         (-2.88)          (4.32)          (0.51)    
Right Ideology             0.0259*         0.0222          0.0166           0.188*** 
                           (2.44)          (1.89)          (1.24)          (3.55)    
Education: ISCED           0.0357***      0.00294         0.00341          0.0195    
                          (10.31)          (0.77)          (0.78)          (1.13)    
Constant                    1.915***        1.581***        2.819***        5.787*** 
                           (6.48)          (7.82)          (9.26)          (5.33)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lns1_1_1                                                                             
Constant                   -1.955***       -2.369***       -1.936***       -0.671*** 
                         (-14.05)        (-16.36)        (-13.74)         (-4.72)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnsig_e                                                                              
Constant                   -0.535***       -0.468***       -0.311***        1.054*** 
                        (-110.07)        (-92.85)        (-63.25)        (212.43)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald χ2(prob.> χ2)     3778.5 (0.001)  7761.3 (0.001)   1957.2 (0.001) 1802.2 
(0.001)      
LR Test (χ2, prob.)     1801.0 (0.001)   347.3 (0.001)  669.0 (0.001)  497.3 
(0.001)  
No. of Obs                 21170           19727           20696           20352    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses;   p<0.06, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
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Table 7: Standard Eurobarometer 78 & 79 Responses for 'Effective action 
against the Economic Crisis' 
 EB72  
(Aut 
2009) 
EB 73 
(Spring  
2010) 
EB 74 
(Aut  
2010) 
EB 75 
(Spring 
 2011) 
EB 76 
(Aut 
 2011) 
EB 77 
(Spring 
 2012) 
EB 78 
(Aut 
 2012)  
EB 79 
(Spring 
2013)  
EB 80 
(Aut 
2013) 
The EU 22% 26% 23% 22% 23% 21% 23% 22% 22% 
The 
(NATIONALITY) 
Government  
19% 19% 20% 20% 20% 21% 20% 21% 22% 
The G20 18% 14% 16% 14% 16% 14% 14% 13% 12% 
The International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
11% 14% 15% 15% 14% 15% 13% 13% 13% 
The United States 12% 7% 6% 7% 5% 7% 8% 8% 8% 
Other/None/DK 18% 20% 20% 22% 22% 22% 22% 23% 23% 
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Chapter 6: What to do about Inequality? Mass Public Opinion 
Support for the European Union in the Republic of Ireland 
 
6.1: Introduction  
This chapter will focus upon the effect of individualÕs perceptions of 
inequality in Ireland and the impact this has on support for the EU. Once again, this 
question is posed in the context of the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 
2007/8, since the crisis can be regarded as a critical juncture in IrelandÕs relationship 
with the EU, as a result of both the economic downturn and a widening of economic 
disparities individuals have experienced. Ireland is a critical case in examining EU 
support because since its accession to the EU in 1973, it has often been considered an 
exemplar of what the EU could offer small member states with a strongly pro-
integrationist mass public. However, in the wake of rising inequality and national 
political responses to austerity in Ireland, I would expect to find reduced support for 
both the EU and continued European integration. More specifically, I would expect to 
find decreasing support for the EU amongst those individuals in an economic position 
to lose the most (see section 6.3 and section 6.4 of this chapter). 
As previously outlined in Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Five the 
EU is an economic project combined with a democratic normative framework. This 
suggests that support for the EU shifts with a desire for politics, in particular 
democratic politics, to play a robust role in stabilising the economy. It appears that 
rising economic difficulties and the need to address inequality have prompted 
individuals in Ireland toward the preference for a stronger state role and one that 
corresponds to a stronger affinity for the EU.   
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Subsequently there are two issues which are relevant to our understanding of 
Irish respondentsÕ popular support for the EU. First, these views about the political 
responsibility to address inequality are independently and strongly predictive. Second, 
there is little evidence that this effect is related to economic Ôwinning and losingÕ via 
individualsÕ SES. Instead of a new group of economic ÔlosersÕ in Ireland amongst 
whom support for the EU has declined, the concern for inequality and the role of the 
EU, both present and future, is more widespread. This is important for our 
understanding of the changing support for the EU project because in conjunction with 
an emerging literature on social justice (Verwiebe & Wegener 2000; Osberg &  
SmeedingÕs 2006; Beckfield 2006) these findings suggests that the EU should reflect 
citizensÕ preferences for fairness and justice via strong and effective democratic 
institutions that function to moderate excessive market distortions.  
It seems that, following the economic crisis in Ireland, if the EU is seen to 
have failed to create adequate economic and social opportunities, or has provided 
these prospects in an unequal manner, EU membership may still continue to represent 
assurance that both economic and political institutions can and indeed will work 
effectively. Therefore, this inquiry will demonstrate that individualsÕ concerns about 
inequality lower support for the EU as it is currently constitute, but increase support 
for deeper European integration in Ireland.  This wide-ranging effect is for the most 
part unrelated to individualsÕ SES and social location of Ôwinning or losingÕ but is 
driven by normative values of fairness and justice in society. This suggests that 
individuals in Ireland regard the EU as an enforcer of democratic competences at both 
the EU and the nation state level and that it is the EU which is the institutional driving 
force to address market-generated inequality in Ireland since the onset of the 
economic crisis of 2007/8.  
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This chapter will therefore examine two features with regards to Irish 
individualsÕ concerns about inequality and support for the EU. Firstly, the analysis 
will demonstrate the importance that individuals place on addressing inequality. 
Secondly, it will show that the importance Irish individuals place on addressing 
inequality is positively correlated with both support for further European integration 
(echoing part of the findings demonstrated in the cross-national case study in Chapter 
Five) and Irish individualsÕ beliefs that the EU is in the interest of Ireland. However, 
the analysis will also highlight that Irish individualsÕ attitudes towards EU 
membership is negatively correlated with addressing inequality. These findings 
indicate that current individual-levels of support for the EU in Ireland may be in a 
precarious state, but they can be salvaged.  
6.2: Irish Attitudes towards the European Union  
As stated in Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Five, recent trends 
suggest that the EU citizenry is becoming more critical of the EU (Franklin, Van der 
Eijk & Marsh 1995; Anderson & Reichert 1995; Norris 1999; Bringear & Jolly 2005; 
De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; Eichenberg & Dalton 2007; Loveless 2010; 
Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010; Kuhn & Stoeckel 2014). Following the 2007-8 
economic crisis, there is a greater percentage of individuals who may not be 
objectively ÔpoorÕ but feel themselves to be at a heightened risk of economic adversity 
as a result of rising inequality and economic problems in both their respective 
member state and the EU. These individuals are likely to be more supportive of 
income redistribution as a means to minimize their own economic insecurity. While 
these preferences for increased economic security may not be unexpected, what this 
would produce in terms of changes in support for the EU project is unclear.  
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The mass public of Ireland is often regarded as one of the most enthusiastic 
supporters of European integration since its accession to the European Economic 
Community in 1973, as they are often considered Ôgood EuropeansÕ with a pro-
integrationist attitude (Sinnott 1995; Sinnott 2002; Gilland 2002; Sinnott 2005; 
Kennedy & Sinnott, 2006; Kennedy & Sinnott, 2007; Laffan & OÕMahony, 2008; 
Lyons 2008; Adshead & Tonge, 2009). However, the reality of Irish public opinion is 
more nuanced with support for the EU in Ireland not a single entity but  a complex set 
of opinions determined by a variety of factors.   
Research has shown that since the 1990s knowledge of the EU amongst the 
Irish public is low (Garry, Marsh & Sinnott 2005; Holmes 2005; Kennedy & Sinnott 
2006; Kennedy & Sinnott 2007; Laffan & OÕMahony 2008, pp. 128) with individuals 
in Ireland more likely to refer to the economic aspects of the EU, such as the freedom 
of movement, the Euro and economic prosperity. This Ôknowledge deficitÕ 
acknowledged by Irish individuals is perhaps not surprising as for the first twenty 
years of EU membership IrelandÕs self-perception of its status within the EU was that 
of a small, poor, peripheral member state. Ireland became a net beneficiary of EU 
funds and successive Irish governments and negotiators prioritised and maximised 
receipts of EU funding via the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or Structural and 
Cohesion Funds. Ireland was said to be suffering from a Ôsponger syndromeÕ in 
viewing the EU as a source of additional exchequer funding for a poor EU member 
state (Laffan & OÕMahony 2008, p. 31) with Irish politicians and officials possessing 
a Ôbegging-bowl mentalityÕ (Matthews 1983; Lee 1989; Hussey 1993). During the 
1990s scholars perceived that while the Irish government and Irish society were 
indeed pro-European, support for the European integration process itself was 
conditional (Scott 1994; McAleese 2000). They reiterated that IrelandÕs approach was 
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to ask what Brussels could do for the Irish economy, rather than what the Irish 
economy could do for Brussels and the EU (McAleese 2000, p. 103).  
The pro-EU status of the Irish began to be challenged in the 2000s when 
IrelandÕs economic boom led the Irish government into conflict with the EU over its 
management of the Irish economy. The Irish government was criticised for its refusal 
to dampen the then successful Celtic Tiger economy and for its substantial tax 
concessions to foreign investors, which were regarded by the European Commission 
as breaking the spirit, if not the law, of the European Single Market (Adshead & 
Tonge 2009, p. 213).The Irish Finance Minister, Charles McCreevy came before the 
European ParliamentÕs Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee to defend 
IrelandÕs budget, which was a result of a reprimand by the European Commission for 
breaching the 2000 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. In these guidelines the 
European Commission specifically stated that, in terms of budgetary policy, Ireland  
ÒÉshould aim to avoid any overheating in the economy, to restrain the growth 
in public consumption to the level indicated in the stability programme and to accord 
priority to developing infrastructures while achieving the stability objectives of fiscal 
policyÓ (European Commission, 2000, p. 35).  
In order to understand individualsÕ knowledge of the EU in Ireland and the 
impact this had on support for the EU, Sinnott (1995) discovered that relatively low 
levels of knowledge regarding the EU were supplemented by positive perceptions of 
EU membership. By analysing 1993 Eurobarometer results, Sinnott attached 
significance to the positive relationship between higher levels of knowledge of EU 
affairs and a positive attitude towards the EU. Sinnott observed that a favourable 
attitude to European integration changed from 36 per cent among those with very low 
  183 
levels of knowledge to 76 per cent among those individuals with very high levels of 
knowledge (Sinnott 1995, p. 16). Low levels of knowledge of the EU were closely 
associated with social class and education and thus being a skilled or unskilled 
manual worker had a significant negative effect on the level of knowledge of 
European affairs. Sinnott (1995) also demonstrated in his findings that both age and 
gender played a role in determining support for the EU. Being over the age of 65 
meant that individuals were more likely to be less informed and less supportive of the 
EU, while men were better informed than women with regards to EU affairs. Despite 
this research being nearly 20 years old, levels of knowledge of the EU in Ireland have 
not increased dramatically since SinnottÕs (1995) original research, with individual 
attitudes towards the EU in Ireland continuing to be increasingly nuanced (Kennedy 
& Sinnott 2006). This is demonstrated in Figure 1 (EU Membership is a ÔgoodÕ thing 
for Ireland) and Figure 2 (EU Membership has benefited Ireland), which use Standard 
Eurobarometer data from 1973-2011 (Figure 1) and 1983-2011 (Figure 2) to highlight 
whether or not individuals in Ireland believe that membership of the EU is a good 
thing and whether or not Ireland has benefited from membership of the EU. In both 
Figure 1 and Figure 2, Irish individuals show positive support for both EU 
membership and the benefits of EU membership for Ireland.  
 
<<Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here>> 
 
Building upon SinnottÕs (1995) findings and Lipset and RokkanÕs (1967) 
investigation into centre-periphery cleavage (1967) and the impact this has on support 
for the EU in Ireland Kennedy & Sinnott (2006, p. 80) state that 
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Òthe Irish have been quite enthusiastic participants in the EU project, with, for 
the most part, positive attitudes towards the EU. The continued deepening of the 
process of integration and the introduction of the Euro have met little resistance and 
have produced sources of identity for many. That said, there remains a proportion of 
the population who oppose further Ôsharing of sovereigntyÕ and are concerned about 
the impact IrelandÕs involvement in the EU is having on Irish identity, values and 
cultureÓ.  
In order to analyse the nuances of Irish public opinion toward the EU Kennedy 
and Sinnott (2007) use four perspectives to specifically examine Irish public opinion 
toward European integration the utilitarian perspective (which regards public opinion 
in terms of individualsÕ evaluations of the economic effects of European integration), 
the identity perspective (which highlights that the EU provides individuals with an 
alternative or complimentary source of identity), Ôthe institutional and importance of 
political knowledgeÕ perspective (which assess individuals attitudes towards both 
domestic and European institutions) and the Ôattitudes to globalisationÕ perspective 
(how individualÕs attitudes toward globalisation and these attitudes have an affect on 
European integration). From an examination of these perspectives, they find that 
despite the fact that conventional wisdom suggests Irish individuals are very positive 
about the EU (Kennedy and Sinnott 2007, p. 61) the reality of Irish public opinion 
towards the EU is much more nuanced.  
In their multivariate analysis 31  Kennedy and Sinnott (2007) find that 
individualsÕ support for the EU in Ireland is a consequence of the interaction of a 
                                                              
31 Kennedy & Sinnott (2007) using Eurobarometer 61 data (fielded between 21 February and March 
2004) use EU membership good or bad, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a Constitution for 
the EU as dependent variables. These three dependent variables differ from affective orientation toward 
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variety of factors, the mix of which depends on what aspect of the EU project is of 
concern. For example, Irish individualsÕ knowledge of the EU does not affect the 
relationship between opinions of EU support and evaluations of domestic and 
European institutions (the Ôinstitutional and importance of political knowledgeÕ 
perspective). Other factors also shape Irish opinion toward the EU but the effects are 
weaker when compared to individualsÕ institutional evaluations. There is some 
support for the utilitarian perspective; however, those individuals who are worst 
positioned to benefit from the EU-in particular those individuals with the lowest 
levels of education- are less likely to be supportive of the EU in Ireland. There is also 
some support for the identity perspective; overall however, Irish individuals who 
identify exclusively with the Irish nation state (in comparison to those Irish 
individuals who prompted some sense of being European) are less likely to be 
supportive of the EU. Finally there is some support for the Ôattitudes to globalisationÕ 
perspective with those individuals in Ireland who have a positive attitude toward 
economic interdependence between EU member states more likely than those 
individuals in Ireland who have a negative attitude toward globalisation to be more 
supportive of the EU. These results demonstrate that individual-level opinion towards 
the EU in Ireland are much more complex than portrayed. When it comes to 
individual-level opinion towards IrelandÕs membership of the EU and potential 
developments in the EU project, other factors which are associated with individualsÕ 
attitudes towards interdependence between EU member states and questions of group 
identity play an important role in shaping public opinion towards the EU in Ireland.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
membership of the EU to evaluations of two aspects of European integration; one existing (EMU) and 
one proposed (EU Constitution).   
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From this, it can be posited that the EU project in Ireland is not one, which can 
be encapsulated by a single overarching judgement, but only through the appreciation 
of many different facets. Lyons (2008 p. 218 & 220) demonstrates that Irish 
respondents tend to focus on national or intergovernmental aspects of EU membership 
and representation rather than on the policy-making aspects of EU institutions which 
produce legislation that has an effect across all EU member states. ÒThe Irish public 
favours more integration but wants the EU to do less common policy-making. In 
short, Irish public opinion towards European integration is ambivalentÓ (Lyons 2008, 
p. 220).  
Between 1972 and 2012, Irish governments have held nine European 
referendum campaigns (see Table 8), with two broad characteristics emerging from 
each campaign. Firstly, turnout in EU-related referendums is generally lower than at 
Irish general elections32 with the lowest turnout being 34.79% in the first referendum 
on the Nice Treaty in June 2001. Secondly, EU-related treaties (with the exception of 
the 1972 Accession Treaty) have gained broad support across the political 
establishment including the mainstream political parties, trade unions and business 
organisations (Lyons 2003 & 2008; OÕMahony 2009). Smaller political parties such 
as Sinn Fin, the Green Party and the Socialist WorkersÕ Party as well as non-party 
political and civil society groups have all opposed EU-related referendums33. Up until 
the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice, successive Irish governments and pro-
European campaigners pointed to the benefits EU membership had brought to Ireland 
in terms of direct financial transfers and increased opportunities for Irish workers and 
                                                              
32 Voter turnout in Irish general elections from 1973-2011: 76.61% (1973) 76.31% (1977) 76.22% 
(1981) 72.86% (1982) 73.33% (1987) 68.51% (1989) 68.49% (1992) 65.92% (1997), 62.57% (2002), 
67.03% (2007) and 70.05% (2011). Data available from Central Statistics Office of Ireland (CSO): 
www.cso.ie  
33 An exception is the Green Party at the time ofthe 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign, when 
the party was a junior partner in the Fianna Fil-led government  
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Irish industry. Pro-European groups and political parties in Ireland have consistently 
relied upon the permissive consensus inherent within mass public opinion in Ireland, 
in particular the fact that individuals in Ireland appreciated the considerable benefits 
that Ireland derived from EU membership and thus little effort was made to explain 
the issues at stake for the Irish electorate.  
 
<<Table 8 about here>> 
 
However, the multifaceted and nuanced nature of Irish public opinion toward 
the EU was demonstrated with the rejection of the Nice Treaty in May 2001 and the 
Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 (see Table 8 for percentage of voter turnout and 
percentage votes for ÔYesÕ and ÔNoÕ) highlighting the potential emergence of a new 
popular scepticism towards the EU in so far as it concerns Irish interests and deeper 
European integration in Ireland. The emergence of referendums as key forums for 
debate about the EU in Ireland has resulted in a much greater degree of polarisation of 
opinions. This polarisation is two-fold firstly, referendums tend to reduce complex 
issues to a simple ÔYesÕ or ÔNoÕ answer; and secondly, with nine EU related 
referendums being held thus far in Ireland, this mechanism of direct democracy has 
fuelled an element of disenchantment among the Irish electorate, with voters 
questioning why they are continuously being asked to vote on complex EU issues.  
Garry, Marsh and Sinnott (2005) and Glencross and Trechsel (2011) 
demonstrate that voting in EU-related referendums typically distinguishes between 
Ôsecond-orderÕ effects and the impact of substantive ÔissuesÕ. According to the Ôissue 
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votingÕ approach, voting in EU-related referendums is driven by individualsÕ 
substantive EU-related concerns. Put simply, individuals decide to support or not 
support a treaty based upon the merits of the European project and the specific 
elements of the respective treaty poses to them (Siune & Svensson 1993; Svensson 
1994; Siune, Svensson & Tonsgaard 1994; Svensson 2002). Meanwhile, Reif and 
SchmittÕs (1980) Ôsecond orderÕ approach which was originally used to explain voting 
in the European Parliament elections posits that the central determinant of vote choice 
in EU-related referendums is EU member statesÕ national party politics. It is noted 
that individuals use the referendum in order to express their discontent or satisfaction 
with the incumbent government. Individuals who are dissatisfied with their nation 
state government will vote ÔnoÕ in a EU-related referendum in order to punish the 
government for its poor performance (Franklin, Marsh & McLaren 1994; Franklin, 
Marsh & Van der Eijk 1995; Franklin 2002). In addition, individuals voting in EU-
related referendums may also determine their vote as a result of party cues with 
individuals voting in accordance with their political party affiliation (Anderson 1998; 
Hooghe & Marks 2005; Hobolt 2006 & 2007).  
As Garry (2013) correctly points out, findings with regards to both Ôissue 
votingÕ and Ôsecond orderÕ approaches are of significant theoretical importance for the 
understanding of individual-level political behaviour and normative evaluations of the 
practicality of using the mechanism of referendums to ratify EU treaties. However, Òif 
citizens merely use EU referendums as a chance to punish the government or to 
express established political party allegiances, then EU referendums hardly 
approximate high-quality deliberative processesÓ (Garry 2012, p. 95). When the Irish 
electorate voted ÔNoÕ to the Nice Treaty in May 2001 and ÔNoÕ to the Lisbon Treaty 
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in June 2008, both the domestic political and economic context played a vital role 
highlighting elements of the Ôissue votingÕ approach and the Ôsecond-orderÕ approach.  
There were three key issues, which were important in the first Nice Treaty 
referendum in May 2001. These three issues were sovereignty, neutrality and EU 
enlargement. Individuals in Ireland who were in favour of retaining as much 
sovereignty as possible in Ireland, wanting Ireland to remain a neutral state and those 
who expressed concerns over the ÔBig BangÕ enlargement are those individuals who 
were likely to have voted ÔNoÕ to the treaty. Following the defeat in May 2001, 
supporters of the Nice Treaty conducted a vigorous campaign around the second 
referendum on the Nice Treaty emphasising the advantages of the EU. The Irish 
government also sought two Declarations with its EU partners, which were added to 
the Nice Treaty at a EU summit in Seville in June 2002 (Garry, Marsh & Sinnott 
2005, p. 208) which provided protection for the continuation of Irish neutrality and 
de-emphasised the issue of neutrality in the lead up to the second Nice Treaty 
referendum in October 2002. Overall, Irish individuals who were dissatisfied with the 
Fianna Fil-led government voted ÔnoÕ to the first Nice Treaty referendum in order to 
punish the government for its poor performance and mismanaged referendum 
campaign.  
In the case of the Lisbon Treaty second-order factors of individual-level 
voting can be cast aside, as satisfaction with the Irish government declined 
significantly between Lisbon 1 and Lisbon 2. The change in the political context from 
the first Lisbon Treaty referendum in June 2008 to the second Lisbon Treaty 
referendum in October 2009 was a result of the Irish governmentÕs attempts to 
address concerns highlighted by the ÔNoÕ campaign. Specifically these issues were in 
relation to military neutrality, the corporation tax rate, the belief that abortion services 
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would be widely available, a weakening of workersÕ rights, and a reduction in Irish 
influence at the EU-level due to the loss of a permanent Irish EU Commissioner. At 
an EU summit in June 2009, it was agreed that guarantees on these issues would be 
added as protocols in the re-run of the Lisbon Treaty referendum in Ireland 
(Fitzgibbon 2010). The change in the economic context from the first Lisbon Treaty 
referendum in June 2008 to the second referendum in October 2009 was dramatic, as 
Ireland plunged into recession after the defeat of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. It was 
frequently expressed that, as a result of the onset of the economic and financial crisis 
Ireland was safer as part of a larger economic community that could potentially offer 
Ireland protection, and it was noted that any intention or signal to distance Ireland 
from the other member states of the EU would have serious implications. As a result 
of the negotiated protocols and the beginning of the economic and financial crisis, it 
was hoped that individuals would vote ÔYesÕ to the second Lisbon Treaty.  
While both Ôissue votingÕ and the Ôsecond orderÕ approach are important for 
the wider debate on normative evaluations of the practicality of using the mechanism 
of referendums to ratify EU treaties, Ôissue votingÕ and the Ôsecond orderÕ approach 
are opaque and difficult approaches to adopt when examining individual-level mass 
public opinion attitudes towards the EU in Ireland. As demonstrated above, in taking 
examples of two unsuccessful EU-related referendums in Ireland, the referendum 
debate becomes tied up in an abundance of domestic and economic issues, which can 
be attributed either to Ôissue votingÕ or Ôsecond orderÕ voting. Overall, this deflects 
from a thorough examination of individual-level normative attitudes towards support 
for the EU in Ireland.  
It is clear from the analysis of the literature outlined in chapter two and the 
examination of Irish attitudes towards the EU demonstrated in this section that the EU 
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is an economic project combined with a democratic normative framework. This 
suggests that support for the EU shifts with a desire for politics, in particular 
democratic political institutions, to play a robust role in stabilising the economy and 
therefore addressing inequality in Ireland since the economic crisis began in 2007/8.  
6.3: Ireland in Context: domestic politics, the economy and the EU  
The Irish economy has experienced many highs and lows since accession to 
the EU with significant periods of growth (1970s, 1990-2007), as well as periods of 
stagnation and significant expenditure reduction (1980s, 2008 to the present). It was 
during the 1990s and 2000s that Ireland experienced an unparalleled period of 
economic growth, rising living standards, job creation and export performance that 
repositioned it away from the southern periphery of the EU with which it had long 
been associated. When examining the Irish economic boom, it is important to note the 
extent to which Ireland between 1994 and the mid-2000s shifted its relative position 
from being one of the poorest to one of the richest EU member states. The collapse of 
the Irish economy and the impact of austerity measures to address the national fiscal 
deficit and the costs of saving the Irish banks have reduced IrelandÕs relative position 
in the EU significantly. Figure 3 shows data from the World Bank on the annual 
percentage growth of GDP in Ireland from 2007-2013. The results demonstrate a 
dramatic decline in annual percentage growth in GDP in Ireland from 5 per cent in 
2007 to -0.3 per cent in 2013.   
 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
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The economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 can be therefore regarded as a 
critical juncture in IrelandÕs relationship with the EU, as a result of both the economic 
downturn and a widening of economic disparities individuals have experienced. 
Consequently, it is important to contextualise Ireland economically and politically 
during the period of 2007/8 in order to determine individual perceptions of inequality 
and the influence these have on support for the EU. Research has suggested that 
individual citizens and labour market participants perceive the costs and benefits of 
European integration differently depending upon national wage bargaining systems of 
welfare state policies (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004). In particular Òdomestic 
political divides between advocates and opponents of EU integration may play out 
differently and yield contrasting partisan alignments if polities are embedded in 
different institutional ÔvarietiesÕ of capitalismÓ (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, p. 
62).  
The diversity in the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ literature centres upon two facets. 
Firstly, capitalist institutions affect the proportion of voters in each EU member state 
who have an incentive to challenge European integration. It is the political economy 
which shapes the Ôgrievance levelÕ that may deliver the patterns of domestic 
contestation (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, pp. 62). This first facet centres upon 
individuals socio-tropic evaluations of European integration. Secondly, individuals 
focus on the potential individual cost and benefits that result from changes in the 
expected economic benefits created by European integration for national political and 
economic institutions. This second facet focuses upon individualsÕ egocentric voting. 
In addition, this second facet also takes into account whether EU citizens are leaning 
towards or away from further European integration. IndividualsÕ preferences for 
European integration do not simply depend on whether individuals are ÔleftÕ or ÔrightÕ 
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in ideological terms, but on whether they are ÔleftÕ or ÔrightÕ within their national 
political-economic context. In addition, the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ literature suggests 
that the economic crisis has been generated primarily in the context of liberal market 
economies and has affected liberal market economies more severely than coordinated 
market economies (Chari & Bernhagen, 2011; Bernhagen & Chari, 2011).  
When analysing Ireland through the lens of the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ 
literature, there are two elements that are important to note. First, it is the second 
facet, which centres upon individualsÕ preferences to be either ÔleftÕ or ÔrightÕ in terms 
of the national political-economic context, which is important in determining 
individualsÕ perceptions of addressing inequality and how these influence support for 
the EU. Secondly, the contextualisation in the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ literature that 
liberal market economies have been affected much more since the onset of the 
economic crisis is also important in determining individualsÕ perceptions of 
addressing inequality and how these influence support for the EU since the onset of 
the economic crisis of 2007/8. These two elements combined contextualise Ireland 
during the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
The irrevocable nail in the coffin for the economic collapse in Ireland was the 
shift in the international financial markets during 2007 and 2008. By early 2008, it 
became increasingly difficult for the Irish banks to maintain funding in the 
international wholesale markets while simultaneously domestic investors were 
withdrawing capital from the Irish property market. This period culminated in a crisis 
in September 2008 with commercial funding for the Irish banks shrinking in the wake 
of the disruption caused in the international credit markets by the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The Irish governmentÕs response to the banking crisis was to guarantee, 
Ònot only all deposit holders but most bondholders [and] in effect [the Irish 
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government] socialised the losses of the private sector resulting in an enormous public 
debt liabilityÓ (Dellepiane & Hardiman, 2012, p. 83). As a result, individualsÕ in 
Ireland have contended with a triple crisis: a severe decline in economic activity, 
substantial losses in the banking system and a rapid deterioration in its fiscal position 
(Lane 2011; Dellepiane & Hardiman 2012). The intervention of the Irish government 
in the form of the Bank Guarantee Scheme of 2008 did not create greater certainty or 
stability in financial markets, as initially hoped, and Ireland sought financial 
assistance from the EU/IMF in November 2010. Individuals in Ireland were not 
protected from the uncertainty and risk of the liberal market economy and these 
individuals recognised this.  
It is evident that the impact of the economic crisis in Ireland was significant in 
terms of long-term impact on the future of the country. Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 20) 
highlight elements of the liberal market economy of Ireland and research conducted 
by Chari and Bernhagen (2011) on explaining the economic crisis and the demise of 
the Celtic Tiger in Ireland demonstrates that Òinstitutions do matterÓ with the 
institutional distinction being made by individuals in Ireland between the integration 
of state actors and a financially robust elite (Chari & Bernhagen 20011, pp. 485). 
Therefore, for Ireland the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ literature produces new hypotheses 
pertaining to more socio-cultural aspects of Irish individuals ideological dispositions. 
This provides a way to analyse individualsÕ attitudes towards addressing inequality 
and how these influence support for the EU since the economic crisis.  
The onset of the 2007/8 economic crisis and the Irish context discussed above 
highlight the heightened risk of economic adversity for individuals in Ireland as a 
result of rising economic problems in both Ireland and the EU. These individuals in 
Ireland are more likely to be more supportive of income distribution as a means to 
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minimise their own economic insecurity. The focus on European integration is now 
towards a more individualist egocentric perspective. The theoretical mechanism 
linking institutions and Irish individuals assessments of EU integration is the 
Òperception of costs and benefits accruing from integration in light of domestic 
capitalist institutionsÓ (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, p. 64). It is now necessary to 
establish a link between Irish citizensÕ perceptions of the costs and benefits of 
European integration and patterns of redistribution in order to address inequality and 
examine support for the EU.  
When assessing the economic crisis, citizens consider its impact on their 
countryÕs economy. Research has shown that this is the case with regards to EU 
support. An EU member stateÕs status as a net beneficiary of European transfers 
(Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Anderson & Reichert 1995; Carrubba 1997) and intra-
European trade (Anderson & Reichert 1995) are important determinants of EU 
support. Indicators of macro-economic growth, inflation and unemployment influence 
aggregate EU support (Anderson & Kaltenhaler 1996). Since Ireland is a net 
beneficiary of EU transfers it seems plausible that individuals in Ireland base their 
opinion of the EU upon the implications for the national economy34.  
European integration now differs from European integration pre-economic 
crisis. While European integration has primarily focused upon market liberalization, 
European economic governance now operates in a different direction by imposing 
regulation and increased (supranational) oversight on banks and markets (Kuhn & 
                                                              
34 The National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) sets out the policy context within which 
funding to Ireland under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective from 2007-2013 
period through both the European Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund is applied. 
EU budget transfers under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective for Ireland totals 
€750 million for the period 2007-2013.  
The full report ÒThe National Strategic Reference Framework for Ireland 2007-2013Ó is available at: 
http://eustructuralfunds.gov.ie/files/Documents/NationalStrategicReferenceFramework200713.pdf  
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Stoeckel 2014, p. 625). The beginning of the economic crisis of 2007/8 hinges upon 
this pre- and post- phase of European integration in Ireland and as a result it is 
expected to lead to resurgence in GabelÕs (1995, 1997; 1998a & 1998b) ÔwinnersÕ and 
ÔlosersÕ thesis. This resurgence derives from the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2007/8 and continuing economic recession in Europe, which has created a 
new group of ÔlosersÕ in the EU project. This new group of ÔlosersÕ continues to be 
socio-economically secure but it includes those individuals who perceive themselves 
to be pushed closer to the economic edge of ÔlosingÕ. Put simply, following the 
2007/8 economic crisis there is a greater percentage of people in Ireland who may not 
be objectively ÔpoorÕ, but who nevertheless feel themselves to be at a heightened risk 
of economic adversity due to rising inequality and economic problems in Ireland and 
the EU. These individuals are likely to be more supportive of income redistribution as 
a means to minimize their own economic insecurity.  
This is vital for the understanding of individualsÕ changing support for the EU 
in Ireland. In conjunction with emerging literature on social justice, the extensive 
nature of individualsÕ support for the EU in Ireland suggests that the EU should 
reflect EU citizensÕ preferences for fairness and justice in society via strong and 
effective democratic institutions. These institutions will then act and function in order 
to diminish excessive market distortions. It appears that, following the economic 
crisis of 2007/8, if the EU is regarded by individuals in Ireland to have failed to create 
adequate and social opportunities, or has provided these prospects in an unequal 
manner, membership of the EU may still represent assurance for individuals that both 
economic and political institutions can and will work effectively in order to address 
inequality.  
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6.4: Inequality in Ireland  
As outlined in Chapter Three, the examination of inequality as a determinant 
of EU support is founded upon a value-based position that reflects individualÕs 
support for the principle that democratic institutions should serve as an arbiter of 
market-generated inequality. In order to demonstrate that this measure of inequality is 
not a proxy for other value-based positions and can therefore be independently 
predictive of support for the EU in Ireland, I analyse how inequality is correlated with 
both ideological and socio-economic positions (i.e. variables that focus upon 
instrumental self-interest, social and economic status, social location and political 
institutions and the market). The on-going economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 is 
used as the salient moment to activate Irish individualsÕ concerns about overall 
economic performance which will highlight that there are more individuals in Ireland 
if not actually doing worse, then at least feeling or perceiving as if they are achieving 
less economically.    
IndividualsÕ perceptions of feeling as if they are achieving less economically 
since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8 comports with the Revisionist School 
within welfare state research which focuses upon political cleavages based on risk 
exposure. Revisionists argue that the fundamental basis for the welfare state is not 
redistribution but demand for social insurance that cuts across class lines (Baldwin 
1990; Iversen & Soskice 2001; Moene & Wallerstein 2001; Swenson 2002; Mares 
2003; Cusack, Iverson & Rehm 2006). These scholars demonstrate that major welfare 
state programs represent social insurance that protects individuals from economic 
risks. Examples of social insurance include health insurance, unemployment benefits 
and retirement pensions (i.e. the goods of society). Although social insurance is 
  198 
redistributive, its principal goal is to guard people from major economic dislocations 
provoked by interruptions to income or volatile non-discretionary expenditure.  
Principles of social justice reject the idea that economic growth and 
development are likely to be undermined by progress in the social sphere, and that 
economic progress does not necessarily mean social progress. Social Partnership has 
been a fundamental driver in economic change in Ireland and has come to constitute a 
system of political economy that has had a profound affect on how the Irish economy 
has developed, how wealth is produced, and how it is redistributed (OÕReardon 2001, 
pp. 113).  However, Social Partnership and centralised wage bargaining were some of 
the first casualties of the economic and financial crisis in Ireland. Despite a 
consensual approach to socio-economic policy since the 1980s, the Irish 
governmentÕs position has been one of a unilateral adjustment rather than a negotiated 
adjustment. The policy constraints of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the focus 
on public sector austerity combined with the unprecedented economic and financial 
crisis has undermined the capacity of Irish state actors (i.e. the Public Services 
Committee, Irish Business and Employers Confederation, Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions) and the Irish government to engage in a strategy of Social Partnership 
(Doherty, 2011).  
In order to link individuals desire to see inequality addressed in Ireland and 
the impact this has upon support for the EU an examination of inequality during the 
Celtic Tiger period (1995-2007) is necessary. As previously stated in this section 
inequality in Ireland actually increased during the 1990s and early 2000s (Atkinson, 
Rainwater & Smeeding 1995; Nolan & Maitre 2000; Cantillon et al 2001). This can 
be attributed to three main reasons. Firstly, the distribution of income between wages 
and profits shifted markedly towards profit (Lane 1998, p. 225). The share of profits 
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in the non-government sector of the economy increased from a quarter to one-third 
from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s and the corresponding share of wages decreased 
from 75 per cent to 65 per cent (Hardiman, McCashin & Payne 2006, p. 43). 
Secondly, among employees there was a marked rise in earnings dispersion: the ratio 
of pay between the highest paid employees and the lowest paid increased significantly 
from 1987 to 1997 (Barrett, Fitzgerald & Nolan 1999). Thirdly, relative income 
poverty rose during the 1990s with just under 19 per cent of households under the 
poverty line in 1994, and almost 26 per cent were under the poverty line in 2001 
(Nolan et al, 2002, p. 19).  
While the Celtic Tiger period (1995-2007) generated increased prosperity for 
the majority of Irish people, high levels of inequality continued to persist. Figure 1 
illustrates the Gini coefficient35 SILC Eurostat data from 1995-2007 in Ireland, and 
the Gini coefficient average from the fifteen member states (1995-2004), twenty-five 
member states (2004-2007) and twenty-seven member states of the EU. Figure 1 
shows that income inequality during the boom years of the Celtic Tiger period (1995-
2007) was above the EU average affirming findings by Atkinson, Rainwater and 
Smeeding (1995), Nolan and Maitre (2000), and Cantillion et al (2001) that there was 
an increase in inequality during the 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
<<Figure 4 about here>> 
 
                                                              
35 The Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income from EUROSTAT SILC data is defined as the 
relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of equivalised 
disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by them 
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It must be noted, however, that the increase in inequality during the 1990s and 
early 2000s is only one aspect of the Celtic Tiger story. While inequality did increase, 
individuals at all income levels were better off in absolute terms too (Hardiman, 
McCashin & Payne 2006, p. 43). Employment grew at an unprecedented rate and by 
the end of the 1990s Ireland had achieved full employment. Earned income also 
increased, thus this growth in earnings, when compounded by reduced taxation, 
resulted in a substantial rise in disposal incomes at all levels in the income 
distribution (Hardiman, McCashin & Payne 2006 p. 43).  
While the living standards and improved employment opportunities generated 
by the economic boom years improved the lives of many individuals in Ireland, less 
attention was attributed to the increases in relative inequality that was a hallmark of 
the Celtic Tiger period, or indeed to the failures to invest adequately in quality social 
services (Kirby & Murphy, 2011). There are a number of scholars that argue that 
Ireland was far from being a model of successful development under globalisation, 
but was rather a warning of the social costs of economic development (Allen 2000; 
Kirby 2002 pp. 206; OÕToole 2003). The economic boom years (1995-2007) saw 
increased levels of income inequality as the top section of the income distribution 
pulled away from the median and, by 2007, the average levels of income inequality 
over the Celtic Tiger period (1995-2007) remained stubbornly high (Dellepaine & 
Hardiman 2012, p. 86).  The rapid growth and employment expansion combined with 
an on going commitment to Social Partnership processes did not contribute to a 
reduction in domestic social inequalities or to an expansion in the extent of social 
consumption. The increase in public spending that took place did not keep pace with 
market-driven living standards and the tax system favoured, rather than contained, the 
surge in higher-income rewards (Dellepaine & Hardiman 2012, p. 87).  
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According to the Gini coefficient SILC Eurostat data from 2008-2012, there 
was a decrease in inequality in Ireland at the beginning of the economic and financial 
crisis, which has continued, with the exception of 2010, until 2012. However, despite 
this decrease individuals in Ireland do not perceive the reduction in inequality per se 
(i.e. income). What individuals do perceive is that they have not been apportioned the 
ÔfairÕ benefits of society and this affects how they think about the current political and 
economic status of both the EU and Ireland. Since the beginning of the economic and 
financial crisis, individuals in Ireland have not been actually doing worse, but they are 
feeling or perceiving as if they are achieving less economically.    
 
<<Figure 5 about here>> 
  
As a consequence, inequality is therefore viewed through the lens of the 
distribution of economic growth and/or the changes in the distribution of economic 
growth. This in turn plays a role in gauging support for the EU, along with 
individualsÕ actual SES and social location. The perceived improvement or perceived 
deterioration in an individualÕs socio-economic well-being in Ireland can be an 
effective determinant of an individualÕs support for continued European integration, 
as well as being used as an evaluation of how to assess support for the EU.  
As theorised previously in Chapter Three and Chapter Five and in order to 
relate this to individualsÕ support for the EU in Ireland, I make a connection between 
individualsÕ concerns about inequality and changes in individualsÕ level of support for 
the EU through the relationship inequality has to both democratic political institutions 
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and the liberal market economy.  I do not posit that individuals in Ireland want an 
alternative arrangement with political democracy and the free market economy of the 
EU, but rather that individuals in Ireland want democratic institutions and the liberal 
market economy to both function effectively (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2006). It 
is much more productive to consider the market and democracy as mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms, so that the liberal market economy can produce improved 
economic outcomes for a larger proportion of individuals in the EU in conjunction 
with robust and efficient democratic institutions.  
For example, if an economy provides high living standards and vigorous 
economic development, individuals will often accept comparatively high, objective 
levels of inequality (Jackman 1975; Bollen & Jackman 1985). This makes the balance 
between market-generated inequalities and effective democratic institutions a 
plausible connection to formulate because individuals in Ireland will regard EU 
member states with strong, democratic political institutions as a safeguard against 
excessive inequalities (Bollen & Jackman 1985; Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny 
& Li 2003; Whitefield & Loveless 2013).  
For Ireland, I propose that in the wake of the on-going economic crisis, the EU 
can be seen primarily as the guarantor of democracy that can combat market-driven 
inequalities. This expressed desire is apparent in individualsÕ support for the EU 
project and its continuation. In addition, perhaps individuals in Ireland consider the 
EU as the mechanism to enforce democratic responses to economic woes in the 
context of rising inequality. It is not unreasonable to make this connection between 
strong democratic responses and market inequalities. IndividualsÕ perceptions of 
excessive inequality do not drive dislike or distrustfulness of democratic institutions, 
in fact, it is nearly always the opposite (for Europe, see Kaltenhaler et al. 2008; for 
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Central and Eastern Europe, see Whitefield & Loveless 2013) corresponding to long-
standing work in which individuals who exhibit dissatisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy want more, rather than less, democracy (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004).  
Thus, when the market distorts the distribution of goods in society, 
(democratic) institutional remedies need to be available. That is to say, if effective 
democratic institutions are the presumed remedy for inequality, this inquiry allows us 
to not only examine changes in the level of support for the EU in Ireland but also to 
re-examine a long-standing question of whether the EU may be valued more for its 
democratic character than its market character. This makes Ireland a critical case 
study in order to determine how individualsÕ perception of inequality is a noteworthy 
determinant for addressing support for the EU, given increasing inequality during the 
economic boom of the Celtic Tiger (1995-2007) and since the onset of the economic 
crisis of 2007/8. 
6.5: Methods: Conceptualization and Operationalization  
Increased support for the EU and the continuation of the EU project suggest 
that individuals in Ireland regard the EU as the enforcer of democratic political 
institutions which appeal to justice, fairness and transparency.  Decreased support for 
the EU is considered in conjunction with increased concerns by individuals in Ireland 
of the ability of the EU to address inequality. This is suggestive of the on-going battle 
with the perceived democratic deficit of the EU, concerns of the efficacy of the EU 
and a preference for the Irish government to be the basis of effective action against 
inequality. In any of these latter cases, Irish individualsÕ concerns with inequality 
depress support for the EU. The theory that combines Irish individualsÕ concern about 
addressing inequality with support for the EU and Irish national governance rests on 
the notion that citizens in Ireland seek strong democratic politics to serve as a 
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safeguard against market-generated inequalities (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny 
& Li 2003; Whitefield & Loveless 2012). This leads to the hypothesis that  
H2: In Ireland, as the level of individualsÕ preferences for inequality to be 
addressed increases, Irish individuals are more likely to support the EU (EU Status 
Quo) and continued expansion (EU enlargement) 
To operationalize this hypothesis, I use the EES 2009 data to examine support 
for the EU. A limitation to the study of support for the EU is the variety of 
determinants for support (see Chapter Two). In addition, Boomgaarden, Schuck, 
Elenbaas and De Vreese (2011) argue that attitudes towards the EU are 
multidimensional, making it relevant to assess which generic models explain variation 
in support or aversion to the different dimensions of EU support.  Boomgaarden et al 
(2011) argue that measures of EU attitudes refer to two clusters of EU attitude 
orientations. The first cluster relates to specific, utilitarian and output oriented 
attitudes, while the second relates to diffuse, affective and input oriented attitudes. In 
this inquiry on Ireland, I also distinguish between attitudes towards the regime and 
towards the community by separating EU support into two categories: the EU status 
quo and EU enlargement. This builds upon the findings of Boomgaarden et al (2011) 
that emotional responses (i.e. perceptions), along with the performance of the 
functioning of the EU, both democratically and economically strengthens utilitarian 
attitudes towards the EU and reflects support based on agreement with extended 
decision-making competencies, policy transfer and further European integration.  
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In order to test the robustness of the inquiry I include three determinants of 
EU support:  
(1) EU Membership is good or bad  
(2) EU Enlargement is good or bad  
(3) EU is in our [IrelandÕs] interest  
By including these three determinants of EU support, this inquiry 
operationalizes the approaches to the understanding of EU support. Using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) Multiple Regression analysis, I run three models of EU support 
in order to test the theoretical mechanism that individuals in Ireland seek strong 
democratic politics to serve as a safeguard against market-generated inequalities since 
the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. This necessitates the 
inclusion of Ôaddressing inequalityÕ into the mass public opinion model thus 
examining the performance of all three models in Ireland immediately after the onset 
of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
Table 9 demonstrates the co-variation of the three dependent variables. Each 
dependent variable varies from one another yet none of the three variables are 
substantively correlated with one another. This suggests the importance of 
operationalization due to the conceptual distinctiveness between the EU as it is 
currently constituted (i.e. EU Status Quo), and the continued expansion of the EU 
project (i.e. EU Enlargement).  
 
<<Table 9 about here>> 
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As outlined in Chapter Two, there are numerous approaches to the 
understanding of EU support. The standard model of EU support includes 
communication (social communication, watching mass media and interest in politics), 
identity (feeling about being described as European, and fear of immigrants), 
ideological congruence and institutional performance (including retrospective and 
prospective socio-tropic economic evaluations as well as normative preferences for 
the liberal market economy and satisfaction with democracy), and socio-demographic 
variables (including self-reported social class, subjective standard of living, age, 
gender, ideology, and education).  
The central independent variable concerning inequality is asked in the context 
of the post-economic crisis therefore centering the conceptual basis for inequality on 
the principle that inequality is generated by liberal market economies and institutions 
are expected to disperse political power  (Bartels 2008; Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli, & 
Gelleny 2008). Put simply, I base my understanding on Irish individuals existing 
normative attitudes that the liberal market economy should be fair versus purely equal 
and that democracy should function in a roughly egalitarian or minimally majoritarian 
manner in order to prevent inevitable market distortions.  
To operationalize this rationale, individual respondents in Ireland were asked 
how they deem the importance of addressing inequality to be using the question 
Òincome and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary peopleÓ. As outlined 
theoretically above (see Chapter Three for comprehensive outline of the theory to be 
tested) I take this to be a value position that demonstrates individual respondentsÕ 
support for democratic institutions to serve as the arbiter of liberal market generated 
inequality. In order to show that this measure of inequality is not a proxy for other 
value positions and can be independently predictive of support for the EU, I analyse 
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how the variable of inequality correlates with both ideological and socio-economic 
positions. The hypothesis, meanwhile, relies on the assumption that individuals in 
Ireland, as EU citizens, regard the EU as a mechanism to reinforce substantive 
democratic governance at both the national level (i.e. Ireland) and at the supranational 
level (i.e. the EU). The OLS Multiple Regression analysis demonstrates that an 
increased number of individuals in Ireland concerned about inequality lowers support 
for the EU as it is currently constituted (i.e. status quo) but increases support for 
deeper European integration. This wide-ranging effect is for the most part unrelated to 
individualsÕ SES of ÔwinningÕ and ÔlosingÕ but is driven by normative values of 
fairness and justice in society, suggesting that individuals in Ireland believe that the 
EU is the enforcer of democratic competences, and it is the EU that is the institutional 
driving force to address market generated inequality in Ireland.  
Individuals with left-leaning ideological positions often consider support for 
intervention by the nation state in the liberal market economy, while individuals with 
right-leaning ideological positions are often associated with conservative ideological 
positions. Using Irish individualsÕ left-right ideological self-placement it is 
demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between Irish individualsÕ concerns 
with addressing inequality of r=0.006 (p=0.0740, N=1,001).  
It may also be intuitive to consider Ôaddress inequalityÕ to be related to Irish 
attitudes regarding the liberal market economy. However, the correlation between 
Ôaddress inequalityÕ and Ômarket preferenceÕ is r=0.000 (p=-0.0017, N=1,001), 
suggesting that these two variables are negatively correlated and do not move 
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together.36 This demonstrates that Irish individualsÕ support for addressing inequality 
is neither a proxy for ideology nor a preference for markets to address inequality.  
Using Irish individualsÕ self reported standard of living, the preliminary 
evidence suggests that as individuals move toward a more precarious economic 
position, the concern for addressing inequality is in fact more pronounced among 
those individuals who are economically affluent (r=0.0123, p=0.1107, N=1,001). 
Therefore, while the standard of living may capture existing economic vulnerability, it 
does not demonstrate results about what to expect with regards to Irish individualsÕ 
views about addressing inequality. This is not surprising when considering research 
that highlights that the distribution of skills, pre-existing non-economic cleavages (for 
example, ethnicity and religious orientation) and subjective attitudes toward welfare 
and social justice distort the direct connection between policy preferences and 
economic interests (Benabou 2000; Benabou & Tirole 2006; Osberg & Smeeding 
2006). 
Overall, it can be posited that support for European integration depends on the 
national political-economic context. Such contexts affect not only the magnitude of 
personal grievances but also their ideological embeddedness into domestic partisan 
alignments. The explanatory value of interacting contextual and individual-level 
variables to account for alignments over European integration highlights the 
plausibility of a multi-level model of the European polity contextualising the national 
varieties of capitalism (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, p. 63) and the need to 
address inequality.  
<<Table 10 about here>> 
                                                              
36 All models were tested for multicollinearity with no significant problems. 
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Interpretation of Theoretically Relevant Independent Variables in OLS Multiple 
Regression Model  
Across all three dependent variables (ÔEU membership is good or badÕ, ÔEU 
enlargement is good or badÕ and ÔEU in IrelandÕs interestÕ, see Table 10) the main 
theoretically relevant variables of inequality and ideological congruence and 
institutional performance perform well. The central independent variable of ÔAddress 
inequalityÕ is positively correlated with both ÔEU enlargementÕ and ÔEU in IrelandÕs 
interests and is statistically significant at the 99% level, ! ! !!01 and 95% level 
! ! !!05 respectively. For both of these models for every one unit increase in the 
need to address inequality both models predict that ÔEU enlargementÕ and ÔEU in 
IrelandÕs interestÕ will increase by 0.0712 and 0.0408 units respectively holding all 
other independent variables constant. This means that in these two models individuals 
believe that further enlargement of the EU and the fact that decisions made in the EU 
are in the interest of Ireland are factors, which increase the need to address market-
generated inequality and as a consequence this increases mass public opinion support 
for the EU. However, in the model ÔEU membership is good or badÕ the central 
independent variable of ÔAddress inequalityÕ is negatively correlated and is not 
statistically significant. Thus, for every one unit decrease in the need to address 
inequality the model predicts that ÔEU Membership good or badÕ will decrease by -
0.00948 units holding all other independent variables constant. This infers that those 
individuals who believe that membership of the EU is neither a good or bad thing for 
Ireland decreases support for inequality to be addressed and therefore decreases 
support for the EU.  
However, given the concern of individuals in Ireland about the issue of 
inequality and its apparent and differential effect on support for the EU since the 
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onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 it is evident that inequality is a 
meaningful political, rather than merely economic, issue and one that needs 
substantive consideration. For individuals in Ireland, evaluations of support for the 
EU are not only economic but socio-tropic with many Irish people believing that the 
liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust manner as they assess societal 
differences based upon both access and opportunity to the EU. This is reiterated 
theoretically by the ideological and institutional performance variables as they are 
almost uniformly positive and as expected with the exception of a negative correlation 
with retrospective socioeconomic evaluation and ÔEU membership good or badÕ (-
0.0299 holding all other variables constant) and market preference with ÔEU 
EnlargementÕ and ÔEU in IrelandÕs interestÕs (-0.0323 and -0.00999 respectively 
holding all other variables fixed).  
In testing the robustness of the theoretical design in this inquiry, prospective 
socioeconomic evaluation and satisfaction with democracy are the best performing 
ideological congruence and institutional performance variables. Prospective 
socioeconomic evaluation is positively correlated and statistically significant at the 
99.9% level, ! ! !!001!with ÔEU membership good or badÕ and satisfaction with 
democracy positively correlated across all three models and statistically significant at 
the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 with ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ and ÔEU in IrelandÕs 
interestsÕ and 99% level, ! ! !!01  with ÔEU membership good or badÕ. The 
correlation coefficients reflect the theoretical strength of this inquiry with prospective 
socioeconomic evaluation reporting coefficients across all three models of 0.0459, 
0.0371 and 0.0267 respectively and satisfaction with democracy reporting coefficients 
across all three models of 0.0560, 0.106 and 0.161 respectively. This further 
demonstrates theoretically that Irish individuals evaluations of support for the EU are 
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not only economic but socio-tropic with many individuals in Ireland believing that the 
liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust manner as they assess societal 
differences based upon both access and opportunity to the EU. This is also a 
noteworthy finding given the intense criticism successive Irish governments have 
encountered since the economic crisis of 2007/8, with scholars citing a lack of 
expertise and inadequate governance as contributors to Irish socio-economic 
inequalities (Kirby & Murphy 2011; Dellepaine & Hardiman 2012).  
Market preference fails to reach statistical significance across all three models 
and is in fact negatively correlated with ÔEU Enlargement good or badÕ and ÔEU in 
our interestÕ. This theoretically demonstrates that for every one unit decrease in the 
need for the liberal market economy to address the economic problems of Ireland the 
models predicts that further EU Enlargement and the belief that the EU acts in 
IrelandÕs interest will decrease by -0.0323 and -0.00999 units respectively holding all 
other independent variables constant. Thus substantively, in conjunction with some of 
the most long-standing theories on EU support, it can be posited that the positive and 
predictive findings from prospective socio-tropic economic evaluations are consistent 
with the notion that individuals in Ireland regard the EU as the institutional driving 
force to address market generated inequality and therefore improve Irish individuals 
socio-tropic economic evaluations following the economic crisis of 2007/8. It can also 
be posited that this notion is consistent with the socio-tropic method of Ireland being 
a net beneficiary of net transfers from the EU to the national level, coupled with the 
principle of utilitarianism (Kennedy & Sinnott 2006 & 2007) for determining EU 
support in Ireland.  
The same conclusions cannot be drawn for retrospective socio-tropic 
economic evaluations which fails to reach statistical significance across all three 
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models: ÔEU membership is good or badÕ, ÔEU enlargement: good or badÕ and ÔEU in 
IrelandÕs interestÕ and is negatively correlated with ÔEU membership good or badÕ. 
This illustrates that for every one-unit decrease in individualsÕ retrospective socio-
tropic economic evaluation in Ireland the model predicts that ÔEU membership good 
or badÕ will decrease by -0.0299 units holding all other independent variables constant 
thus reducing support for the EU. However, individuals retrospective socio-tropic 
economic evaluations are positively correlated with ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ 
and ÔEU in IrelandÕs interestsÕ demonstrating that for every one unit increase in 
individuals retrospective socio-tropic economic evaluation in Ireland the model 
predicts that further EU enlargement and the belief that the EU acts in the interests of 
IrelandÕs will increase support for the EU by 0.0184 and 0.0208 units holding all 
other independent variables constant.  
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that individuals in Ireland are concerned 
about inequality and its apparent and differential effect on support for the EU since 
the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. As a consequence of this 
concern, it is evident that inequality is a meaningful political, rather than merely 
economic, issue and one that needs substantive consideration. For individuals in 
Ireland, evaluations of support for the EU are not only economic but socio-tropic with 
many people believing that the liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust 
manner as they assess societal differences based upon both access and opportunity to 
the EU. This is reiterated theoretically by the ideological and institutional 
performance variables, which are almost uniformly positive and in the expected 
direction.  
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Interpretation of all Independent Variables in OLS Multiple Regression Model  
Controlling for all other factors, across all three dependent variables there is 
no effect on social communication. It is neither positively correlated nor statistically 
significant across all three models, and across all three models for every one unit 
decrease in social communication all models predict that ÔEU membership good or 
badÕ, ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ and ÔEU in IrelandÕs interestÕ will decrease by -
0.0189, -0.0448 and -0.0202 units respectively holding all other independent variables 
constant. Only the use of ÔMass mediaÕ is positively correlated and statistically 
significant at the 99% level, ! ! !!05 with ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ. However, 
across all three models for every one-unit increase in mass media all models predict 
that membership of the EU, further EU enlargement and the belief by individuals in 
Ireland that the EU acts in IrelandÕs interests will increase marginally by 0.00377, 
0.631 and 0.0311 units respectively holding all other independent variables constant. 
IndividualsÕ interest in politics is statistically significant at the 95% level, ! ! !!05 
and positively correlated with ÔEU in IrelandÕs interestsÕ demonstrating that the belief 
by individuals in Ireland that the EU acts in IrelandÕs interests will increase 
marginally by 0.0669 units respectively holding all other independent variables 
constant.  
Overall, the ÔidentityÕ variables are perhaps the most consistent predictor of 
support for the EU in Ireland as ÔFeel EuropeanÕ is positively correlated across all 
three models and statistically significant at the 99.9% level, ! ! !!001 with ÔEU 
membership good or badÕ and ÔEU in IrelandÕs interestÕ and at the 95% level, 
! ! !!05 with ÔEU enlargement good or badÕ. The coefficients also reflect this as for 
every one-unit increase in individuals in Ireland feeling European all three model 
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predicts that support for the EU will increase by 0.0824, 0.0832 and 0.154 units 
respectively holding all other independent variables constant thus increasing support 
for the EU. ÔImmigration fearÕ meanwhile is negatively correlated across all three 
models and is statistically significant at the 95% level, ! ! !!05! with ÔEU 
membership good or badÕ and 99.9%, ! ! !!001 level with ÔEU enlargementÕ. This is 
to say that for every one-unit increase in individualsÕ in Ireland fearing immigration 
all three models predict that support for the EU will decrease by -0.0253, -0.0766 and 
-0.0211 units respectively holding all other independent variables constant thus 
decreasing support for the EU. The statistical significance and correlation coefficients 
across all three dependent variables for Ôfeel EuropeanÕ and across two dependent 
variables for Ôimmigration fearÕ emphasises the paradox that despite the fact that 
individuals in Ireland are widely regarded as Ôgood Europeans with a pro-
integrationist attitudeÕ there remains a nationalistic sentiment in Ireland. This is 
concurrent with the notion of perceived cultural threats (McLaren 2002 & 2004) and 
the inherent and implied ethnic level of Irish identity (Gilland, 2002).  
For the socio-demographic variables, I note that similar to findings on support 
for the EU in the twenty-seven member states, the reliance on GabelÕs (Gabel 1998a 
& 1998b) Ôwinners and losersÕ thesis on static demographic variables may be 
deteriorating. The richer, younger, more educated males in Ireland no longer appear to 
regard the EU and further European integration as a net positive. There is only a slight 
gender effect with gender being statistically significant at the 95% level, ! ! !!05 
with ÔEU membership is good or badÕ. Despite tending in a positive direction, as 
expected, education, age, self-reported social class, and subjective standard of living 
in Ireland are not statistically significant across all three models and are thus not 
powerful predictors in gauging EU support in Ireland.  
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Ideology provides limited consistency, as those individuals in Ireland who 
subscribe to the ÔleftÕ of the political spectrum herald ideological positions that are not 
statistically significant across all three models of EU support: ÔEU membership is 
good or badÕ, ÔEU enlargement is good or badÕ and ÔEU in our [IrelandÕs] interestÕ. 
Simultaneously, the analysis demonstrates that those individuals in Ireland who self-
identity with the ÔrightÕ are supportive of the EU, with Ôright ideologyÕ positively 
correlated and statistically significant at the 95% level, ! ! !!05!with the ÔEU: in our 
IrelandÕs interestÕ. This is suggestive of two important facets.  
Firstly, the findings suggest that support for the EU in Ireland from individuals 
on the ÔrightÕ of the political spectrum is indicative of a clear market position, as a 
result of the positive correlation and statistical significance with ÔEU in our IrelandÕs 
interestÕ and the positive correlation and statistical significance of Irish individualsÕ 
prospective socio-tropic economic evaluations. Secondly, this finding reiterates the 
ÔrightÕ leaning nature of individuals in Ireland within the literature on national 
political-economic context in the varieties of capitalism. This ÔrightÕ leaning nature of 
Irish individuals also relates to an individualsÕ normative view of inequality and 
support for the EU in Ireland. From this, it can be posited that those individuals on the 
ÔrightÕ support an increase in EU involvement in Irish economic governance as the 
EU is operating and functioning in the interest of Ireland by improving the liberal 
market position of Ireland, and therefore Irish individualsÕ position in the market 
during the economic crisis. Put simply, individuals acknowledge that the EU is acting 
as the institutional driving force to address market-generated inequality in Ireland. 
This conclusion is not unwarranted given the individual-level findings for the 
inequality variable. As individuals in Ireland agree with the notion that income and 
wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people, support for the EU (EU in 
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IrelandÕs interest) increases. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation. 
IndividualsÕ attitudes towards addressing inequality increase support for the EU, 
therefore lending support to the theoretical notion that EU citizens regard the EU as a 
means to reinforce substantive democratic governance at both the nation state level in 
Ireland and within the EU itself, namely as a means to combat excessive inequality. 
6.6: Discussion  
The findings here are illustrative of both individualsÕ attitudes and orientations 
toward the EU in Ireland, as they determine elements of Irish individualsÕ assessments 
of liberal market economies, which include the ability to distribute or redistribute the 
goods of society. In turn, this allows analysis to take place of the evolving nature of 
the EU in Ireland incorporating new economic realities for individuals in Ireland since 
the economic crisis of 2007/8. The test of the theoretical mechanism examines 
whether the liberal market economy in Ireland is too unequal. Put simply, the liberal 
market economy has either failed to create adequate economic and social 
opportunities or has provided these economic and social prospects in an unequal 
manner and individuals in Ireland recognise this. When tested the theoretical 
mechanism is robust when controlling for all other existing explanations as Ôaddress 
inequalityÕ is positively correlated and statistically significant in model 2 (ÔEU 
enlargement is good or badÕ) and model 3 (ÔEU in our [IrelandÕs] interestÕ). From 
these findings, it can be inferred that individualsÕ attitudes and orientations towards 
addressing inequality in Ireland increases support for the EU, as Irish respondents 
regard the EU as the institutional driving force to reinforce substantive democratic 
governance at both the nation state level and the EU level. For individuals in Ireland it 
is the EU and not the Irish state which is perceived to be best placed to address 
inequality in Ireland since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
  217 
Given these findings, there are two predominant questions which need to be 
addressed. Firstly, do individuals in Ireland regard the EU as a source of economic 
security? Secondly, do individuals in Ireland regard the EU project as a continuance 
of economic and political decisions that have produced substantial financial and 
economic difficulties for the greater part of the population in Ireland?  
The economic crisis has had an extensive and considerable effect on the 
economic welfare of individuals in Ireland since it began in 2007/8. If the EU is 
primarily the promoter of the liberal market economy via integration of the Irish 
stateÕs economy into the wider framework of EU member state economies, it is 
reasonable to expect that those individuals in Ireland who are pushed or perceive 
themselves or others to be pushed towards a more precarious personal economic state 
may exhibit reduced support for the EU and on going European integration. Kriesi et 
al (2008) argue that competition which is guided by changes in the economy, cultural 
diversity, competition between national governments, and the perceived 
encroachment of supranational politics has driven European societies in the theorised 
directions of GabelÕs (1998a & 1998b) initial contribution of Ôwinners and losersÕ of 
European integration.  
However, from the multiple regression analysis of Ireland, rather than finding 
that Irish individuals believe that inequality should be addressed therefore decreasing 
support for the EU the opposite is the case: Irish individualsÕ attitudes towards 
addressing inequality increases support for the EU in Ireland, in particular for further 
European integration. This is an interesting and noteworthy finding in the context of 
Ireland, and points to the perception that individuals in Ireland believe that the Irish 
political system has failed the Irish people in reducing and addressing inequality. The 
intervention by the Irish government in the form of the Bank Guarantee Scheme of 
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2008 did not create greater certainty or stability in economic markets, as initially 
hoped, and individuals in Ireland were not protected from the uncertainty and risk of 
the liberal market economy. In addition, with the Irish economy in deep recession 
Irish individuals perceived the uncertainty and risk of the liberal market economy in 
2012 and voted ÔYesÕ to the Fiscal Treaty (see Table 8). Irish individuals have 
recognised this uncertainty and risk of the liberal market economy and have 
demonstrated a preference for ÔmoreÕ Europe, not ÔlessÕ Europe.  
The current and enduring model of EU support fails to discern the salient and 
timely issue of Irish individualsÕ perceptions of inequality as a determinant of EU 
support in Ireland, specifically since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8. An 
analysis of inequality is imperative in order to examine increasingly nuanced and 
normative evaluations of Irish individualsÕ economic and political assessments of EU 
support. When analysed, Irish individualsÕ evaluations of support for the EU are not 
only economic but also socio-tropic. This demonstrates that individuals in Ireland 
believe that since the economic crisis of 2007/8 the liberal market system functions in 
an unfair and unjust manner. This makes inequality a noteworthy determinant of EU 
support, as individuals in Ireland are assessing societal differences based on both 
access to and opportunity within the EU. It is the overlap between an individualÕs 
perception of those experiencing material disadvantage and those facing heightened 
economic risk that contributes to individuals in Ireland regarding the EU, as a result 
of its capacity to enforce democratic competences, as the institutional driving force to 
address liberal market generated inequality in Ireland since the economic crisis. The 
appeal by Irish individuals to address inequality is not surprising, as Kirby and 
MurphyÕs (2011) analysis demonstrates that Ireland ranks consistently among the 
worst in the EU for inequality (Kirby & Murphy 2011, p. 94) which directly contests 
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the view of researchers at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in 
Ireland that the economic boom years of the Celtic Tiger (1995-2007) represented the 
Ôbest of timesÕ for all of Irish society (Fahey, Russell & Whelan 2007, pp. 1-10).  
Given the notion that democratic institutions are designed to function in a 
roughly egalitarian or at least a minimally majoritarian manner (Dahl, 1989) they are 
the key institutional mechanisms available for individuals to combat excessive and 
inevitable distortions (Bollen & Jackman 1985; Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996; Reuveny 
& Li 2003). If the means of democracy are seen to be impartial and fair, individuals in 
Ireland-having received what they wanted or not-tend to accept the outcome, thus 
producing legitimacy (Rohrschneider, 2005). Therefore, democracy can be considered 
to provide protection from the perceived inequalities of the liberal market economy 
by serving as an impartial arbiter of generic social welfare, reducing the effects of, 
although perhaps not eliminating, liberal market driven inequality. 
In order to link democratic institutions and Irish individuals perception of the 
unfair and unjust distribution of access and opportunity within the liberal market 
economy since the economic crisis to the understanding of individual-level support 
for the EU in Ireland, I draw a connection between Irish individualsÕ concerns about 
inequality and changes in individual level support for the EU in Ireland. This inquiry 
highlights that those individuals in Ireland who want inequality to be addressed 
appear to be receptive to further European integration and are currently dissatisfied 
with the EU in this context. Irish individualsÕ concerns with inequality depress 
support for the EU, suggesting that the perceived Ôdemocratic deficitÕ in the EU does 
continue to reinforce previous concerns about European governance (Rohrschneider, 
2002). However, popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy tends to 
produce a desire for more, rather than less, democracy (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). 
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The findings here demonstrate that support for European integration via Irish 
individualÕs concerns about addressing inequality suggests a resilient connection 
between the robust democratic enforcement that the EU could potentially offer. It may 
be posited that individuals in Ireland have disapproved of the EUÕs response to the 
economic crisis so far. Yet despite this, individuals in Ireland believe that the EU has 
a positive role to play in addressing inequality since the onset of the economic crisis 
of 2007/8. Whether the role to be played by the EU in addressing inequality 
supersedes the Irish nation state, or whether the EUÕs role is one that reinforces the 
EU project, is opaque, ambiguous and difficult to discern. It may be conceived that 
the EU is being called upon in order to address inequality in a substantive manner, in 
addition to the action or inaction of the Irish state.  
It is difficult to assess whether it is either the EU or the Irish state that is 
perceived by individuals in Ireland as being primarily responsible for the stabilisation 
of financial and economic markets and domestic and international economics 
following the economic crisis. However, recent Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer  
72, Autumn 2009 to Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013) asks respondents: ÒIn your 
opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis?Ó37. The responses can be seen in Table 
11.  
 
<<Table 11 about here>> 
 
                                                              
37 Question QC3 in Eurobarometer 72 & 74, Question QB3a in Eurobarometer 73, Question QC3a in 
Eurobarometer 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 & 80. Please see 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm  
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The individual-level responses are notable as individuals in Ireland regard the 
Irish state as much less effective in its action to manage the effects of the economic 
crisis since Spring 201038. It may be posited that for individuals in Ireland the 
question of effective action against the economic crisis may not have a clear answer. 
However, what is clear is that individuals in Ireland want more, not less EU 
democratic action. This demonstrates that the EU is indeed regarded by individuals in 
Ireland as the institutional driving force to address perceptions of inequality since the 
onset of the economic crisis. Here, inequality in the distribution of economic growth 
and or changes plays a strong role alongside Irish individualsÕ actual SES and social 
location acting as a determinant of Irish individualsÕ support for on going European 
integration, as well as an evaluative filter through which to assess the EU in its 
current form. When the liberal market distorts the distribution of goods in society, 
(democratic) institutional remedies need to be available. If effective democratic 
institutions are in fact the presumed remedy for inequality, analysis of changes in the 
level of support for the EU is possible, as well as a re-examination of the long-
standing question of whether the EU may be valued more for its democratic character 
than its market character is possible which is demonstrated by Eurobarometer data 
(Table 11).  
                                                              
38 With three exceptions: Autumn 2009, Autumn 2011 and Autumn 2013. Context of Ireland outlined 
below.  
Autumn 2009 (EB72) the Irish government had an 8% advantage over the EU. During the autumn of 
2009 (October 2009) Ireland held itÕs second referendum on Lisbon.  
Autumn 2011 (EB76) The Irish government had a 2% advantage over the EU. During the autumn of 
2011 the Occupy Dame Street movement began (October 2011. IrelandÕs financial bailout was 
finalised in November 2011) which lasted until March 2012. The ÔOccupyÕ movement witnessed calls 
for the end public ownership of private debt as a result of the Bank Guarantee Scheme (2008), public 
protests against austerity (November 2011) and the withdrawal of the EU/IMF/Troika in Ireland.  
Autumn 2013 (EB80) the Irish government had a 6% advantage over the EU. During the autumn of 
2013 two constitutional referendums were held: Thirty-second Amendment Bill propose abolishing 
Seanad Eireann (rejected) and Thirty-third Amendment establishment of Court of Appeal to sit 
between High Court and Supreme Court (passed) placing emphasis on domestic politics (October 
2013).  
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The effect of addressing inequality and the effect this has on individual level 
support for the EU in Ireland is twofold. Firstly, increased support for the EU and its 
continuation in Ireland suggests that individuals in Ireland regard the EU as an 
enforcer of democratic political institutions, exemplifying the normative appeal to 
justice, fairness, and transparency. Secondly, decreased support for the EU, in 
conjunction with increased concern for addressing inequality in Ireland, is suggestive 
of either the ongoing struggle with the perceived Ôdemocratic deficitÕ worries of 
insufficient efficacy of the EU, or simply a preference for the Irish state to be the 
source of action. In any of these cases, Irish individualsÕ concern with inequality 
depresses support for the EU as it is currently constituted but increases support for 
further European integration.  
6.7: Conclusion 
 Overall the findings here are consistent with those findings in the analysis of 
the twenty-seven EU member states in Chapter Five and are suggestive that 
individuals in Ireland acknowledge attitudes and orientations toward the EU, which 
are undergoing a predominant shift. This alteration in attitudes and orientations 
towards the EU at the individual-level in Ireland demonstrates that there is an 
inadequacy in the understanding of support for the EU in a period of dramatic and 
demanding economic change. In the current context of the on going economic crisis, I 
argue that a transformation in Irish individualsÕ thinking, specifically the development 
of a normative attitude that the liberal market economy should be fair versus purely 
equal, and a belief that democracy should function in an egalitarian manner in order to 
reduce market distortions, is not an excessive claim.  I find that Irish individualsÕ 
desire to address inequality is strongly correlated with negative support for the EU as 
it is, but positively correlated toward a deepening of EU integration. This finding 
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depends on both individualsÕ SES and social location, making it a common 
explanation of support for the EU, as well as normatively supportive of stronger 
democratic institutional performance. This in turn allows an analysis of the changing 
nature of the role of the EU in the eyes of Irish individuals in light of many new 
economic realities. 
European integration and European governance have been centrally important 
in the economic transformation of Ireland, particularly through the alignment of state 
strategy with the action of economic and social interests. Given the current economic 
context, inequality not only heightens individual level concerns about economic 
stability, but it has also demonstrated that context-especially in the case of Ireland- is 
important and has directly influenced politics. As well as economic recovery, the 
majority of individuals in Ireland want an even distribution of growth, and therefore, 
by addressing inequality, democratic political institutions (i.e. the EU) gain more 
support from individuals in Ireland, making inequality a noteworthy determinant of 
EU support in Ireland.  
The following empirical chapter will build upon the findings in the preceding 
empirical chapters (Chapter Five and Chapter Six): that individuals are indeed looking 
toward the EU to address market-generated inequality in their member state, and that 
this subsequently has an impact on individual-level support for the EU. The following 
empirical chapter will aim to address whether the role to be played by the EU in 
addressing inequality supersedes the EU member state, or whether the EUÕs role is 
one that reinforces the European project. It may be conceived that the EU is being 
called upon to address inequality in a substantive manner in addition to EU member 
state action or inaction. Therefore, the following empirical chapter will examine 
whether is it either the EU or the national governments of EU member states which 
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are primarily responsible for the stabilisation of the financial markets and both 
domestic and international economics.  
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Tables  
Table 8: EU-Related Referendums in Ireland 1973-2012 
EU-Related Treaty  
 
Date, Month, Year Turnout  
 
Accession to the European 
Community 
 
 
10th May 1973 
  
Yes 83.09% No 16.91%  
Turnout 70.88%  
 
Treaty on Single European 
Act 
 
 
26th May 1987 
 
Yes 69.92% No 30.08% 
Turnout 44.09% 
 
Treaty of European Union 
(Maastricht) 
 
 
11th June 1992 
 
 
Yes 69.05% No 30.95% 
Turnout 57.31% 
 
Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
 
22nd May 1998 
 
Yes 61.74% No 38.26% 
Turnout: 56.20% 
 
 
Nice Treaty 1 
 
 
7th June 2001 (Rejected) 
 
Yes 46.13% No 53.87%  
Turnout: 34.79% 
 
 
Nice Treaty 2 
 
 
19th October 2002 
 
Yes 62.89% No 37.11% 
Turnout: 49.47% 
 
 
Lisbon 1 
 
 
12th June 2008 (Rejected) 
 
Yes 46.60% No, 53.40%  
Turnout 53.13%  
 
 
Lisbon 2 
 
 
2nd October 2009 
 
Yes 67.13%, No, 32.87% 
Turnout 59% 
 
 
The Fiscal Treaty 
 
 
31st May 2012 
 
Yes 60.29%, No 39.71%  
Turnout 50.60% 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO)  
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Table 9: Co-Variation of EU Support Variables in Republic of Ireland 
 EU membership 
is good 
EU enlargement is 
good 
EU is in our 
interest 
EU membership is 
good 
   
EU enlargement is 
good 
r= 0.2330 
p≤ 0.0000 
N=1001 
  
EU is in our interest 
r= 0.2237 
p≤ 0.0000 
N=1001 
r= 0.1445 
p≤ 0.0000 
N=1001 
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Table 10: OLS Multiple Regression Analysis: Support for EU in Ireland 
 
(1) EU Good or 
Bad
(2) EU Enlargement 
Good or Bad
(3) EU in Ireland's 
Interest
Inequality 
-0.00948 0.0712** 0.0408*
(-0.70) (3.01) (2.05)
Communication 
-0.0189 -0.0448 -0.0202
(-0.74) (-1.01) (-0.54)
0.00377 0.0631** 0.0311
(0.29) (2.78) (1.62)
0.0326 -0.0386 0.0669*
(1.57) (-1.08) (2.22)
Identity
0.0824*** 0.0832* 0.154***
(3.56) (2.1) (4.55)
-0.0253* -0.0766*** -0.0211
(-2.14) (-3.73) (-1.22)
Ideological Congruence & Institutional Performance
-0.0299 0.0184 0.0208
(-1.52) (0.54) (0.73)
0.0459*** 0.0371 0.0267
(3.31) (1.54) (1.31)
0.0175 -0.0323 -0.00999
(1.32) (-1.40) (-0.52)
0.0560** 0.106*** 0.161***
(3.04) (3.33) (5.98)
Socio-demographic Variables 
0.0282 -0.0346 0.000127
(3.04) (3.33) (5.98)
0.0173 -0.0185 0.0148
(1.13) (-0.69) (0.66)
0.00216 0.000964 0.000425
(1.96) (0.50) (0.26)
0.0675* 0.106 -0.034
(2.01) (1.82) (-0.69)
0.0124 0.0156 0.0308
(0.27) (0.19) (0.45)
0.00936 0.0373 0.127*
(0.22) (0.51) (2.04)
0.0219 0.00749 -0.0245
(1.75) (0.35) (-1.35)
2.055*** 1.636*** 1.441***
(13.51) (6.22) (6.46)
Adj. R2 0.0982 0.0614 0.0973
No. of Observations 825 816 828
t statistics in parentheses: *P<0.05 **P<0.01 ***P<0.001
OLS Multiple Regression Analysis: Support for EU in Ireland 
Retrospective Socioeconomic Evaluation
Prospective Socioeconomic Evaluation 
Market Preference 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
Address Inequality 
Mass Media
Social Communication 
Interested in Politics 
Feel European 
Immigration Fear
Right Ideology 
Education: ISCED
Constant 
Self-Reported Social Class 
Subjective Standard of Living
Age 
Gender: 1=male
Left Ideology 
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Table 11: Standard Eurobarometer Responses for 'Effective action against 
effects of Financial & Economic Crisis' 2009-2013 
 
 EB72 
(Autumn 
2009) 
EB73 
(Spring 
2010) 
EB74 
(Autumn 
2010) 
EB75 
(Spring 
2011) 
EB76 
(Autumn 
2011) 
EB77 
(Spring 
2012) 
EB78 
(Autumn 
2012) 
EB79 
(Spring 
2013) 
EB80 
(Autum
n 2013) 
 
The EU 
 
21% 
 
29% 
 
32% 
 
26% 
 
22% 
 
26% 
 
28% 
 
25% 
 
22% 
 
The Irish 
Government 
 
29%* 
 
24% 
 
13% 
 
21% 
 
24%* 
 
20% 
 
19% 
 
19% 
 
28%* 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Membership of the EU is a ÔgoodÕ thing for Ireland 1973-2011. 
ÒGenerally speaking, do you think that [IrelandÕs] membership of the Common 
Market/European Community/EU is?Ó  
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer data 1973-2011 
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Figure 2: Ireland has benefited from EU Membership. ÒTaking everything into 
consideration, would you that [Ireland] has on balance benefited or not from 
being a member of the Common Market/European Community/EU?Ó Source: 
Standard Eurobarometer Data 1983-2011 
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer Data 1983-2011 
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Figure 3: Annual Percentage Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
Ireland 2007-2013 
 
 
Source: World Bank  
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Figure 4: Gini Coefficient of Equivalised Disposable Income 1995-2007 in 
Ireland  
 
 
Source: Statistics on Income & Living Conditions (SILC) Eurostat 
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Figure 5: Gini Coefficient of Equivalised Disposable Income 2008-2012 in 
Ireland 
 
Source: Standards on Income & Living Conditions Eurostat 
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Chapter 7: The European Union or the EU Member State? 
IndividualsÕ Preferences for addressing Economic Insecurity 
 
7.1: Introduction  
This examination has thus far established an in-depth analysis of individual-level 
normative attitudes towards addressing inequality in a cross-variation analysis of the 
twenty-seven EU member states and a single case study of the Republic of Ireland. This 
inquiry has demonstrated that inequality is correlated with both ideological and socio-
economic status with the on-going economic crisis of 2007/8 used as the salient moment 
to activate individualsÕ concerns with regards to overall economic performance. This in 
turn has highlighted that there are more individuals if not actually doing worse, then at 
least feeling or perceiving as if they are achieving less economically. This has allowed 
individuals in the EU to determine what continued European integration means to them as 
either a ÔwinnerÕ or a ÔloserÕ of the EU project. It must be noted, however, that being a 
ÔloserÕ of the EU project may not be restricted to variations in individual income. It is in 
fact the unfair distribution of the goods of society which may have placed more 
individuals in a more fragile socio-economic state, or made these individuals feel as if 
they are in a more precarious socio-economic state. The variations in how individuals 
benefit from and share in aggregate economic growth, or in how those alterations in 
economic growth are distributed can be revealed in individualsÕ concerns about 
inequality. Therefore, while many individuals may not be de facto ÔpoorÕ or ÔlosersÕ of 
the EU project, in a stringent economic definition (i.e. according to income) many 
individuals may perceive themselves closer to such a position since the onset of the 
economic crisis of 2007/8.   
In Chapter Five and Chapter Six I used a combination of the following 
dependent variables all of which examine support for the EU, have been used in both 
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the HLM and OLS Multiple Regression analyses (1) EU Membership is good or bad, 
(2) Satisfaction with democracy in the EU, (3) EU Enlargement is good or bad, (4) 
More European Unification and (5) EU in our interest. These dependent variables were 
used in order to gauge individualsÕ normative beliefs about whether it is the 
responsibility of the EU or the responsibility of individual EU member states to address 
market-generated inequality. The findings in the cross-national case study of the then 
twenty-seven member states of the EU and the single case study of the Republic of 
Ireland demonstrate that individuals are in fact looking for the EU to address market-
generated inequality in their respective member states, and this subsequently has an 
impact on individual-level support for the EU. What is somewhat of an opaque question 
to arise from both analyses is whether the role to be played by the EU in addressing 
inequality supersedes the EU member state, or whether the EUÕs role is one that 
reinforces the European project. Put simply, it may be considered that the EU is being 
called upon to address inequality in a substantive manner, in addition to EU member 
state action or inaction. Therefore, is it the EU or the national governments of EU 
member states that are primarily responsible for the stabilisation of the financial markets 
and domestic and international economics? By conducting a Binary Logistic regression 
analysis on Eurobarometer data from 2009-2013, I will be able to determine whether it 
is the EU or the EU member state which can carry out the most effective action against 
the economic and financial crisis, thus specifically analysing individual-level support 
for the EU.  
7.2: IndividualsÕ Preferences for addressing Economic Insecurity and Market-
Generated Inequality  
The economic crisis has had a wide-ranging and significant effect on the 
economic welfare of individuals in the EU since it began in 2007/8. If the EU is 
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primarily a promoter of the liberal market economy via integration of EU member 
state economies, it is reasonable to expect that those individuals who are pushed or 
perceive themselves or others to be pushed toward a more fragile personal economic 
situation will exhibit reduced support for the EU and on going European integration. 
Kriesi et al (2008) argue that economic competition which is directed by changes in 
the American economy, cultural diversity, competition between national 
governments, and the perceived encroachment of supranational politics have driven 
European societies in the theorized directions of GabelÕs (1998a & 1998b) initial 
contribution of Ôwinners and losersÕ of European integration. However, as analysis 
has demonstrated in Chapter Five (cross-national analysis) and Chapter Six (Irish case 
study) of this inquiry, ÔlosersÕ of European integration are not only ÔlosersÕ with 
regards to European integration, but they are also ÔlosersÕ as a result of EU member 
statesÕ reducing their public sector capacity and political willingness to continue 
fundamental elements of the welfare state for individuals. The findings of my research 
support this understanding in two ways.  
Firstly, those individuals who want inequality to be addressed appear to be 
receptive to further European integration and are dissatisfied with the current 
performance of the EU in this context. The findings in Chapter Five and Chapter Six 
demonstrate that support for European integration via individualsÕ concerns about 
addressing inequality suggests a robust connection with the strong democratic 
enforcement that the EU could potentially offer. It may also be suggested that 
individuals have disapproved of the EUÕs response to the economic crisis so far. 
However, as demonstrated in chapter five and chapter six individuals believe that the 
EU has a positive possible role to play in addressing inequality since the beginning of 
the economic crisis of 2007/8.  Whether the role to be played by the EU in addressing 
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inequality supersedes the EU member state, or whether the EUÕs role is one that 
reinforces the European project is opaque, ambiguous and difficult to discern. It may 
be conceived that the EU is being called upon in order to address inequality in a 
substantive manner, in addition to EU member state action or inaction.   
There is no direct way to assess the findings of Chapter Five and Chapter Six 
as to whether it is the EU or the national governments of EU member states which are 
primarily responsible for the stabilisation of the financial markets and both domestic 
and international economics. However, recent Eurobarometer data (2009-2013) asked 
respondents: ÒIn your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective 
actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?Ó 39  The initial 
responses can be seen in Table 7 (Chapter Five) and Table 11 (Chapter Six) with 
individualsÕ overall preference being for the EU.  
Secondly, it is not merely those individuals who find themselves in a more 
precarious economic position whose concern about inequality affects their support for 
the EU project. It also appears that individualsÕ evaluations of EU support are not 
solely economic but also socio-tropic (Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). Put simply, 
the system can be too unfair, making inequality representative of this as individualsÕ 
assess societal differences in both access to and opportunity within the EU, rather 
than their own individual access. It is apparent from the findings demonstrated in 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six that the economic crisis, which began in 2007/8 has 
affected individual-level support for the EU and the continuation of the EU project. 
However, instead of a new group of concerned economic ÔlosersÕ who are more 
resistant to the EU project (Gabel 1998a & 1998b), there is a more extensive concern 
                                                              
39 Question QC3 in Eurobarometer 72.4 (2009) and Eurobarometer 74.2 (2010). Question QC3a in 
Eurobarometer 76.3 (2011), Eurobarometer 78.1 (2012) and Eurobarometer 80.1 (2013) 
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about inequality and the role of the EU, as well as optimism for the EU project, 
following the onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8.  
In order to tease out the opaque conclusions to be drawn from Chapter Five and 
Chapter Six as to whether the role to be played by the EU in addressing inequality 
supersedes the EU member state, or whether the EUÕs role is one that reinforces the 
European project the socio-tropic nature of individuals attitudes towards the EU project 
will be examined in a Binary Logit Regression model using Eurobarometer data from 
2009-2013. This is conducted to specifically analyse individual-level support for the 
EU.  
7.3: Methods: Conceptualization and Operationalization 
  As demonstrated in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, increased support for the 
EU and the continuation of the EU project suggests that individuals regard the EU as 
an enforcer of democratic political institutions, which appeal to fairness, justice and 
transparency. The theory that combines individualsÕ concern about addressing 
inequality to individual-level support for the EU and national governance rests on the 
notion that citizens seek strong democratic politics to serve as a safeguard against 
market-generated inequalities (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny & Li 2003; 
Whitefield & Loveless 2012). In order to give specificity to whether individuals 
believe it is the EU or the nation state which is best placed to take effective action 
against the economic crisis, it is necessary to build upon the findings of Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six and the theoretical mechanism of this inquiry. Put simply, individuals 
believe that the EU is the mechanism best placed to address market-driven inequality. 
This in turn will increase individual-level support for the EU.  The hypothesis to be 
tested is:  
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H3: The EU is primarily responsible for the stabilisation of the financial 
markets, and domestic and international economics in order to address market 
generated inequalities thus influencing individual-level support for the EU 
To operationalize this hypothesis I use Eurobarometer 2009-2013 data40 to 
examine whether it is the EU or the national governments of EU member states, 
which individuals believe are best placed to take effective action against the economic 
and financial crisis. In order to determine individualsÕ economic insecurity and 
therefore their reliance on either the EU or the EU member state government to 
address their economic insecurity as a result of market-generated inequality, I include 
two determinants of economic insecurity:  
(4) Economic Insecurity: Household  
(5) Economic Insecurity: Impact of Crisis 
By including these two determinants of individualsÕ economic insecurity, this inquiry 
operationalizes the approaches to the understanding of governance, whether this is 
supranational or national. Methodologically, Binary Logit Regression is a type of 
regression analysis where the dependent variable takes one of two values. The 
response variable, or dependent variable, for this analysis is whether the EU is best 
placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis (ÔEU: 
Effective ActionÕ). The explanatory variables are assembled into three groups: 
economic insecurity, ideological congruence and institutional performance, and socio-
demographic variables. Using Binary Logit Regression analysis I run five models of 
effective action against the economic and financial crisis in order to determine 
                                                              
40 Eurobarometer data used between 2009-2013 for this analysis are: Eurobarometer 72.4 (2009), 
Eurobarometer 74.2 (2010), Eurobarometer 76.3 (2011), Eurobarometer 78.1 (2012) & Eurobarometer 
80.1 (2013) 
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individual-level support for the EU since the beginning of the economic and financial 
crisis in 2007/8.  
 
<<Table 12 about here>> 
 
The equation for the binary logistic regression model is:  
Logged odds (EU: effective action) = a + b!!(economic insecurity: household) + b2 
(economic insecurity: impact of crisis) + b3 (prospective socio-economic evaluation) 
+ b4 (satisfaction with democracy) + b5 (age) + b6 (gender) + b7 (education) + b8 
(left ideology) + b8 (right ideology) + b9 (self-reported social class)
41
 
Beginning with the Economic Insecurity independent variables, the 
independent variable ÔEconomic Insecurity: HouseholdÕ asks respondents whether 
they live day to day, whether they know what they will be doing in the next six 
months, and whether they know the long term economic perspective of their 
household. Using the odds ratio of the Binary Logit regression coefficient, which 
demonstrates how much the odds of the dependent variable change for each unit 
change in the independent variable, we can interpret the effect this has on individual-
level support for the EU.  
In 2009, for each unit increase in economic insecurity (with regards to an 
individualsÕ economic circumstances within their household) the odds ratio increased 
by 1.200 (i.e. individuals feeling or perceiving themselves to be economically 
                                                              
41 All Binary Logit Regression models have been tested for multicollinearity with no reported 
problems. 
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insecure with their household finances are 1.200 times more likely to believe that the 
EU is best placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis). 
This increased the overall belief that the EU is best placed to take effective action 
against the economic and financial crisis, rather than an individual EU member state, 
by 20 per cent42. This is a positive relationship yet statistically significant at the 99.9 
per cent level (P≤0.001).  In 2010 for each unit increase in an individuals economic 
insecurity within their household the odds ratio also increased by 1.077 (i.e. 
individuals feeling or perceiving economically insecure with their household finances 
are 1.077 times more likely to believe that the EU is best placed to take effective 
action against the economic and financial crisis). Put simply, every one-unit change 
increase in an individualÕs economic insecurity within their household increases the 
odds of the EU taking effective action against the economic and financial crisis by 7.7 
per cent. This indicates that in 2010, individuals believed that the EU was best placed 
to tackle the economic and financial crisis. This is a positive relationship and displays 
statistical significance at the 95 per cent level (P≤0.05).  
The positive relationship and belief that the EU is best placed to take effective 
action against the economic and financial crisis continued in 2011, 2012 and 2013. In 
2011 for each unit increase in economic insecurity (with regards to an individualsÕ 
economic circumstances within their household), the odds ratio increased by 1.200. 
This is a positive, statistically significant (P≤0.001) relationship. Again, this boosted 
the overall belief that the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis, rather than an individual EU member state, by 20 per 
cent. In 2012 and 2013, for each unit increase in economic insecurity with regards to 
                                                              
42 This percentage is derived by the following formula: Logit Exp (B) coefficient -1 * 100=percentage 
increase or decrease in the odds ratio  
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an individualsÕ economic circumstances within their household the odds ratio 
increased by 1.169 and 1.093 respectively. These are both positive relationships and 
are statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level (P≤0.001). It also demonstrates 
that individuals believe that the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic crisis by 16.9 per cent and 9.3 per cent respectively, indicating increased 
individual-level support for the EU.  
The second economic insecurity variable ÔEconomic Insecurity: Impact of 
CrisisÕ asks respondents whether the impact of the economic crisis on the job market 
has reached its peak or that the worst is still to come. In 2009 for each unit increase in 
economic insecurity with regards to the impact of the economic crisis on the job 
market the odds ratio decreased by 0.821. This indicates that a one-unit change 
increase in an individualÕs economic insecurity with regards to the impact of the 
economic crisis on the job market decreases the odds of the EU taking effective action 
against the economic and financial crisis by 17.9 per cent. This also demonstrates that 
the odds of individuals believing that the EU is best placed to take effective action 
against the economic and financial crisis decreases as the impact of the economic 
crisis on the job market (Economic Insecurity: Impact of the Crisis) increases.  There 
is a negative relationship between these two variables: however, what is noteworthy is 
that individualsÕ views on the impact of the economic crisis on the job market are 
statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level (P≤0.001). This pattern continues in 
2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. With each unit increase in economic insecurity with 
regards to the impact of the economic crisis on the job market, the odds ratio 
decreased by 0.752, 0.798, 0.774 and 0.646 respectively.  This indicates that a one-
unit change increase in an individualsÕ economic insecurity with regards to the impact 
of the economic crisis on the job market decreases the odds of the EU taking effective 
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action against the economic and financial crisis by 24.8 per cent in 2010, 24.8 per 
cent in 2011, 22.6 per cent in 2012 and 35.4 per cent in 2013. The negative 
relationship between these two variables and the statistical significance at the 99.9 per 
cent level (P≤0.001) also continues. Overall, from 2009 to 2013 the odds of 
individuals believing that the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis decreases as the impact of the economic crisis on the 
job market decreases. This suggests an overall negative relationship, indicating a 
decline in individual level support for the EU. However, the consistent statistical 
significance at the 99.9 per cent level (P≤0.001) in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
is a noteworthy finding.  
For the ideological congruence and institutional performance variables, both 
ÔProspective socio-economic evaluationÕ and  ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ provide 
noteworthy findings. For ÔProspective socio-economic evaluationÕ each respondent 
was asked whether the economic situation in their country will be better, worse or the 
same in the next twelve months. In 2009 and 2010, the odds ratios increased by 1.005 
and 1.025 respectively and are both positive relationships. This demonstrates that the 
odds that individuals believe that the EU is best placed to take effective action against 
the economic crisis increased by 0.5% in 2009 and 0.25% in 2010. This also indicates 
increased individual-level support for the EU. For each unit increase in an 
individualsÕ prospective socio-economic evaluation, the odds ratio decreased in 2011 
(0.999), 2012 (0.967) and 2013 (0.939). This indicates that there is a negative 
relationship. In addition, there is no statistical significance with the exception of 2013, 
which is statistically significant at the 95 per cent level (P≤0.05). This demonstrates 
that a one-unit change increase in an individualsÕ prospective socio-economic 
evaluation decreases the odds of the EU taking effective action against the economic 
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and financial crisis by 0.1 per cent in 2011, 3.3 per cent in 2012 and 6.1 per cent in 
2013.  
For ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ, each respondent was asked whether on the 
whole they were very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy works in their country (i.e. their EU member state). 
Unfortunately, the satisfaction with democracy variable was not asked in 2010. 
However, in 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013 for each unit increase in an individualÕs 
satisfaction with democracy in his or her EU member state the odds ratio increased by 
1.083, 1.098, 1.120 and 1.128 respectively. In addition, the relationship between and 
individuals ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ in their EU member state and an 
individuals belief that the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis is statistically significant at the 99 per cent level 
(P≤0.01) in 2009 and 2011 and at the 99.9 per cent level in 2012 and 2013 (P≤0.001). 
Overall, ÔSatisfaction with democracyÕ displays a consistently positive relationship 
from 2009-201343 and demonstrates that the odds that individuals believing that the 
EU is best placed to take effective action against the economic crisis increased by 8.3 
per cent in 2009, 9.8 per cent in 2011, 2 per cent in 2012 and 2.8 per cent in 2013.  
For the socio-demographic variables from 2009-2013, ÔageÕ displays a 
uniformly negative, yet statistically significant relationship at the 99.9 per cent level 
(P≤0.001). In 2009, for each unit increase in an individualsÕ age the odds ratio 
decreased by 0.932. This indicates that a one-unit change increase in an individuals 
age decreases the odds of that individual believing the EU is best placed to take 
effective action against the economic and financial crisis by 6.8 per cent. In 2010 for 
                                                              
43 With the exception of 2010 as the Satisfaction with Democracy question was not asked. 
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each unit increase in an individualÕs age, the odds ratio decreased by 0.886. This 
indicates that a one-unit change increase in an individualÕs age decreases the odds of 
that individual believing the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis by 11.4 per cent. In 2011, 2012 and 2013 for each unit 
increase in an individualÕs age the odds ratio decreased by 0.920, 0.914 and 0.911 
respectively. This indicates that a one-unit change increase in an individuals age 
decreased the odds of that individual believing the EU is best placed to take effective 
action against the economic and financial crisis by 8 per cent in 2011, 8.6 per cent in 
2012 and 8.9 per cent in 2013.  
For ÔgenderÕ, this is an almost uniformly positive (with the exception of 2010) 
relationship from 2009-2013, as well as being a statically significant relationship at 
the 95 per cent level (P≤0.05) in 2010, 99 per cent level (P≤0.01) in 2009 and 2013, 
and the 99.9 per cent level in 2011 (P≤0.001). In 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, for each 
unit increase in an individualÕs gender the odds ratio increased by 1.122 (2009), 1.144 
(2011), 1.106 (2012) and 1.150 (2013). This indicates that a one-unit change increase 
in an individuals gender (i.e. whether that individual is male or not) increased the 
odds of that individual believing the EU is best placed to take effective action against 
the economic and financial crisis by 2.2 per cent in 2009, 4.2 per cent in 2011, 10.6 
per cent in 2012 and 15 per cent in 2013. In 2010, for each unit increase in an 
individualsÕ gender the odds ratio decreased by 0.906 which demonstrates that a one-
unit change increase in an individualÕs gender decreases the odds of that individual 
believing the EU is best placed to take effective action against the economic and 
financial crisis by 9.4 per cent.  
For ÔeducationÕ, each respondent was asked how old he/she was when he/she 
stopped full-time education. The positive relationship between education and EU 
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effective action is almost uniformly positive (with the exception of 2010). In 2009, 
2011, 2012 and 2013 for each unit increase in an individualsÕ education the odds ratio 
increased by 1.045, 1.116, 1.064 and 1.115 respectively (i.e. individuals with a higher 
level of education are 1.063, 1.111, 1.084 and 1.168 times more likely to believe that 
the EU is best placed to take effective action against the economic and financial 
crisis). This boosted the odds and the overall belief that the EU is best placed to take 
effective action against the economic and financial crisis, rather than an individual EU 
member state, by 4.5 per cent in 2009, 1.6 per cent in 2011, 6.4 per cent in 2012 and 
6.8 per cent in 2013. In 2011, for each unit increase in an individualsÕ education the 
odds ratio decreased by 0.826. This indicates that a one-unit change increase in an 
individualÕs education decreases the odds of that individual believing the EU is best 
placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis by 17.4 per 
cent. However, what is also noteworthy about education is that from 2009-2013, 
whether the relationship is positive or negative education is a statistically significant 
relationship at the 95 per cent level (P≤0.05) in 2010 and the 99.9 per cent level 
(P≤0.001) in 2011 and 2013.  
For ÔLeft/Right self-placementÕ, respondents were asked in political matters 
whether their position is of the ÔleftÕ or the ÔrightÕ on a ten-point scale. From Table 8 
we can see that ÔLeft/Right Self PlacementÕ displays a negative relationship in 2009 
and 2010. Left/Right Self Placement also displays a statistically significant 
relationship at the 99.9% level with P≤0.001) in 201044. In 2009 and 2010 for each 
unit increase in an individualÕs Ôleft/right self-placementÕ the odds ratio decreased by 
0.974 and 0.992 respectively. Put simply, individuals exhibiting a left/right leaning 
                                                              
44 Please note that Left/Right Self Placement was not asked in Standard Eurobarometer 76.3, 78.1 and 
80.1 is omitted from this Binary Logit Regression model.  
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political ideology are 0.974 and 0.992 times more unlikely to believe that the EU is 
best placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis. This 
indicates that a one-unit change increase in an individuals right ideology decreases the 
odds of individuals believing the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis by 2.6per cent in 2009 and 0.8 per cent in 2010.  
Finally, with regards to ÔSelf-reported social classÕ, respondents were asked 
whether they regard themselves and their household as belonging to the working 
class, middle class or upper class of society. In 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 for 
each unit increase in Ôself-reported social classÕ the odds ratio increased by 1.154, 
1.053, 1.114, 1.125 and 1.018 respectively. This is also a positive relationship and 
statistically significant in 2009 at the 99.9 per cent level (P≤0.001) and 2010, 2011 
and 2012 at the 99 per cent level (P≤0.01). This indicates that a one-unit change 
increase in an individuals Ôself reported social classÕ increases the odds of that 
individual believing the EU is best placed to take effective action against the 
economic and financial crisis by 5.4 per cent in 2009, 5.3 per cent in 2010, 1.4 per 
cent in 2011, 2.5 per cent in 2012 and 1.8 per cent in 2013.  
While they are not presented in Table 8 for space considerations, I run twenty-
seven dummy variables as multi-level, fixed effect models that allow for random 
variation on the intercept as the mean level of support controlling for the individual-
level (i.e. each EU member state). Nearly all of the EU member statesÕ dummy 
variables are statistically significant, which suggests cross-national variation in 
support for the EU.  
This is understandable as the standard model of EU support greatly relies on 
national-level variables that play a role in shaping popular perceptions of the EU 
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(Kritzinger, 2003). Several scholarly works have presented evidence that popular 
perceptions of the EU are contextualized by national institutional factors (Anderson 
1998; Norris 1999; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002). Furthermore 
individualsÕ evaluation of the EU depends on nation-state performance (Anderson 
1998; Janssen 1991). As of recently, however, national-level contextual factors matter 
differently. As EU member states move from lower levels of economic and political 
performance, citizens move from economic to political criteria (Anderson & Reichert 
1996; Gabel 1998; Carrubba 2001; Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010). The underlying 
assumption remains that further EU expansion implies continued market 
liberalisation. Yet what individuals may regard as excessive economic risk and 
insecurity via their perception of inequality may have little to do with inequality per 
se but rather on whether the economy as a whole provides high living standards and 
dynamic economic development.  
As demonstrated in Table 12, Logistic regression assumes that all of the 
independent variables in the model have an additive effect on the logged odds of the 
dependent variable (i.e. ÔEU: effective actionÕ.) However, logistic regression also 
assumes that the independent variables in the model have an interactive effect on the 
probability of the dependent variable. Therefore, the effect of any independent 
variable will vary depending on the level of the dependent variable (i.e. in this inquiry 
ÔEU: effective actionÕ) being analysed. In order to summarise these interaction effects 
I use the Sample Averages Method to compare probabilities across groups.  By using 
the Sample Averages Method, I examine the effects of each independent variable in 
the model while holding all other independent variables constant at their sample 
means. This allows an analysis to take place in order to determine the effect of each 
variable on individuals who are ÔaverageÕ on all the other variables being studied.  
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The following equation converts the logged odds of EU: effective action into a 
predicted probability:  
Equation: Probability of EU: Effective action = Exp(Logged odds of EU: Effective 
action)/1 + Exp(Logged odds of EU: Effective Action)) 
According to this formula we retrieve the probability of EU: effective action 
by first raising the natural log base (e) to the power of the logged odds of ÔEU: 
effective actionÕ. We then divide this number by the quantity one plus (e) raised to the 
power of the logged odds of ÔEU: effective actionÕ.  
The predictor variables of ÔEconomic Insecurity: HouseholdÕ and ÔEconomic 
Insecurity: Impact of CrisisÕ in the Binary Logit regression analysis demonstrate a 
uniformly statistical significant relationship with ÔEU: effective actionÕ. In particular, 
ÔEconomic Insecurity: HouseholdÕ exhibits a positive relationship across all models 
from 2009-2013. This boosts the overall belief that individualsÕ who perceive or feel 
themselves to be economically insecure believe that the EU is the mechanism best 
placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis, rather than an 
individual EU member state and this subsequently influences individual-level support 
for the EU. As a consequence of this, in order to calculate the predicted probability of 
ÔEU effective actionÕ for individualsÕ attitudes towards the level of economic 
insecurity they perceive or feel themselves to be experiencing, I hold individualsÕ 
economic insecurity and the impact of the crisis on the job market constant at the 
sample mean. By holding ÔEconomic Insecurity: Impact of CrisisÕ constant at the 
sample mean, this allows individualsÕ economic insecurity within their household to 
vary, thus establishing the full effect of individualsÕ household economic insecurity 
upon their belief as to whether the EU is best placed to take effective action against 
  250 
the economic and financial crisis. Put simply, the more economically insecure 
individuals feel or perceive themselves to be within their household, the more it will 
have an effect on whether individuals believe the EU is best placed to take effective 
action against the economic and financial crisis. This in turn will demonstrate 
individual-level support for the EU and the European project.  
In 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 those individuals who continue to 
perceive themselves to be economically insecure within their household but who 
know what they will be doing (economically) in the next twelve months or have a 
long term perspective (i.e. one to two years) in relation to their household financial 
and economic situation also demonstrate an increased probability that the EU is best 
placed to take effective action against the economic crisis and financial crisis. This 
highlights individualsÕ preference for the EU to take effective action against the 
economic crisis even when they are not experiencing the worst-case scenario of 
economic insecurity (i.e. living day to day) which in-turn increases individual-level 
support for the EU.  
In 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 the relationship between EU effective 
action and the economic insecurity an individual perceives within his/her household 
finds an increase in the ratio of the predicted probabilities between those individuals 
who are confident in terms of their current household economic situation of what they 
will be doing economically in the next six months, and those individuals who have a 
long term perspective of their household economic and financial circumstances by 
12.37 in 2009, 22.01 in 2010, 16.30 in 2011, 0.4 in 2012 and 7.09 in 2013. An 
individualsÕ decision shifts in favour of the belief that the EU is best placed to take 
effective action against the economic and financial crisis when individuals who 
perhaps do not feel or perceive themselves to be as economically insecure in terms of 
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their household financial and economic situation from a probability of less than 12 to 
a probability of greater than 12 in 2009, from a probability of less than 22 to a 
probability of greater than 22 in 2010, from a probability of less than 16 to a 
probability of greater than 16 in 2011, from a probability of less than 0.4 to a 
probability of greater than 0.4 in 2012 and from a probability of less than 7 to a 
probability of greater than 7 in 2013. Thus, those individuals who perceive 
themselves to be a little more economically secure with regards to their economic 
situation within their household continue to exhibit increased support for the EU. 
7.4: Discussion 
The findings here are evocative of individualsÕ attitudes and orientations 
towards the EU, as they determine individual-level assessments of liberal market 
economies via personal economic insecurity in the twenty-seven member states of the 
EU. As a result, this has allowed an analysis to take place of the evolving nature of 
mass public opinion toward the EU, which has incorporated new economic realities 
since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 to the present.  
Throughout this inquiry, the test of the theoretical mechanism examines 
whether the liberal market economy is too unequal. Put simply, the liberal market 
economy has either failed to create adequate economic and social opportunities or it 
has provided these economic and social prospects in an unequal manner, and 
individuals in the twenty-seven EU member states recognise this. In this chapter 
specifically, the theoretical mechanism has continued to be tested but with the 
addition of an individualsÕ economic insecurity via their perceptions of inequality as a 
result of the imbalanced distribution of the goods of society. By analysing 
individualsÕ economic insecurity as well as their beliefs about whether it is the 
national governments of EU member states or the EU itself which is best placed to 
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take effective action against the economic crisis, this has allowed an examination to 
take place to specify individual-level support for the EU. When tested, the theoretical 
mechanism is robust when controlling for all other existing explanations, as 
ÔEconomic Insecurity: householdÕ is positively correlated and statistically significant 
from 2009-2013. While ÒEconomic Insecurity: Impact of CrisisÕ is negatively 
correlated, there is some correlation and it is uniformly statistically significant at the 
99.9 per cent level (P≤0.001) from 2009-2013. From these findings, it can be inferred 
that individualsÕ attitudes and orientations towards economic insecurity in the twenty-
seven member states of the EU increases support for the EU, as respondents regard 
the EU as best placed to take effective action against the economic and financial 
crisis, which therefore increased individual-level mass public opinion support for the 
EU from 2009-2013.  
This chapter was built upon the findings in Chapter Five and Chapter Six as to 
whether it was specifically the EU or the national governments of EU member states 
which are best placed to take effective action against the economic and financial 
crisis, in light of individuals attitudes towards economic insecurity via, and as a result 
of, the market-generated inequality  individuals experience within the EU since the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. From the Binary Logit 
Regression analysis, I have demonstrated that individual-level support for the EU 
since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 up until 2013 
increases support for the EU, and not the belief that the national governments of EU 
member states are best placed to take effective action against the economic and 
financial crisis. This is an interesting and noteworthy finding as in the cross-national 
analysis of the EU twenty-seven member states in Chapter Five (see Table 5 and 
Table 6) individuals responses to whether it is the EU or the national government of 
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the EU member state fare equally. Meanwhile, in the single case study of Ireland in 
Chapter Six (see Table 10) individualsÕ regard the Irish state as being much less 
effective in its action to manage the effects of the economic and financial crisis and 
demonstrate a clear preference for the EU to take effective action against the crisis.   
Previously, in Chapter Five and Chapter Six it was posited that for individuals 
in the EU, the question of how to take effective action against the economic and 
financial crisis did not have a clear answer given the discrepancies between the 
preferences for effective action against the crisis at the national level and the 
supranational level (see Table 5, Table 6 and Table 10). However what the analysis in 
this chapter has achieved is that across the twenty-seven EU member states there is 
indeed a preference for the EU to take effective action against the economic and 
financial crisis from those individuals who feel or perceive themselves to be 
economically insecure. Furthermore, and in conjunction with the findings of Chapter 
Five and Chapter Six, it is clear that individuals in the EU want more, not less, action 
from the EU. This demonstrates that the EU is the institutional-driving force best 
placed to address individualsÕ economic insecurity as a result of market-generated 
inequality  since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2007/8 and up until the 
present (2013). The analysis here has demonstrated two findings: firstly, that the EU 
is widely presumed to be the remedy against the economic and financial crisis; 
secondly, that economic insecurity as a result of market-generated inequality, which 
individuals are feeling, or perceiving in their daily lives needs to be addressed by the 
EU. This in turn has allowed an analysis to take place of the changes in the level of 
individual support for the EU from 2009-2013. Overall, the findings here demonstrate 
that, since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2007/8, individuals and mass public 
opinion within the EU continue to exhibit robust support for the EU.  
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7.5: Conclusion  
The findings here are consistent and work in conjunction with the findings in 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six that individual-level attitudes and orientations towards 
the EU are undergoing a predominant shift. The alteration in individualsÕ attitudes and 
orientations towards the EU demonstrates that there is an inadequacy in the 
understanding of individual-level support for the EU during a period of dramatic and 
demanding economic and financial change (i.e. since the onset of the economic crisis 
in 2007/8 up until the present).  
As previously argued in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, a transformation in 
individualsÕ thinking, in particular the development of a normative attitude that the 
liberal market economy should be fair versus equal and that institutional mechanisms 
(i.e. the EU or the national governments of EU member states) should function in an 
egalitarian manner to reduce market distortions is not an excessive claim. In this 
chapter, the positive correlation between economic insecurity (via market generated 
inequality) and effective action taken by the EU against the economic and financial 
crisis specifically demonstrates individual-level support for the EU, as mass public 
opinion support for the EU is consistently positive and robust up until the present 
(2013). Individuals are indeed looking for the EU to address economic insecurity and 
market-generated inequality in their respective EU member states and this 
subsequently has an impact on individual-level support for the EU. This chapter has 
drawn upon the findings in Chapter Five and Chapter Six and addressed the 
proposition that the role to be played by the EU in order to address economic 
insecurity as a result of market-generated inequality does in fact supersede the EU 
member state and therefore reinforces individual-level support for the EU project. 
Individuals are calling upon the EU to address both inequality and economic 
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insecurity in a substantive manner as a result of EU member state action or inaction. 
The findings in Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven demonstrate that, for 
individuals, the EU is best placed to address market generated inequality and as a 
consequence of this individuals economic insecurity. These individuals believe that it 
is the EU which is placed best to tae effective action against the economic crisis. 
These findings increase individual-level mass public opinion support for the EU in a 
variety of different ways. However, what is clear is that support for the EU is not 
declining.  
The following chapter will outline the findings and results of this inquiry in 
further detail and demonstrate that the central independent variable of inequality and 
the subsequent independent variable of economic insecurity are innovative and 
noteworthy determinants of individual-level support for the EU since the beginning of 
the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
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Tables 
Table 12: Odds Ratios of Logit Coefficients: EU best placed to take effective 
action against economic and financial crisis 2009-2013 
!! Year 
Coefficient 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Economic Insecurity    
Household  1.200*** 1.077* 1.200*** 1.169*** 1.093** 
Impact of Crisis 0.821*** 0.752*** 0.798*** 0.774*** 0.646*** 
Ideological Congruence & Institutional 
Performance    
Prospective Socio-Economic Evaluation 1.005 1.025 0.999 0.967 0.939* 
Satisfaction with Democracy 1.083** N/A 1.098** 1.120*** 1.128*** 
Sociodemographic Variables    
Age  0.932*** 0.886*** 0.920*** 0.914*** 0.911*** 
Gender 1.122** 0.906* 1.144** 1.016 1.150** 
Education  1.045 0.826* 1.116*** 1.064* 1.115*** 
Left/Right Self Placement  0.974 0.992*** N/A N/A N/A 
Self-Reported Social Class 1.154*** 1.053** 1.114** 1.125** 1.018 
Country Dummies not shown for space 
considerations 
 Constant  7.774*** 3.897 14.139*** 25.037*** 6.985** 
No. of Obs (N) 8970 8248 9231 9248 10045 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1: Introduction  
This chapter will conclude this research and demonstrate that selecting the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 as the salient moment to examine individualsÕ 
perceptions of inequality was accurate and appropriate, as inequality used as a 
determinant of mass public opinion support does in fact affect individual-level 
support for the EU. The chapter will give a brief overview of the theory of inequality 
used to determine individual-levels of support for the EU as well as assessing the 
normative implications inequality has within the debate surrounding mass public 
opinion and support for the EU. The chapter will also highlight future research 
directions as a result of the findings demonstrated as part of this inquiry.  
8.2: A Theory of Inequality, the Role of Inequality and how it affects Support for 
the European Union  
This inquiry has posited that following the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2007/8 there is a greater percentage of people who may not be objectively 
ÔpoorÕ but nevertheless feel themselves to be at a heightened risk of economic 
adversity due to rising inequality and economic problems both in their respective 
member states and the EU. These individuals are likely to be more supportive of 
income redistribution as a means to minimize their own economic insecurity.  
The theoretical rationale for linking inequality and support for the EU has 
used the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 as the salient 
moment and has focused upon theoretical determinants such as instrumental self-
interest, SES, social location, democratic political institutions, and the liberal market 
economy. These determinants are examined as to how they play a fundamental role in 
determining how inequality can be identified as the central independent variable in 
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this inquiry. In doing so, an analysis has also taken place of how individuals in the EU 
perceive both the notion of inequality and the way in which individualÕs normative 
notions of inequality affect support for the EU.  
The role of inequality and how it affects support for the EU focuses upon how 
inequality has an influence on support for the EU, both directly and indirectly, at the 
individual-level. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the examination of inequality as 
a determinant of EU support is founded upon a value-based position that reflects 
individualÕs support for the principle that democratic institutions should serve as an 
arbiter of market-generated inequality. In order to demonstrate that this measure of 
inequality is not a proxy for other value-based positions and can therefore be 
independently predictive of support for the EU, I analyse how inequality is correlated 
with both ideological and socio-economic positions: put simply, how inequality is 
correlated with variables that centre upon instrumental self-interest, social and 
economic status, social location and political institutions and the market.  I use the on 
going financial crisis of 2007/8 as a salient moment to activate citizensÕ concerns 
about overall economic performance, suggesting that there are more individuals if not 
actually doing worse economically, then at least feeling or perceiving as if they are 
achieving less economically. As these evaluations are not only economic but also 
socio-tropic, it is possible to assess the liberal market economy via the spectrum of 
inequality, highlighting that the market may in fact be too unfair. This makes 
inequality representative at the individual-level as individuals begin to assess societal 
opportunities in terms of access to and opportunity within the EU, in turn creating 
inequality as a determinant for support for the EU.  
For individuals, the perception of inequality is centred upon the failure of the 
market to reform and produce both increased social mobility and increased 
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opportunities (Loveless, 2010). The simplest form of relationship is that inequality 
produces perceptions of inequality (Loveless & Whitefield 2011, p. 241) with this 
relationship being studied in two approaches. The first approach draws upon 
empirical evidence by Marmot (2001) and Alesina et al (2004) in their analyses of life 
chances and happiness. According to this research individuals may be more likely to 
perceive inequality in countries where absolute levels of inequality are objectively 
higher. The second approach highlights how perceptions of inequality may be 
determined by changes in absolute levels of inequality in a nation state. A high level 
of inequality may in fact be constant and perceived by individuals as ÔnormalÕ, and is 
therefore  ÔunseenÕ by citizens. Kreidl (2000) posits that these objective measures of 
inequality may only shape individualsÕ perceptions when citizens notice a significant 
change in the extent of inequality from previous ÔnormalÕ levels. Both of these 
approaches of individualsÕ perceptions of inequality have a direct effect on support 
for the EU.  
The notion of normative commitments refers to individualsÕ stances on how 
the economy, welfare state and political system should operate. Normative values 
reflect and reply to SES and social locations in an important way. Individuals who are 
normatively opposed to liberal markets per se or individuals who have robust, state 
centred and welfare state orientated views of liberal market regulations are more 
likely to review levels of inequality to be excessive. When these normative beliefs 
about the perceptions of inequality are combined with individuals instrumental self-
interest, SES, social location, and views on democratic political institutions, these 
normative values will have a direct effect on support for the EU.  
  The findings in Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven reiterate the 
direct effect and normative notions of inequality. In Chapter Five, the findings from 
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the cross-national case study of the twenty-seven EU member states demonstrate that 
individualsÕ support for the EU as a mechanism to address inequality is independently 
and strongly correlated with negative support for the EU as it is in its current form 
and positive support toward a deepening of European integration. This finding is 
dependent on individualsÕ socio-economic location, making it a common explanation 
of support for the EU as well as normatively supportive of stronger democratic 
institutional performance.  
As a consequence of this finding the varying role the EU has played since the 
onset of the economic crisis of 2007/8 can also be examined. Previous research has 
demonstrated that inequality not only intensifies individual-level concerns about 
economic stability, but it also increases demands in democratic politics (Whitefield & 
Loveless 2013). In the context of increasing GDP and rising inequality- a state of 
affairs which, given the findings in Chapter Five describes the majority of EU 
member states-most of these member states want to share economic growth. Those 
EU member states- which do not want to share economic growth, support the notion 
that democratic political institutions should address inequality. This in turn increases 
support for democratic regimes (i.e. the EU) and reinforces substantive democratic 
national governance. In addition, increasing demands from individuals for re-
distributional fairness and justice via EU regime legitimacy, whether it is perceived or 
actual, is a means to address market-generated inequality in the EU since the onset of 
the economic crisis of 2007/8. 
In Chapter Six the findings from the single case study of the Republic of 
Ireland are consistent with the findings in Chapter Five and are overall suggestive that 
individuals in Ireland acknowledge attitudes and orientations toward the EU which 
are undergoing a predominant shift. This alteration in attitudes and orientations 
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towards the EU at the individual-level in Ireland demonstrates that there is an 
inadequacy in the understanding of support for the EU in a period of dramatic and 
demanding economic change. The desire among individualsÕ in Ireland to address 
inequality is strongly correlated with negative support for the EU as it is, but 
positively correlated with a deepening of EU integration. This finding is again 
dependent on individualsÕ socioeconomic status and social location, making it a 
common explanation of support for the EU. It also makes it normatively supportive of 
stronger democratic institutional performance.  
Finally the findings in Chapter Seven (a second cross-national case study of 
the twenty-seven EU member states, using Standard Eurobarometer data from 2009-
2013) demonstrates that individual-level support for the EU and mass public opinion 
support for the EU are consistently positive and robust up until the present (2013). 
Individuals are indeed looking for the EU to address economic insecurity and market-
generated inequality in their EU member state and this subsequently has an impact on 
individual-level support for the EU. By drawing upon the previous findings of 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six, the results in Chapter Seven have specified that the 
role to be played by the EU in addressing economic insecurity as a result of market-
generated inequality does in fact supersede the EU member state, and therefore 
reinforces individual-level support for the EU project.  
In Chapter Five and Chapter Six the central independent variable of inequality 
is asked in the context of the post-economic crisis and therefore roots the conceptual 
basis for inequality on the principle that inequality is generated by liberal market 
economies and that it is the responsibility of institutions to disperse political power in 
order to address inequality (Bartels 2008; Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli & Gelleny 2008). 
From this, my understanding of individualsÕ existing normative attitudes is based 
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upon the belief that the market should be fair versus purely equal and that democracy 
should function in either a roughly egalitarian or minimally majoritarian manner in 
order to prevent inevitable market distortions. The empirical Chapters of Five and Six 
establish an in-depth analysis of individual-level normative attitudes towards 
addressing inequality in a cross-variation analysis of the twenty-seven member states 
of the EU and a single case-study of the Republic of Ireland.  
The examination of individual-level normative attitudes towards inequality 
demonstrates that inequality is correlated with both ideological and socio-economic 
status with the on-going economic and financial crisis used as the salient moment to 
activate individualsÕ concerns with regards to overall economic performance of EU 
member states (Chapter Five) and the Republic of Ireland (Chapter Six). The 
theoretical findings from the cross-variation analysis of the twenty-seven EU member 
states and the single case study of the Republic of Ireland have highlighted 
empirically that there are more individuals in the twenty-seven member states of the 
EU and the Republic of Ireland who feel or perceive themselves to be achieving less 
economically.  
As a consequence, this has allowed individuals across all twenty-seven 
member states of the EU and indeed in the Republic of Ireland to determine what 
continued European integration means to them as either a ÔwinnerÕ or a ÔloserÕ of the 
EU project. However, being a ÔloserÕ of the EU project is not restricted to variations 
in individual income. It is in fact the unfair distribution of the goods of society, which 
has placed more individuals in a more fragile socio-economic state or made these 
individuals feel as if they are in a more precarious socio-economic state. The 
variations in how individuals benefit from and share in aggregate economic growth 
and how those alterations in economic growth are distributed are revealed in 
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individualsÕ concerns about inequality. Therefore the theoretical findings that 
individuals may not be de fact ÔpoorÕ or ÔlosersÕ in a strict economic sense, i.e. 
according to their individual income, many individuals across the twenty-seven 
member states of the EU and the Republic of Ireland perceive themselves to be closer 
to a ÔloserÕ of the European project since the onset of the economic crisis.  
By using EES 2009 data and conducting a HLM analysis in Chapter Five to 
examine the cross-variation in the twenty-seven EU member states and a OLS 
Multiple Regression analysis in Chapter Six to examine the single case study of 
Ireland the inquiry was able to gauge individualsÕ normative beliefs about whether it 
is the responsibility of the EU or the responsibility of individual EU member states to 
address liberal market-generated inequality. The theoretical findings from the cross-
national case study of the twenty-seven member states of the EU and the single case 
study of the Republic of Ireland demonstrated that individuals are in fact looking 
towards the EU, and not individual EU member states, to address market-generated 
inequality. This subsequently has a positive impact on individual-level support for the 
EU since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.    
However, a limitation which arises from the HLM and OLS Multiple 
Regression analysis in Chapter Five and Chapter Six is whether the role to be played 
by the EU in addressing inequality supplants the individual EU member state or 
whether the role to be played by the EU is one that reinforces the European project. It 
may be considered that the EU is being called upon by individualÕs to address 
inequality in a substantive manner as a result of inaction by EU member states. This 
poses the question as to whether it is the EU or national governments of EU member 
states, which are primarily responsible for the stabilisation of financial markets and 
domestic and international economics.  
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In Chapter Seven by using Eurobarometer data from 2009-2013 and 
conducting a Binary Logistic regression analysis the theoretical mechanism that the 
liberal market economy has either failed to create adequate economic and social 
opportunities or it has provided these economic and social prospects in an unequal 
manner, continues to be tested but with the addition of individualsÕ economic 
insecurity via their perceptions of inequality as a result of the imbalanced distribution 
of the goods of society. The theoretical findings from this analysis demonstrates 
empirically that it is the EU and not the national governments of EU member states 
which are best placed to take effective action against the economic and financial crisis 
and therefore address individual concerns about their own economic insecurity as a 
result of the market-generated inequality they have experienced since the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis in 2007/8 to the present.  
In either of these cases, the theoretical findings in Chapter Five and Chapter 
Six empirically demonstrate that the EU is the institution best placed to address 
market-generated inequality cross-nationally (EU twenty-seven member states) and 
nationally (Republic of Ireland) while Chapter Seven empirically reiterates that it is 
the EU and not the nation state to address individuals economic insecurity as a 
consequence of market-generated inequality. All of the above theoretical findings 
indicate positive support for the EU since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis.  
The thesis has the potential to empirically track the dynamic change in 
individual-level support for the EU over time by continuing to include inequality in 
the mass public opinion support for the EU model therefore moving beyond the 
economic crisis but also examining specifically the impact of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8. Inequality as a determinant of EU support can continue to 
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examine individual-level normative notions of support for the EU beyond the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 and can examine the effect on support for the 
EU and whether it remains a salient issue.  Individual-level concerns about inequality 
and economic insecurity also have the potential longitudinally to influence policy-
making at both the national and EU-level.  
Beyond Economic Crises 
Firstly, as demonstrated throughout this inquiry inequality is an innovative and 
noteworthy determinant of EU support in particular since the onset of the economic 
and financial crisis and should therefore continue to be used in the model of EU 
support. In doing so, theoretical determinants of support for the EU such as 
instrumental self-interest, SES, social location, democratic political institutions and 
the liberal market economy can continue to be examined in order to determine a) how 
individuals perceive the notion or concept of inequality and b) how these normative 
notions of inequality affect support for the EU.  From examining the notion of 
inequality and the normative notion of inequality the insertion/inclusion of it as an 
independent variable in future models for EU support moves inequality beyond the 
2007/8 economic and financial crisis and allows the model of EU support to 
empirically track socio-economic and socio-political attitudes in relation to inequality 
and economic beyond the 2007/8 economic and financial crisis.   
Examining the Impact of Economic and Financial Crises  
While there are signs of economic recovery in the EU problems continue to 
persist, which as demonstrated in this inquiry, are having a significant impact on 
individuals political and social attitudes towards both the EU and the nation state.  
The economic and financial crisis has made more people more aware of the need to 
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address inequality. The thesis has demonstrated that since the onset of the economic 
crisis there is a greater percentage of people who perceive themselves to be at 
heightened economic crisis and as a consequence of this these individuals are more 
supportive of income redistribution as a means to minimize their own economic 
insecurity.  By continuing to examine inequality and economic insecurity 
longitudinally, calls by individuals of the need to address inequality could influence 
policy-making at both the nation state and EU-level. These calls to address inequality 
are in relation to the functioning of the liberal-market economy and to the feasibility 
of current austerity measures both of which will increase support for the EU given 
empirical findings in this inquiry that the EU is the institution best placed to address 
market-generated inequality.  
Overall, this inquiry demonstrates that individuals are calling upon the EU to 
address both inequality and economic insecurity in a substantive manner, as a result 
of EU member state action or inaction. The findings in Chapter Five, Chapter Six and 
Chapter Seven demonstrate that for individuals the EU is best placed to address 
market generated inequality and individualsÕ economic insecurity.  
8.3: Normative Implications  
From this inquiry, are we able to conclude that inequality has contributed to 
individual-level attitudes and behaviour towards the EU since the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8? IndividualsÕ perceptions of inequality exert 
an influence not independently but as a consequence of individualsÕ choices (i.e. 
whether individuals perceive or feel inequality). That is so say that since the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis in 2007/8, inequality has been regarded 
by individuals as a re-orientation of their attitudes to the new and challenging political 
and economic order within the EU and has thus been a means of attitudinal change. In 
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some aspects this undermines the long-standing tradition within political science of 
the causal rather than the correlated.  However, I argue that inequality represents a 
political choice for individuals. Put simply, whether individuals feel or perceive that 
inequality increases or decreases support for the EU is a political choice which in turn 
entails observable political consequences. That is the causal argument. Individuals 
within the EU engage in the political choice of whether they perceive or feel 
inequality since the onset of the economic and financial crisis and this in turn has an 
impact on whether they believe that inequality needs to be addressed. If individuals 
believe that inequality needs to be addressed, they then assess whether it is the 
responsibility of the EU to address inequality. How individuals perceive, feel and 
experience inequality enables these choices.  
I also pose the normative question of whether individualÕs attitudes towards 
inequality are ÔgoodÕ for support for the EU:  that is, whether or not individualÕs 
attitudes towards inequality, beyond both the structural constraints and beyond the 
political attitudes can be ÔgoodÕ for support for the EU. This appears to be somewhat 
counter-intuitive, however, the findings from this inquiry demonstrate that it is not 
entirely unreasonable to make this claim. The findings in Chapter Five and Chapter 
Six (cross-national case study of the twenty-seven member states of the EU and the 
single case study of the Republic of Ireland) show that individuals who want 
inequality to be addressed are receptive to further European integration despite their 
dissatisfaction with the current performance of the EU in addressing inequality. The 
findings demonstrate that support for the EU via individualÕs concerns about 
addressing inequality suggests a resilient connection between inequality and the 
strong democratic enforcement that the EU could offer. While individuals have 
disapproved of the EUÕs response to the economic and financial crisis so far, the 
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findings from Chapter Seven (cross-national case study of the EU considering 
whether or not the EU is best placed to take effective actin against the economic and 
financial crisis) do confirm that the EU has a positive role to play. The findings in 
Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven demonstrate that inequality, as a 
determinant of mass public opinion, is ÔgoodÕ for individual-level support for the EU. 
It is this distinction that makes the study of inequality as determinant for support for 
the EU innovative, provocative and distinct.  
8.4: Future Research Directions  
Throughout this inquiry a mixed methods approach was used in order to 
examine the role of inequality and support for the EU since the onset of the economic 
and financial crisis of 2007/8. Firstly, a quantitative study using cross-national data 
from the EES in 2009 used multi-level modelling, specifically, HLM, to investigate 
the impact of inequality on mass public opinion support for the EU. This cross-
national EES 2009 data was then used to conduct a single case study of the Republic 
of Ireland using an OLS Multiple Regression model to test this theory. As a 
consequence of the findings of the cross-national examination and the single case 
study of Ireland that individuals in both the twenty-seven member states of the EU 
and the Republic of Ireland believe that inequality should be addressed and that it is 
the responsibility of the EU and not an EU member state to address inequality 
therefore increasing support for the EU project, Eurobarometer data from 2009-2013 
was used to conduct a Binary Logit Regression model. This examination was 
conducted to determine the impact individuals economic insecurity had on support for 
the EU across all twenty-seven EU member states and strengthen the findings of the 
first empirical analyses of the cross-national examination and single case study of 
Ireland. The findings from all three empirical chapters demonstrate that individualsÕ 
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concerns about inequality, economic insecurity and redistribution will lead to 
individuals to look toward the EU rather than the nation state for effective action from 
EU institutions to address inequality and as a consequence individuals support both 
enlargement and deepening of the EU project. Overall, individuals display robust 
support for the EU since the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
This mixed methods, quantitative approach, was used because in recent years 
there has been a surge in research, which aims to integrate what we know about 
citizensÕ political behaviour with what we know about macro-level differences across 
countries. This inquiry aims to understand the macro-level differences across all 
twenty-seven member states of the EU, as well as the Republic of Ireland, if 
economic insecurity, perceptions of inequality and normative concerns about 
democratic institutions to ameliorate market-generated inequality has a positive 
impact on support for the EU. HLM was selected as a method in the first instance 
because it is often considered to be superior to OLS because it theoretically produces 
appropriate error terms that control for potential dependency due to nesting effects 
while OLS does not. An additional argument favouring the use of HLM is that it is a 
generalization of OLS which better handles continuous variables that reflect 
randomized effect designs and therefore HLM produces more accurate error terms.  
The great advantage of the single case study of Ireland is that by focusing on a single 
case tit can be extensively examined and can makes an important contribution to the 
establishment of general propositions and thus to building upon the theory under 
examination here in this inquiry.  
From this research on the role of inequality and how this has had an effect on 
individual-level political behaviour and attitudes towards the EU since the beginning 
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of the economic and financial crisis in 2007/8 there are two areas of future research, 
which I have been identified and should be undertaken.  
The first is an extension of the current research and would aim to be a 
longitudinal study of the existing theoretical mechanism, whereby individuals regard 
the EU as an enforcer of democratic competencies at both the EU and nation state 
level, thus allowing the EU to act as the institutional driving force to address market-
generated inequality in their respective nation states. Using quantitative methods and 
European Election Studies data from 1979-2009 (including 2014 data once released), 
and Standard Eurobarometer data from 1973-2014 an examination of how member 
states of the EU perceive the question of how inequality should be addressed would 
be tested. Should inequality be addressed at the nation state level, or at the EU level? 
In addition, because this is a longitudinal study, the inquiry would trace the influence 
that EU membership has had on the question of addressing inequality and whether the 
direction of this relationship would be positive or negative as membership of the EU 
became embedded within the psyche of the nation state. In the first instance, the EES 
are about electoral participation and voting behaviour in EP elections. However, they 
are also concerned with the evolution of a EU political community and a European 
public sphere with citizensÕ perceptions of and preferences in relation to the EU 
political regime and with their evaluations of EU political performance. Standard 
Eurobarometer data regularly monitors mass public opinion in EU member states, 
with each survey consisting of approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews in each of 
the twenty-seven member states of the EU and reports published twice a year (Spring 
and Autumn) based on new samples but with a repeated cross-section design. The 
standard modules ask for attitudes towards European unification, institutions and 
policies, in conjunction with measurements for socio-political orientations, as well as 
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respondent and household demographics. By using Standard Eurobarometer data 
snapshots of individual-level attitudes towards inequality and support for the EU 
would be able to be examined specifically (i.e. individuals attitudes towards 
inequality and support for the EU in Spring and Autumn of a given year), as well as 
assessing inequality through the lens of EU membership and the effect this has had on 
the question of addressing inequality. This would also allow cross-comparison to be 
made between two sets of longitudinal data: the EES and Standard Eurobarometer.   
The second area of future research is a something of a point of departure from 
current research and focuses upon regionalism in the United Kingdom and the effect 
this has on mass public opinion towards the EU. In particular it aims to examine how 
mass public opinion towards the EU is determined in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. It would include an evaluation of the impact of devolution on the EU debate, 
whether or not this can be regarded as a determinant of EU support in all three regions 
and if this is in fact a causal factor which allows for the differentiation between mass 
public opinion in all three regions and the Eurosceptic element in British mass public 
opinion.  
In broad terms, Scotland tends to be most in favour of remaining in the EU 
with positive attitudes to the EU viewed in a utilitarian manner. However, what 
impact will the referendum on Scottish independence in September 2014 have on 
mass public opinion in Scotland towards the EU? Will membership of the EU in 
Scotland continue to be supported following the outcome of the 2014 referendum? 
Wales is the least supportive region of the EU in the UK, despite being a benefactor 
of net receipts and/or funds such as European Agricultural Rural Development Fund, 
Common Agricultural Policy, European Regional Development Fund, European 
Social Fund, and specific investment programmes such as JESSICA and JEREMIE. 
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The cost benefit approach of EU membership fails to resonate with Welsh mass 
public opinion-why? Finally, mass public opinion in Northern Ireland has become 
more supportive of the EU since UK accession in 1973 and is now one of the least 
Eurosceptic regions within the UK. The transformation in attitudes is unexpected 
given the scarce attention the EU receives in national media and from the government 
in Stormont. This research is in a preliminary stage however to operationalize this 
research, quantitative methods will be employed and comprehensive analysis of mass 
public opinion surveys (notably Standard Eurobarometer, European Election Studies, 
British Election Study and Northern Irish Election Study data in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland) will be conducted.   
This future research will continue to fill the existing gap in the literature 
surrounding individual perceptions of inequality as a determinant of EU support, by 
extending the perception of inequality as a determinant longitudinally and analysing 
whether individualsÕ desire for the EU to address inequality is, or is not, exclusive to 
the post economic and financial crisis period of 2007-8. Secondly, this future research 
will aim to demonstrate the regional variation (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
of mass public opinion in the UK and establish a determinant for this variation, which 
can be inserted into the enduring model of mass public opinion of EU support.  
8.5: Conclusion  
This inquiry has been both ontological and etiological. The former relates to 
the inductive nature of this inquiry. Is inequality a significant determinant in 
determining individual-level mass public opinion towards the EU since the beginning 
of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8? In addition, is there substantive and 
provocative evidence that individuals have re-oriented themselves to the new 
political, economic and social realities since the onset of the economic and financial 
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crisis of 2007/8? Does this belief affect their political attitudes, behaviour and 
orientations towards the EU?  
The latter informs our understanding of individualÕs perceptions of inequality. 
Put simply, how has the economic and financial crisis, which began in 2007/8 
influenced individualsÕ attitudes and orientations towards inequality and thus their 
support for the EU? Combining the answers of both sets of questions, I arrive at the 
conclusion that individualsÕ attitudes towards inequality and how inequality should be 
addressed should be included as a determinant of support for the EU since the onset of 
the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8.  
Overall, the study of inequality is an amalgamation of individualÕs satisfaction 
with democracy, the liberal market economy and inequality when assessing 
individual-level support for the EU. The distribution of the goods of society is 
represented by income and attendant socio-economic supports to income such as 
social welfare benefits and pensions, the ability to spend disposable income and 
access to complementary aspects of income such as health and education. It is from 
the distribution of the goods of society that individuals will perceive that there is more 
inequality since the onset of the economic crisis of 2007-8.  
In order to address inequality or perceptions of inequality, the role of 
democratic institutions is examined and found to provide solutions to market 
generated inequality.  When this is combined with national-level contextual factors 
what individuals regard as excessive inequality has little to do with inequality per se 
but more to do with whether the liberal market economy of the EU as a whole is 
providing high living standards and dynamic economic development. As a result of 
individualsÕ concerns about inequality being closely related to normative values such 
  274 
as fairness and justice in society (Kreidl 2000; Verwiebe & Wegener 2000; Osberg & 
Smeeding 2006; Loveless & Whitefield 2011) and the fact that these views are not 
strictly egalitarian, in this inquiry individualÕs attitudes and perceptions of inequality 
in fact diminishes GabelÕs (1998a & 1998b) ÔwinnersÕ and ÔlosersÕ of European 
integration. This inquiry therefore creates a ÔnewÕ group of ÔwinnersÕ or ÔlosersÕ thesis 
when assessing support for the EU in a normative way.  
By broadening the comparative analysis on inequality from the Central and 
Eastern European member states of the EU to a cross-national examination of the 
twenty-seven member states of the EU, and a single case study of the Republic of 
Ireland, this inquiry has sought to broaden the scope of the study of inequality by 
examining hypothesised effects on individual-level support for the EU since the onset 
of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. In doing so, individual-level effects on 
the perception of inequality in the complex social setting of the beginning of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 have been established, which in turn identifies 
the significant role inequality plays when analysing mass public opinion support for 
the EU.  
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